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Wednesday, December 22, 2021
Mutual divorce - Parties lived together only for three days, after which they have Mutual divorce - Parties lived together only for three days, after which they have separated on account of irreconcilable differences Decree of mutual divorce by waiving separated on account of irreconcilable differences Decree of mutual divorce by waiving statutory waiting period of six months- Supreme Court
Monday, December 20, 2021
Is it mandatory for plaintiff to give full description of suit property?
with its full description including boundaries thereof as
required in Order 7 rule 3 of the civil procedure code, as
amended in state of Maharashtra and cannot suppress the
market value of the Suit property from the court, as required to
be stated for the purposes of valuation of the suit for the
purpose of jurisdiction of the court as also for payment of the
Court fee.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
FIRST APPEAL NO. 729 OF 2013
Kishorbhai Premchand Shah V HIRJI BHOJRAJ & SONS
CORAM:-A. P. BHANGALE, J.
DATED : 2/9/2013
Citation;2014(2) MHLJ187 Bom
The appeal is directed against the
order dated
22-10-2011 passed in Civil Suit No. 1711 of 2010 below Ex. 6
passed by the Learned City Civil judge , City Civil Court
Mumbai rejecting the plaint under order 7 Rule 11 (d) of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
The plaintiff claimed as transferee, occupant and ownership of the premises being Room No. 3, Mahavir
Building. According to the Plaintiff there was a clause 10 of re conveyance in earlier written agreement for Sale dated
31-03-1957 between Occupant Kishorbhai Premchand Shah
and charitable Trust (Defendant no. 1). The Trust issued notice
to the Plaintiff on 04-07-1988 to enforce clause 10 of the
agreement offering sum of Rs 1575/- by cheque and sought re-
acquisition of the suit premises on the basis of clause 10 and
offered monthly tenancy of the suit premises at the rate of Rs
50/- to the Plaintiff . The Plaintiff rejected the offer of tenancy,
disputing the right of the Trust under clause 10 of the
Agreement dated 31-03-1957 to re-conveyance of suit
premises.
It is case of the Plaintiff that plaintiff took objection after the Trust decided to dispose off it’s property by
a Public notice dated 28-01-2009 published in ‘Mumbai
Samachar’Gujrathi News Paper and objected by letter dated
21-02-2009 . Trust replied and denied the statements made by
the Plaintiff by reply dated 02-03-2009. Thus Plaintiff had
filed S.C suit 1711 of 2010 for declaration that he holds and
occupy the suit premises; with full and complete ownership
challenging clause 10 and 14 of the Agreement for Sale dated
31-03-1957 as void and have no legal effect, with an prayer for
permanent injunction restraining Defendants from interfering
with the Plaintiff’s Possession, on the basis of clause 10 and 14
of the Agreement dated 31-03-1957.
The Suit was valued for Rs 1000/-only mentioning
clause Section 6 (iv) (j) of the Bombay Court Fees Act though
the Plaintiff was seeking declaration as to ownership of the Suit
property and also seeking relief to declare that clauses 10 and
14 of the Agreement dated 31-03-1957 are void.
The Trial Court had noticed after hearing the
Parties and upon perusal of the Plaint that the Plaintiff claimed
declaration that She is occupying the suit property as Owner
and also that the clauses 10 and 14 of the Agreement dated
31-03-1957 as Void. The Plaintiff had knowledge about the
notice dated 04-07-1988 (vide Para 6 of the Plaint) from the
Trust but She claimed that suit premises was allegedly
purchased by her in 1994. Learned Trial Judge applied Art 58
of the Limitation Act, 1963 whereby the period of Limitation is
three years reckoned from when the Trust gave notice dated 04-
07-1988 to the Plaintiff’s predecessor of enforcing the clause
10 of agreement dated 31-03-1957 while offering Tenancy to
the Plaintiff’s predecessor, who had rejected the offer of
Tenancy. No Suit was filed within three years from 04-07-1988
when the right to Sue first accrued in favour of the Plaintiff or
her predecessor. Thus it was observed by a reasoned order that
the Suit was barred under Art 58 of limitation Act as filed
beyond period of Limitation.
The Court also found that the Suit was not valued properly for the purposes of the Court fees and jurisdiction.
Learned Trial Judge refereed to Section 6 (iv)(d) of the
Bombay court fees Act and observed that 1⁄4 th ad valorem fee
was leviable on the market value of the Suit property. Valuation for the purposes of the Court fees and jurisdiction was made at Rs 1000/- only as stated in Para 23 of the Plaint
despite the fact that the residential property is situated at Matunga, prime area in City of Mumbai where market price cannot be less than Ten Lakhs.
It is true that the plaintiff is free to make his or her own estimation of the reliefs sought in the Plaint. But if
meager, arbitrary, and unreasonable the valuation appears Court can consider the prayers made and valuation made for reliefs of declaration and injunction in respect ownership title claimed over suit property, and may reject the plaint if
valuation for the purposes of the Court fees and jurisdiction is
found deliberately wrong.
In the Plaint valuation was stated in Para 23 thus;
“23.The Plaintiff values the relief claimed in the Suit at Rs 1000/- and has paid the court fees accordingly”
This was deliberate, bald and vague statement in mischievous
disregard to the relevant provisions of the Suit valuation Act as
well as the the Bombay court Fees Act or willful ignorance of
relevant provisions of law to avoid revenue. By improper and unjust valuation with scant disregard for the provisions of the
Suit valuation Act and the provisions of the Bombay Court
Fees Act the plaintiff can not allowed to get away from the
fiscal liability before approaching the Court of law.
No care was taken by the Plaintiff to cure the defect of wrong valuation and vagueness in description of
the suit property despite the fact that specific written objections
were taken by the defendant. The Plaintiff could have valued
the Suit separately for the purposes of the Court fees and
jurisdiction of the Court as contemplated under the
Suit Valuation Act and mentioning the relevant provision of the
Bombay Court fees Act. Valuation for the purposes of the Court fees and for the purposes of the jurisdiction may also be the same. But when the plaintiff in substance wanted to claim the declaration as to the right , title as Owner of the immovable
residential property situated at Matunga, prime area in City of
Mumbai capable being valued in terms of money preferably by the Government ready reckoner price and was duty bound to state the market price of the property by reasonably estimating the suit for the purposes of valuation of the Suit and for
jurisdiction of the Court and ought to have made payment of
ad valorem court fees stating the relevant provisions briefly for
benefit of the ministerial officer of the Court for to file the
plaint. . This was not done even till plaint was rejected by the
Court and not even till this appellate stage. The plaintiff must
be vigilant to give description of the immovable suit property
with its full description including boundaries thereof as required in Order 7 rule 3 of the civil procedure code, as amended in state of Maharashtra and cannot suppress the market value of the Suit property from the court, as required to be stated for the purposes of valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction of the court as also for payment of the Court fees. The relevant facts which need to be looked into for whether to return or reject the plaint are the deciding averments made in the plaint. The trial Court can exercise the power to reject the plaint at any stage of the suit even before
registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant
or at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of O.7, R. 11, the averments in the plaint are the relevant and not
the defence pleas taken by the defendant in the written
statement. Defence would be wholly irrelevant at the stage of
rejection of the plaint under order 7 Rule 11 (Saleembhai &
Ors. v. AIR 2003 SC 759). Hence no fault is found with the
impugned order rejecting the Plaint as barred by Article 58 of
the Limitation Act as also the plaintiff continued to run the risk
of rejecting of plaint due to wrong valuation for the purposes of
the Court fees and jurisdiction in view of the provisions under
Order 7 rule 11 (d) of the Code of Civil procedure
For all the reasons stated no interference is
required by this Court with the impugned reasoned order. The
(A.P. BHANGALE, J.)
appeal lacks merits and is dismissed with cost
Sunday, December 12, 2021
बलात्कार की पीड़िता को डीएनए टेस्ट कराने के लिए मजबूर नहीं किया जा सकता': POCSO मामले में इलाहाबाद हाईकोर्ट ने कहा
आगे यह भी कहा गया कि कथित घटना के इतने लंबे समय के बाद बलात्कार की पीड़िता को डीएनए परीक्षण के लिए मजबूर नहीं किया जा सकता है। पृष्ठभूमि इस मामले में अतिरिक्त सत्र न्यायाधीश सुल्तानपुर के 25 जून 2021 के आदेश के खिलाफ पीड़िता की मां ने पुनरीक्षण(रिवीजन) याचिका दायर की थी। 14 वर्षीय पीड़ित लड़की के साथ सात महीने पहले कथित तौर पर बलात्कार किया गया था, जिसके परिणामस्वरूप वह गर्भवती हो गई। जिसके बाद थाना कोतवाली देहात, जिला सुल्तानपुर में भारतीय दंड संहिता की धारा 376, 504, 506 और यौन अपराधों से बच्चों का संरक्षण अधिनियम, 2012, (पॉक्सो) अधिनियम की धारा 3/4 के तहत मामला दर्ज किया गया था।
बेटी के गर्भवती होने की खबर मिलने पर पीड़िता की मां ने आरोपी से उसकी शादी कराने की कोशिश की थी लेकिन आरोपी के पिता ने इस तरह के प्रस्ताव से इनकार कर दिया। इसके अलावा, मुकदमे की सुनवाई के दौरान, आरोपी को किशोर घोषित कर दिया गया था, जिसके परिणामस्वरूप मामला ट्रायल कोर्ट से किशोर न्याय बोर्ड, सुल्तानपुर में स्थानांतरित कर दिया गया। नतीजतन, आरोपी ने किशोर न्याय बोर्ड के समक्ष पीड़िता का डीएनए परीक्षण कराने के लिए एक आवेदन दिया। 25 मार्च, 2021 को किशोर न्याय बोर्ड ने पूरे तथ्यों और परिस्थितियों और रिकॉर्ड पर उपलब्ध सबूतों पर विचार करने के बाद डीएनए टेस्ट करवाने की मांग वाले आवेदन को खारिज कर दिया।
किशोर न्याय बोर्ड ने अपने आदेश में कहा था कि पीड़िता की जांच के लिए इस तरह का आवेदन केवल उसी चरण में दायर किया जा सकता है जब सीआरपीसी की धारा 313 के तहत बचाव पक्ष के गवाहों के बयान दर्ज किए जा रहे हों। बोर्ड ने आगे यह भी कहा था कि पीड़ित बच्चे को डीएनए टेस्ट के लिए भेजने से मुकदमे में और देरी होगी, जबकि क़ानून के प्रावधानों के तहत मुकदमे की सुनवाई को जल्दी से समाप्त किया जाना चाहिए। इसके बाद, किशोर न्याय बोर्ड के आदेश के खिलाफ, आरोपी ने अतिरिक्त सत्र न्यायाधीश, सुल्तानपुर के समक्ष एक आपराधिक अपील दायर की, जिसने 25 जून, 2021 के आदेश के तहत डीएनए परीक्षण करवाने की मांग वाले आवेदन को अनुमति दे दी। कोर्ट का निष्कर्ष न्यायालय ने पाया कि अतिरिक्त सत्र न्यायाधीश, सुल्तानपुर ने आक्षेपित आदेश पारित करते हुए भारत के संविधान के अनुच्छेद 14--21 के प्रावधानों की अनदेखी की है। आगे यह भी कहा कि पीड़िता का डीएनए टेस्ट करवाने की अनुमति देने का कोई कारण नहीं था क्योंकि विचाराधीन मुद्दा यह है कि क्या बलात्कार का अपराध किया गया था और न कि क्या आरोपी बच्चे का पिता है? पुनरीक्षण याचिका की अनुमति देते हुए कोर्ट ने कहा, ''25.06.2021 के आदेश को खारिज किया जाता है और किशोर बोर्ड के दिनांक 25.03.2021 के आदेश की पुष्टि इस संशोधन के अधीन की जाती है कि सीआरपीसी की धारा 313 के तहत इस तरह के आवेदन के संबंध में बोर्ड के अवलोकन ( कि उसके गुणदोष के आधार पर विचार किया जाएगा) को भी संशोधनवादी (रिविजनिस्ट)के खिलाफ इस तरह नहीं पढ़ा जाएगा कि कथित घटना के इतने लंबे समय के बाद बलात्कार की पीड़िता को डीएनए परीक्षण के लिए मजबूर किया जा सकता है।''
Collector has to assess market value of land taking into account sale consideration reflected in exemplar deeds and not on the basis of minimum rates.
Court No. - 38
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 53843 of 2010
Petitioner :- Pratap Singh
Respondent :- State of U.P. and Others
Counsel for Petitioner :- Rajesh Kumar Mishra
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.
Heard Shri Rajesh Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Awadhesh Chandra Srivastava, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents.
By means of this petition, the petitioner seeks to challenge the order dated 31.12.2009 passed by the Additional District Magistrate (Finance & Revenue), Moradabad in Case No.407/09 under Section 33/40/47 of the Indian Stamp Act, 18991 whereby, by means of an ex-parte order, deficiency of stamp has been imposed upon the petitioner while relying upon the report dated 16.10.2009 of the Assistant Inspector General of Registration. Further under challenge is the order dated 26.05.2010 passed by the Additional Commissioner (Administration), Moradabad Mandal, Moradabad, whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 56 of the Act, being Appeal No.74/2009-10, has been partly allowed by reducing the amount of penalty imposed upon the petitioner.
The facts as mentioned in the petition are that the petitioner purchased an area of 0.002 hectares from Khasra No.869-Ka, an area of 0.130 hectares from Khasra No.948 and an area of 0.255 hectares from Khasra No.950, totalling 0.387 hectares in Village-Bhogpur, Mithauni, Tehsil & District-Moradabad by means of a sale-deed executed on 27.09.2007, which was registered thereafter. It is stated that the aforesaid land was purchased for agricultural purposes and the stamp duty was paid in accordance with the minimum rates specified by the Collector. The name of the petitioner was also mutated in the revenue records. It is alleged that the respondent no.2 passed the impugned order dated 31.12.2009 without issuance of summons or notice to the petitioner, in which it was held that the plots in question are for residential usage and, therefore, deficiency of stamp duty of Rs.1,38,400/- and penalty of Rs.1,38,400/- alongwith interest at the rate of 1.5% per mensem were imposed. It is stated that on coming to know of the ex-parte order passed by the respondent no.2, an appeal was filed by the petitioner before the Additional Commissioner (Administration) which was partly allowed by reducing the amount of penalty imposed, though no error was found in the order of the respondent no.2 in assessing the land in question as residential.
The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that an ex-parte report of the Assistant Inspector General of Registration has been relied upon by the respondent no.2 to record a finding regarding evasion of duty which could not have been relied upon by the authority in view of the judgment of this Court in the matter of Ram Khelawan alias Bachcha v. State of U.P. and another2. It is further contended that the vendors of the sale-deed in question had sold their entire share of the land on the khasra numbers to the petitioner, and the admitted terms of the habendum clause appearing in the sale-deed reflect that the land in question was bhumidhari over which agricultural activities were being carried on. The learned counsel states that the order of the respondent no.2 was passed ex-parte without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It is further contended that the Additional Commissioner (Administration), in the appellate order, has committed an error of law in affirming the order of the respondent no.2 and that neither the penalty nor the deficiency in stamp duty could have been imposed upon the petitioner under the facts and circumstances of the present case.
Learned Standing Counsel has opposed the writ petition stating that the report of the Assistant Inspector General of Registration dated 16.10.2009 has referred to three exemplar sale-deeds pertaining to parts of land of those very Khasra numbers that were sold to other persons in which the purpose for purchase was stated to be residential. The contention is that, accordingly, no fault exists in the order of the respondent no.2 on this ground and, also on the ground that the service of notice on the petitioner was deemed sufficient.
It is noticed, as is admitted, that the impugned order dated 31.12.2009 was ex-parte. It is not the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that any restoration application was filed on behalf of the petitioner in respect of the aforesaid order dated 31.12.2009. The petitioner straightaway proceeded to file the appeal under Section 56 of the Act. The grounds of appeal, that has been enclosed as Annexure-6 to the writ petition, do not contain any ground with regard to the non-receipt of notice. Among the grounds raised is of lack of opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. In view of the aforesaid, the affirmation on behalf of the petitioner that no notice was received by him, is belied. The order of the respondent no.2, Additional District Magistrate, has been passed relying upon the report of the Assistant Inspector General of Registration dated 16.10.2009 in which it was mentioned that portions of lands of those very Khasra numbers, were subject of instrument Nos.4894/05, 601/06 and 2463/07 on which stamp duty on the basis of the residential rates was paid. The respondent no.2 has observed that since neither the petitioner nor his counsel had appeared nor any objection was filed, it would be deemed that he accepts the report and notice. Accordingly, the deficiency in stamp duty and penalty were imposed.
Annexure-5 is the report made by the Assistant Inspector General of Registration dated 16.10.2009. The relevant part of the report dated 16.10.2009 is extracted below:-
"...........
अधोहस्ताक्षरित द्वारा अर्द्धनगरीय एवं उपान्त क्षेत्र के कृषि आधारित मूल्यांकन वाले विक्रय विलेखों के मूल्यांकन जांच के क्रम में उक्त विक्रय विलेख मेरे संज्ञान में आया। अभिलेखों के अवलोकन से खसरा न० 869, 948 व 950 स्थित ग्राम भोगपुर मिठौनी से सम्पत्ति क्रय की गयी तथा आवासीय दर के मूल्यांकन पर स्टाम्प शुल्क अदा किया गया है। उक्त प्रकार के कतिपय विलेखों का विवरण निम्न सारिणी में दिया जा रहा हैः-
क्रमांक
विक्रय विलेख संख्या
निष्पादन तिथि
खसरा न०
अन्तरित क्षेत्रफल (वर्ग मी० में)
दर प्रति वर्ग मी०
मूल्यांकन जिस पर स्टाम्प शुल्क अदा किया गया
अदा किया गया स्टाम्प शुल्क
1.
4894/05
9.11.05
869, 948, 950
140.00
1500
210000
21000
2.
601/06
8.2.06
948
132.47
1500
199000
20000
3.
2463/07
5.4.07
869, 948, 950
245.91
1600
394000
31600
उपरोक्त सारिणी के अवलोकन से स्पष्ट है कि खसरा न० 869, 948, 950 स्थित ग्राम भोगपुर मिठौनी से सम्बन्धित विक्रय विलेख संख्या 4894/05, 601/06 तथा 2463/07 का निबन्धन किया गया तथा निर्धारित आवासीय दर के मूल्यांकन पर स्टाम्प शुल्क अदा किया गया है। एक ही ग्राम एक ही एक ही खसरे की भूमि के दो दर्रो के आधार पर सम्पत्ति के बाजार मूल्य का निर्धारण किया जाना तर्क संगत एवं विधि सम्मत् नही है कि सारिणी में उल्लिखित विलेख विवादित विलेख संख्या 5733/07 के द्वारा अन्तरित सम्पत्ति के मूल्यांकन हेतु उपयुक्त एवं तर्क संगत पूर्व दृष्टांत / दृष्टांत स्टजित करते है। ....."
As is evident from the report, as extracted above, that three specific exemplar deeds have been relied upon by the Assistant Inspector General of Registration to reflect the residential usage over the land in question.
In the decision of Ram Khelawan (supra), a coordinate Bench of this Court had made an observation that no reliance can be placed on an ex-parte report for deciding the case. It was observed that the ex-parte inspection report may be relevant for initiating the proceedings under Section 47-A of the Act and after initiation of the case, inspection is to be made by the Collector or the authority hearing the case after due notice to the parties to the instrument as provided under Rule 7(3)(c) of the U.P. Stamp (Valuation of Property) Rules, 1997.
Though this Court is in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations made by this Court in the case of Ram Khelawan (supra), however, in the present case at hand, the ex-parte report specifically refers to three exemplar instruments that were considered by the Assistant Inspector General of Registration while making his report. It was, therefore, open for the District Magistrate, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, where despite notice, neither any objection was filed on behalf of the petitioner nor had any advocate appeared on his behalf, to rely upon the ex-parte report which was based upon the exemplar deeds. It is always open to the Collector or the authority undertaking an examination of an instrument under Section 47-A(3) of the Act, to refer to exemplar deeds for the purpose of ascertaining the market value even though they may form part of an ex-parte report that has led to the initiation of the proceedings under Section 47-A(3) of the Act. Therefore, no fault can be attributable to the respondent no.2 in relying upon the three exemplar deeds that find mention in the ex-parte report dated 16.10.2009. In view of the above, the order of the Additional Commissioner, upholding the order of the respondent no.2, cannot faulted as far as this aspect is concerned.
However, the matter of concern in the present petition is that despite relying upon the aforesaid exemplar deeds, the respondent no.2 has proceeded to assess the value of the land in question on the basis of the minimum rates prescribed by the Collector. This could not have been done in view of the express provisions of Section 47-A(3) of the Act that is also relied in the judgment of this Court in Ram Khelawan (supra) and several other decisions. In the decision of a three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Pushpa Sareen vs. State of U.P.3, it has been held as follows:-
"26. The true test for determination by the Collector is the market value of the property on the date of the instrument because, under the provisions of the Act, every instrument is required to be stamped before or at the time of execution. In making that determination, the Collector has to be mindful of the fact that the market value of the property may vary from location to location and is dependent upon a large number of circumstances having a bearing on the comparative advantages or disadvantages of the land as well as the use to which the land can be put on the date of the execution of the instrument.
27. Undoubtedly, the Collector is not permitted to launch upon a speculative inquiry about the prospective use to which a land may be put to use at an uncertain future date. The market value of the property has to be determined with reference to the use to which the land is capable reasonably of being put to immediately or in the proximate future. The possibility of the land becoming available in the immediate or near future for better use and enjoyment reflects upon the potentiality of the land. This potential has to be assessed with reference to the date of the execution of the instrument. In other words, the power of the Collector cannot be unduly circumscribed by ruling out the potential to which the land can be advantageously deployed at the time of the execution of the instrument or a period reasonably proximate thereto. Again the use to which land in the area had been put is a material consideration. If the land surrounding the property in question has been put to commercial use, it would be improper to hold that this is a circumstance which should not weigh with the Collector as a factor which influences the market value of the land.
28. The fact that the land was put to a particular use, say for instance a commercial purpose at a later point in time, may not be a relevant criterion for deciding the value for the purpose of stamp duty, as held by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. and others v. Ambrish Tandon and another, (2012) 5 SCC 566. This is because the nature of the user is relateable to the date of purchase which is relevant for the purpose of computing the stamp duty. Where, however, the potential of the land can be assessed on the date of the execution of the instrument itself, that is clearly a circumstance which is relevant and germane to the determination of the true market value. At the same time, the exercise before the Collector has to be based on adequate material and cannot be a matter of hypothesis or surmise. The Collector must have material on the record to the effect that there has been a change of use or other contemporaneous sale-deeds in respect of the adjacent areas that would have a bearing on the market value of the property which is under consideration. The Collector, therefore, would be within jurisdiction in referring to exemplars or comparable sale instances which have a bearing on the true market value of the property which is required to be assessed. If the sale instances are comparable, they would also reflect the potentiality of the land which would be taken into consideration in a price agreed upon between a vendor and a purchaser."
Accordingly, the impugned order of the respondent no.2 dated 31.12.2009, insofar as it assesses the valuation of the land in question on the basis of the minimum rates, is set aside. The order of the Additional Commissioner (Administration) dated 26.05.2010 is also set aside insofar as it affirms the order of the respondent no.2 assessing the market value on the basis of the minimum rates. The matter is remitted to the respondent no.2 or the competent authority who may be seized of the matter, to assess the market value taking into account the monetary consideration reflected in the exemplar deeds aforesaid or any other exemplar deeds, and not on the basis of the minimum rates. This exercise shall be done by the authority concerned within a period of three months from today. Since the petitioner is represented, no separate notice is required to be sent to him. It is, however, provided that the petitioner shall appear before the respondent no.2 on 22.12.2021 alongwith a certified copy of the order passed today, whereafter dates may be fixed. In case of failure of the petitioner in appearing on that day, it will be open to the authority concerned to proceed in accordance with law.
In view of the aforesaid observations and to the extent mentioned above, this writ petition is allowed.
Order Date :-07.12.2021
Saturday, November 27, 2021
‘जन्म देने वाली माँ से ज्यादा हक उसे पालने वाली का’ – 10 साल की बच्ची के लिए लड़ाई, मद्रास हाई कोर्ट का अहम फैसला
Tuesday, November 2, 2021
Anomaly of Medical Report can not be seen in the petition of 482: Allahabad High Court
Monday, November 1, 2021
एक्सिडेंट के समय प्रीमियम का भुगतान नहीं तो क्या क्लेम मिलेगा? सुप्रीम कोर्ट का अहम फैसला
सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने कहा कि किश्त भुगतान की तारीख 14 अक्टूबर 2011 को थी लेकिन भुगतान नहीं किया गया और 6 मार्च 2012 को एक्सिडेंट हुआ और 9 मार्च को जब बकाये किश्त का भुगतान किया गया तो एलआईसी को एक्सिडेंट के बारे में नहीं बताया गया और यह सब जानबूझकर गलत इरादे से किया गया। एलआईसी पॉलिसी की शर्तों में कहा गया है कि जब एक्सिडेंट होगा तब पॉलिसी जारी रहनी चाहिए लेकिन इस मामले में 14 अक्टूबर 2011 को किश्त भुगतान नहीं किए जाने के कारण पॉलिसी लैप्स कंडिशन में थी और 6 मार्च 2012 को जब एक्सिडेंट हुआ तो पॉलिसी प्रभाव में नहीं था। ऐसे में शिकायती का एक्सिडेंट बेनिफिट का दावा सच्चाई वाला नहीं है।
सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने कहा कि एक्स्ट्रा बेनिफिट के तौर पर एक्सिडेंट क्लेम नहीं मिल सकता क्योंकि जिन दिन एक्सिडेंट हुआ उस दिन पॉलिसी फोर्स में नहीं था। पॉलिसी 14 अक्टूबर 2011 से लैप्स कंडिशन में था और 6 मार्च 2012 को घटना वाले दिन फोर्स में नहीं था ऐसे में एक्सिडेंट बेनिफिट का एक्स्ट्रा क्लेम नहीं मिेलेगा। सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने नैशनल कंज्यूमर फोरम के फैसले को खारिज कर दिया।
Friday, October 29, 2021
राष्ट्रीय स्वयंसेवक संघ की तुलना तालिबान से करने वाले व्यक्ति की अग्रिम ज़मानत याचिका हाई कोर्ट से ख़ारिज
अदालत के समक्ष, राज्य ने प्रस्तुत किया कि अतुल ने उपद्रव किया और जनता की धार्मिक भावनाओं को भड़काया।
दूसरी ओर, आरोपी वकील ने प्रस्तुत किया कि उसे मामले में झूठा फंसाया गया था और उसने कभी भी किसी संगठन या धर्म के खिलाफ ऐसी टिप्पणी नहीं की।
दलीलों को सुनने के बाद, अदालत ने फैसला सुनाया कि उसके खिलाफ पर्याप्त सबूत हैं और उसकी याचिका को खारिज कर दिया
Thursday, October 14, 2021
Suit can be dismissed if the same is barred by limitation
Tuesday, October 5, 2021
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 374 – Appeals from convictions – In an appeal from a judgment of conviction, the Appellate Court is required not only to review, but re-appreciate the entire evidence on record afresh, and determine for itself, whether the prosecution have succeeded in establishing the charge against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
The only point that arises for determination in this revision is about the duties of the AppellateCourt under Section 374 of the Code, while hearing and determining an appeal from a judgment of conviction.
The Appellate Court has not done any reassessment of evidence afresh, but has merely surveyed it. That the Appellate has done by detailing the evidence in the judgment. There is hardly any appraisal done by the AppellateCourt to find out for itself, whether the prosecution have successfully established the charge against the revisionists, of which they have been convicted by the Trial Court.
Rather, the Appellate Court has expressed its agreement with the Magistrate with remarks to the effect that a criminal appeal can be accepted only if it is shown that the Trial Court has committed any error of fact or law that is manifest, or ignored evidence on record and passed a wrong and illegal order. The Appellate Court has further remarked that a criminal appeal cannot be allowed solely on the ground that a different view of the evidence is possible.
The way, the Appellate Court has opined about the law relating to the duties of the AppellateCourt, while hearing an appeal from a judgment of conviction, it has gone utterly wrong. In an appeal from a judgment of conviction, the Appellate Court is required not only to review, but re-appreciate the entire evidence on record afresh, and determine for itself, whether the prosecution have succeeded in establishing the charge against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Contrary to what the Appellate Court has said, if two views of the evidence are possible, certainly the Appellate Court is duty bound to take the view that favours the accused. This is in keeping with the presumption of innocence of the accused and the jurisdiction that Court exercises in an appeal from conviction, where the entire case is at large for a plenary re-appraisal.
The parameters, by which the Appellate Court has judged the revisionists’ appeal, would be those applicable to a Court of revision or may be to the Appellate Court in some measure, if it were hearing an appeal from a judgment of acquittal; not of conviction.
The Appellate Court has gone utterly wrong about the standard, by which it had to judge the revisionists’ appeal. The impugned judgment cannot, therefore, be sustained. However, since the AppellateCourt has not yet discharged its sacrosanct duties of doing a complete independent re-appraisal of evidence, it is not for this Court to put a terminus to the proceedings. The case must go back to the AppellateCourt for determination of the appeal afresh, after setting aside the impugned judgment.
Important Paragraphs : 5, 6, 7
Case Law Reference
- Lal Mandi v. State of W.B., (1995) 3 SCC 603
CRIMINAL REVISION No. -756 of 2020 Rajan @Raja Ram v. State of U.P.
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