अतिरिक्त साक्ष्य लेने की शक्ति- "सीआरपीसी की धारा 391 सीपीसी के ऑर्डर XLI नियम 27 के समान; अपीलीय कोर्ट को शक्ति का संयम से उपयोग करना चाहिए": इलाहाबाद हाईकोर्ट

आपराधिक संहिता की धारा 391 के तहत प्रदत्त शक्तियां नागरिक प्रक्रिया संहिता के आदेश XLI नियम 27 के समान है, इलाहाबाद हाईकोर्ट ने हाल ही में कहा कि अपीलीय अदालत द्वारा अतिरिक्त साक्ष्य लेने की ऐसी शक्तियों का इस्तेमाल संयम से किया जाना चाहिए। न्यायमूर्ति डॉ. योगेंद्र कुमार श्रीवास्तव की पीठ ने जोर देकर कहा कि इस्तेमाल की जाने वाली इस प्रकार की शक्तियां एक विवेकाधीन प्रकृति की होती हैं और इसका उपयोग साक्ष्य की खामियों को पूरा करने और कमियों को पाटने के लिए नहीं किया जा सकता है।

कोर्ट के समक्ष मामला कोर्ट अतिरिक्त जिला और सत्र न्यायाधीश, हाथरस द्वारा पारित आदेश को रद्द करने के लिए सीआरपीसी की धारा 482 के तहत दायर अर्जी पर विचार कर रहा था, जिसने कुछ व्यक्तियों को गवाह के तौर पर तलब करने के लिए सीआरपीसी की धारा 391 के तहत अदालत के समक्ष दायर अर्जी खर्जी कर दी थी। संक्षेप में तथ्य आवेदक को एक आपराधिक मुकदमे के तहत भारतीय दंड संहिता की धारा 419 और 420 के तहत अतिरिक्त सिविल जज (जूनियर डिवीजन)/जेएम, हाथरस द्वारा पारित एक आदेश के तहत दोषी ठहराया गया था और सजा सुनाई गई थी।

उक्त आदेश से व्यथित, आवेदक ने एक अपील दायर की और अपील के लंबित रहने के दौरान, अपीलीय अदालत द्वारा कुछ व्यक्तियों को गवाह के रूप में बुलाने और अतिरिक्त साक्ष्य रिकॉर्ड पर लाने के लिए सीआरपीसी की धारा 391 के तहत एक अर्जी दायर की थी। सीआरपीसी की धारा 391 के तहत दायर आवेदन को खारिज करते हुए, अपीलीय अदालत ने इस तथ्य पर ध्यान दिया कि अपील पांच साल से अधिक समय बीत जाने के बाद दायर की गई थी, अपील पर बहस नहीं की जा रही थी और गवाहों को बुलाने की मांग करने वाला आवेदन मुकदमे को अटकाने की दृष्टि से दायर किया गया था।
यह भी कहा गया कि आवेदक ने सुनवाई के दौरान उपरोक्त व्यक्तियों को गवाह के रूप में बुलाने के लिए कोई आवेदन नहीं किया था और अपील के स्तर पर उन्हें बुलाने का कोई औचित्य नहीं था। न्यायालय की टिप्पणियां शुरुआत में, कोर्ट ने कहा कि संहिता की धारा 391 अदालत को अपीलीय स्तर पर अतिरिक्त सबूत स्वीकार करने का अधिकार देती है, अगर उसे लगता है कि इस तरह के अतिरिक्त सबूत आवश्यक हैं। इस संबंध में, कोर्ट ने 'रामभाऊ एवं अन्य बनाम महाराष्ट्र सरकार (2001) 4 एससीसी 759' के मामले में सर्वोच्च न्यायालय के फैसले का उल्लेख किया और कहा कि अपवाद की प्रकृति में होने के कारण संहिता की धारा 391 के तहत अतिरिक्त साक्ष्य प्राप्त करने की अपीलीय अदालत की शक्ति को हमेशा सावधानी और समझदारी के साथ इस्तेमाल किया जाना चाहिए, ताकि न्याय का लक्ष्य पूरा किया जा सके।

कोर्ट ने 'जाहिरा हबीबुल्ला एच. शेख एवं अन्य बनाम गुजरात सरकार एवं अन्य (2004) 4 एससीसी 158' का भी उल्लेख किया, जिसमें यह कहा गया था कि हालांकि इस धारा के तहत एक व्यापक विवेकाधिकार प्रदान किया गया है, लेकिन किसी कमी को पाटने के लिए शक्तियों का प्रयोग नहीं किया जा सकता है और अपीलीय अदालत को अतिरिक्त सबूत लेने का निर्देश देते समय इसके कारणों को रिकॉर्ड में लाना आवश्यक था। कोर्ट ने अभियुक्त की याचिका खारिज करते हुए कहा, "इस धारा के तहत शक्तियों को नागरिक प्रक्रिया संहिता, 1908 के आदेश XLI नियम 27 के तहत प्रदत्त शक्तियों समान रखा गया है और इसके मद्देनजर अधिकार के रूप में अपीलीय स्तर पर अतिरिक्त साक्ष्य प्रस्तुत नहीं किए जा सकते हैं और अपीलीय न्यायालय द्वारा इस्तेमाल की जाने वाली शक्तियां विवेकाधिकार, ठोस न्यायिक सिद्धांतों पर आधारित एवं न्याय के हित में होना चाहिए। विवेक का प्रयोग उपयुक्त मामलों में किया जाना होता है, न कि साक्ष्य की खामियों को पूरा करने और कमियों को पाटने के लिए। अतिरिक्त साक्ष्य स्वीकार करने के लिए अपीलीय अदालत द्वारा कारणों को रिकॉर्ड में लेना अनिवार्य बनाया गया है और इसका एक मात्र कारण है कि मुकदमे के बाद के चरण में साक्ष्य को आसानी से स्वीकार करने की प्रवृत्ति पर विराम लगाया जा सके। लागू होने वाला परीक्षण यह है कि क्या साक्ष्य को आगे बढ़ाना केस के न्यायोचित निर्णय के लिए जरूरी है?" 

केस का शीर्षक - रामदास तुरेहा बनाम उ.प्र. सरकार एवं अन्य
स्रोत- लाइव लॉ

Lower appellate Court rightly exercised its power under Order 23, Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code and also rightly held that compromise decree was executable.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 23, Rule 3 and Order 20, Rule 6 (2) - Compromise decree - Plaintiff contends that compromise decree was not executable as it was merely a declaratory decree - Order 23, Rule 3 of Civil Procedure Code deals with compromise of suit and Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded and shall pass decree in accordance therewith, in so far as, it relates to parties to suit, whether or not subject matter of agreement, compromise or satisfaction was same as subject matter of suit - Decree was not merely a declaration - Lower appellate Court rightly exercised its power under Order 23, Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code and also rightly held that said decree was executable.

(LMASLFD1813182)

मद्रास हाईकोर्ट ने मुआवजे की राशि बढ़ाने से किया इंकार

मोटर दुर्घटना का दावा - मुआवजा - की मात्रा - का पता लगाना - दुर्घटना के समय घायल दावेदार की आयु 46 वर्ष थी - उसके बाएं चेहरे, निचले और ऊपरी होंठ, नाक, चेहरे और उसके पूरे शरीर में गंभीर फ्रैक्चर की चोटें लगी थीं - घायल दावेदार था  दस दिनों की अवधि के लिए अस्पताल में इन-पेशेंट के रूप में भर्ती - डॉक्टर ने 20% पर उसकी विकलांगता का आकलन किया - ट्रिब्यूनल ने विकलांगता के प्रतिशत को ध्यान में रखते हुए रु। 2,000 / - प्रति प्रतिशत विकलांगता और परिणामस्वरूप, रु। 40,000 की राशि प्रदान की।  /- विकलांगता के मद में दिया गया - ट्रिब्यूनल ने दर्द और पीड़ा के लिए 25,000 / - की राशि और चिकित्सा बिलों के लिए 60,000 / - की राशि भी प्रदान की - ट्रिब्यूनल ने अतिरिक्त पोषण के लिए 5,000 / - रुपये, 10,000 /  - परिचर शुल्क के लिए, उपचार की अवधि के दौरान आय के नुकसान के लिए रु. 15,000/- - दावेदार एक गृह निर्माता था - न्यायाधिकरण, आय की अवधि के दौरान आय की हानि के तहत मुआवजा देने के उद्देश्य से घायल दावेदार की आय को सही माना और   रु. 15,000/- रु. 5,000/- प्रति माह की दर से - धारित, ट्रिब्यूनल द्वारा दी गई राशि दावेदार को लगी चोटों की प्रकृति और उसके अस्पताल में भर्ती होने की अवधि के अनुरूप है - मुआवजे को बढ़ाने का कोई कारण नहीं है। 

दिल्ली उच्च न्यायालय ने कल्याणकारी योजनाओं का लाभ उठाने के लिए एमएसएमई अधिनियम के तहत अधिवक्ताओं को 'पेशेवर' के रूप में शामिल करने की याचिका पर नोटिस जारी किया

दिल्ली उच्च न्यायालय ने कल्याणकारी योजनाओं तक पहुँचने के उद्देश्य से MSME अधिनियम के तहत "पेशेवरों" की परिभाषा के भीतर अधिवक्ताओं को शामिल करने की मांग करने वाली एक जनहित याचिका पर आज नोटिस जारी किया।

 मुख्य न्यायाधीश डीएन पटेल और न्यायमूर्ति ज्योति सिंह की खंडपीठ ने व्यक्तिगत रूप से एक पक्ष के रूप में पेश अधिवक्ता अभिजीत मिश्रा की सुनवाई के बाद एमएसएमई मंत्रालय, वित्त मंत्रालय, बार काउंसिल ऑफ इंडिया और आरबीआई को नोटिस जारी किया।

याचिका में कहा गया है कि MSME मंत्रालय भारत सरकार की प्रगतिशील योजनाओं के लिए अधिवक्ताओं को  पेशेवर नहीं मानता है।  यह कहा जाता है कि भारत सरकार की विकास योजनाओं तक पहुँचने के लिए पात्र होने के लिए अनिवार्य आवश्यकता के रूप में GSTN, Business PAN, TAN होने की पूर्वाग्रहपूर्ण पात्रता मानदंड अधिवक्ताओं के कल्याण के विरुद्ध है।

 

इलाहाबाद हाईकोर्ट ने कहा : दीमक की तरह देश को चाट रहा है साइबर अपराध, व्यवस्था पर सवाल

साइबर ठगों के देश भर में फैले नेटवर्क पर चिंता जताते हुए इलाहाबाद हाईकोर्ट ने कहा है कि साइबर ठग दीमक की तरह पूरे देश को चाट रहे हैं। देश की आर्थिक स्थिति को कमजोर कर रहे हैं। साइबर ठगी का शिकार हुए लोगों का पैसा न डूबे, इसकी जवाबदेही तय किया जाना जरूरी है।

कोर्ट ने केंद्र सरकार, रिजर्व बैंक और राज्य सरकार को नोटिस जारी कर पूछा है कि ईमानदार नागरिकों की गाढ़ी कमाई साइबर ठगी से कैसे सुरक्षित हो सकती है। कोर्ट ने कहा कि बैंक व पुलिस की जिम्मेदारी तय की जानी चाहिए। याचिका की सुनवाई 14 सितंबर को होगी। यह आदेश न्यायमूर्ति शेखर कुमार यादव ने नीरज मंडल उर्फ राकेश की अर्जी की सुनवाई करते हुए दिया है।

कोर्ट ने डीजीपी कार्यालय, लखनऊ, एसपी क्राइम व निरीक्षक साइबर क्राइम (प्रयागराज) से प्रदेश व प्रयागराज में एक लाख से अधिक व एक लाख से कम की

साइबर ठगी के दर्ज अपराधों व उनकी स्थिति की जानकारी मांगी थी। अधिकारियों की ओर से दाखिल हलफनामे में संतोषजनक जानकारी नहीं दी जा सकी। कोर्ट ने कहा इससे लगता है बैंक व पुलिस दोनों गंभीर नहीं है।

कोर्ट ने कहा कि आश्चर्य होता है कि लोगों की जीवन की पूंजी लुट जाती है और उनसे कह दिया जाता है कि ठगी दूरदराज इलाके से हुई है। नक्सल एरिया में

पुलिस भी जाने से डरती है। धन वापसी मुश्किल है। लोग भाग्य को दोष देकर बैठ जाते हैं। बैंक व पुलिस की सुस्ती का लाभ साइबर अपराधी उठाते हैं।

साइबर ठगों से जज भी नहीं है सुरक्षित

कोर्ट ने कहा साइबर ठगी से जब जज भी सुरक्षित नहीं तो आम आदमी के बारे में क्या कहा जाए। राज्य सरकार को ठगी रोकने और बैंक व पुलिस की जवाबदेही तय करनी चाहिए। एक पूर्व जज से एक लाख रुपये की ठगी हुई। गिरफ्तार अभियुक्त ने कहा कि गिरोह काम करता है। यह गाढ़े समय या शादी आदि के लिए जमा पैसे निकाल कर ले जाते हैं। लोगों के अरमानों पर पानी फेर देते हैं। बिचौलिए लोगों का पैसा न खा जाए, इसके लिए प्रधानमंत्री ने जन-धन खाते खुलवाए। सरकारी योजनाओं का पैसा खाते में जमा किया जा रहा है।

बैंक में भी सुरक्षित नहीं है पैसा

अदालत काला धन रखने वाले सफेदपोश की बात नहीं कर रही, वह ईमानदार गरीब नागरिकों की बात कर रही, जिनका पैसा बैंक में जमा होता है। जो देश के विकास में खर्च होता है। ठगों की वजह से गरीब का पैसा बैंक में भी सुरक्षित नहीं है। जमा पैसे की गारंटी लेनी होगी। जिम्मेदारी तय हो कि गरीब का पैसा कैसे वापस आए। इसकी जिम्मेदारी किस पर तय हो। ग्राहकों के पैसे कैसे सुरक्षित हों, जिम्मेदारी तय किया जाना जरूरी है।

स्रोत- अमर उजाला

यूपी में शिक्षा मंत्री का नया ऐलान- प्राइमरी शिक्षकों का शहरी-ग्रामीण काडर होगा खत्‍म, इंग्‍लिश मीडियम स्‍कूल किए जाएंगे बंद

उत्‍तर प्रदेश में प्राइमरी शिक्षकों का ग्रामीण क्षेत्रों से नगरीय क्षेत्रों में तबादला अब आसान हो जाएगा। प्रदेश सरकार ने शहरी और ग्रामीण काडर खत्‍म करने का निर्णय लिया है। इसके साथ नई शिक्षा नीति के तहत अंग्रेजी माध्‍यम के परिषदीय स्‍कूलों को भी बंद करने का निर्णय लिया गया है। बेसिक शिक्षा मंत्री सतीश चंद्र द्विवेदी ने कानपुर में ये ऐलान किए।  
बीएनएसडी शिक्षा निकेतन में बुधवार को आयोजित गुरु वंदना कार्यक्रम में भाग लेने आए बेसिक शिक्षा मंत्री पत्रकारों से बातचीत के दौरान कहा कि परिषदीय शिक्षा में शिक्षकों के नगरीय और ग्रामीण काडर को समाप्त कर दिया जाएगा। इससे शिक्षकों के ग्रामीण क्षेत्र से नगरों में स्थानांतरण आसान हो जाएगा। उन्होंने कहा कि अभी ग्रामीण क्षेत्रों में शिक्षक सरप्लस हैं और नगरीय क्षेत्र में शिक्षकों की कमी है। काडर समाप्त होने से शिक्षकों की नगर क्षेत्र में कमी खत्‍म हो जाएगी। उन्‍होंने कहा कि अंग्रेज़ी माध्यम के परिषदीय स्कूल खोले गए थे लेकिन अब नई शिक्षा नीति में इसे समाप्त कर दिया जाएगा। 

सभी स्कूलों में मातृभाषा में पढ़ाई होगी। इसकी तैयारी कर ली गई है। उन्होंने कहा कि प्रधानाध्‍यापकों को टैबलेट दिए जाने हैं। इसके लिए एक समिति आईआईटी कानपुर की राय लेगी। इसके बाद टेंडर प्रक्रिया शुरू की जाएगी। 

स्रोत-हिंदुस्तान

जनहित याचिका क्या है?

भारतीय नागरिकों के मूल अधिकारों का हनन हो रहा है तो हाईकोर्ट और सुप्रीम कोर्ट में याचिका दायर कर अधिकारों की रक्षा की गुहार लगाई जा सकती है। हाईकोर्ट में अनुच्छेद-226 के तहत और सुप्रीम कोर्ट में अनुच्छेद-32 के तहत याचिका दायर की जा सकती है।

अगर किसी एक आदमी के अधिकारों का हनन हो रहा है तो उसे निजी अर्थात निजी हित का  लिटिगेशन माना जाएगा और अगर ज्यादा लोग या कहें कि आम जनों के हित प्रभावित हो रहे हैं और निम्नवर्णित मामलो में याचिका योजित करें तो उसे जनहित याचिका माना जाएगा।

1. मौलिक अधिकारों या कानूनों द्वारा गारंटीकृत किसी अन्य कानूनी अधिकार का उल्लंघन;

2. गरीबों के बुनियादी मानवाधिकारों के (उल्लंघन) मामलों में;

3. यह सुनिश्चित करने के लिए कि सरकारी अधिकारी या नगरपालिका अधिकारी अपने सार्वजनिक कर्तव्यों का पालन करें;

4. सरकारी नीति के संचालन के लिए। 

 जनहित याचिका डालने वाले व्यक्ति को अदालत को यह बताना होगा कि कैसे उस मामले में आम लोगों का हित प्रभावित हो रहा है। दायर की गई याचिका जनहित है या नहीं, इसका फैसला कोर्ट ही करता है। इसमें सरकार को प्रतिवादी बनाया जाता है। सुनवाई के बाद सुप्रीम कोर्ट और हाईकोर्ट सरकार को उचित निर्देश जारी करती हैं। 

पत्र द्वारा भी हाईकोर्ट और सुप्रीम कोर्ट में याचिका दाखिल की जा सकती है। यदि कोर्ट को लगता है कि ये जनहित से जुड़ा मामला है तो पत्र को ही जनहित याचिका के रूप में स्वीकार किया जा सकता है और सुनवाई होती है। ऐसे पत्र में बताया जाना जरूरी है कि मामला कैसे जनहित से जुड़ा है। अगर कोई सबूत है तो उसकी कॉपी भी पत्र के साथ लगा सकते हैं। पत्र जनहित याचिका में तब्दील होने के बाद संबंधित पक्षों को नोटिस जारी होता है और याचिकाकर्ता को भी कोर्ट में पेश होने के लिए कहा जाता है। अगर याचिकाकर्ता के पास वकील न हो तो कोर्ट मुहैया कराती है। हाईकोर्ट चीफ जस्टिस के नाम भी लेटर लिखा जा सकता है।
दूसरा तरीका ये है कि अधिवक्ता  के माध्यम से जनहित याचिका दायर की जा सकती है। अधिवक्ता  याचिका तैयार करने में मदद करता है। याचिका में प्रतिवादी कौन होगा और किस तरह उसे ड्रॉफ्ट किया जाएगा, इन बातों के लिए अधिवक्ता की मदद जरूरी है। जनहित याचिका दायर करने के लिए कोई फीस नहीं लगती। इसे सीधे काउंटर पर जाकर जमा करना होता है। जनहित याचिका ऑनलाइन दायर नहीं की जा सकती।

भारत में जस्टिस पीएन भगवती को जनहित याचिका का जनक माना जाता है जिन का 16 जून 2017 को 95 वर्ष की अवस्था में निधन हो गया था वह भारत के 17 वें मुख्य न्यायाधीश थे। भारत में जनहित याचिका की शुरुआत 1980 में हुई।

Allahabad framed contemp charges against a lawyer who called judges 'goondas'

The Allahabad High Court last week witnessed unfortunate scenes when one Asok Pande, a practicing lawyer, came to the Court room in a civil dress with an unbuttoned shirt and used abusive language against the judges and said that the Judges were behaving like 'goondas'

Thereafter, initiating a Suo Motu Contempt Proceedings against him, the Bench of Justice Ritu Raj Awasthi and Justice Dinesh Kumar Singh, prima facie, found him guilty of committing ex facie contempt of Court.

Essentially, during the course of the hearing, when he did not stop and continued to create an unpleasant atmosphere inside the Court and went on to disturb the Court proceedings, the Court had to call the Court Officer and the security to remove him from the Court Room.

Court's observations (charges framed by the Court)

On August 18, 202021 as soon as the Court assembled in the morning, Pande came to the podium in the civil dress with an unbuttoned shirt, and when the Court asked why he was not in a proper uniform, he said that since he had challenged the Bar Council Rules prescribing the Dress Code in PIL CivilNo. 14907 of 2021 therefore, he would not put on the uniform.

He also contended before the Court that since he was appearing in-person and therefore, it was not required for him to don Lawyers' Uniform.

To this, when the court told him that he should at least appear in 'decent dress' if he were to appear in-person, he started questioning the Court as to 'what is decent dress'.

The Court asked him to button his shirt, which he did not do and created ruckus in the Court in the morning and atmosphere of the Court got completely vitiated and used intemperate language, indulged in indecent behaviour amounting to 27 gross misconduct and challenged the authority of the Court.

In this backdrop, finding him prima facie guilty of committing contempt of Court, the Court observed thus:

" Your conduct was unbecoming a member of the legal profession. When Court warned that if you would not behave properly, the Court would have no option except to remove you from the Court, you challenged the Court and said that if the Court had power; it could remove him from the Court. You used abusive language against the judges and said that the Judges were behaving like goondas."

Similarly, the Court noted, on August 16, 2021, when the Court took suo motu cognizance in in respect of Bar Association Election and the Court was hearing the Returning Officer and Chairman of the Elders' Committee of Awadh Bar Association, Advocate Pande had barged in the Court and came to podium without uniform and started shouting on top of your voice.

In fact, when the Court has asked him as to in what capacity, he was addressing the Court, he had said that being a Member of the Avadh Bar Association, he had every right to address the Court.

Again, when the Court had asked him as to why he was not in uniform, he had said that he wouldn't don the advocate's uniform as he had challenged the Bar Council Rules prescribing the Dress Code for Lawyers and insisted on addressing the court without donning Advocate's uniform. 4

Against this backdrop, finding his conduct, ex-facie contemptuous as envisaged under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defining criminal contempt, he has now been called upon to answer the charges framed against him in person or through counsel and present himself to be tried on August 31, 2021 before the Bench concerned.

This particular provision makes one liable to be punished and to be debarred from practicing in this Court in view of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

"Your conduct in the court and outside the court clearly intended to defile the image of the Court, cast insinuations and personally insult judges in open Court. It is clearly intended to bring the Court into disrepute by making scandalous allegations and using abusive language against the judges," added the Court.

In its order, the Court has also recounted Pande's brief history of misbehavior, using indecent and intemperate language in pleadings and oral submissions and making scurrilous allegations against sitting and retired Chief Justices, Judges of the Court, and judges of the Supreme Court.

Importantly, besides initiating the contempt proceedings, the Court has also directed the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to examine the past conduct of Sri Asok Pande, Advocate, and to decide whether such a person is worthy of being part of the noble profession, and take appropriate disciplinary proceedings against Asok Pande.

Case title - Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Criminal) no. 1493 of 2021| Re: Asok Pande ….. Alleged contemnor

Merely on the ground if the wrong provision has been quoted in the petition, the petition should not be rejected-Jharkhand High Court

Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 7, Rule 14 (3) - Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5 Petition had been filed by the plaintiffs not under Order 7, Rule 14 (3) of the Civil Procedure Code rather under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for seeking leave to mark documents for proper adjudication of the issue - Petition filed after cross-examining of the stage of the plaintiffs' evidence - Trial Court, passed an order allowing the relief sought for by the plaintiffs by granting leave to mark the documents as exhibits with a liberty to the defendants to cross-examine the witnesses so adduced by the plaintiffs - Contention that petition since was filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for seeking leave of the Court to mark exhibits ought not have been allowed but since appropriate power has not been invoked as provided under Order 7, Rule 14 (3) of the Civil Procedure Code - Merely on the ground if the wrong provision has been quoted in the petition, the petition should not be rejected rather the contents of the petition, is to be looked into for the ends of justice - Part of the prejudice had already been taken into consideration by the Trial Court - No error apparent on the face of the record warranting any interference by Court.

(LMASLFD-1655534)

सीआरपीसी की धारा 82 के तहत भगोड़े की उद्घोषणा नियमित तरीके से नहीं होनी चाहिए: इलाहाबाद हाई कोर्ट

इलाहाबाद उच्च न्यायालय (लखनऊ बेंच) ने फैसला सुनाया है कि सीआरपीसी की धारा 82 के तहत कार्यवाही जारी करने के लिए, जांच अधिकारी को अदालत की मदद लेने की जरूरत है, और धारा 482 सीआरपीसी के तहत उद्घोषणा केवल कोर्ट के आदेश पर जारी की जाएगी।

न्यायमूर्ति सरोज यादव ने टिप्पणी की कि यह तय है कि यदि कोई आरोपी जांच के दौरान गिरफ्तारी से बचता है, तो आईओ आरोपी को बिना वारंट के गिरफ्तार कर सकता है यदि अपराध संज्ञेय था।

सीआरपीसी की धारा 82(1) के अनुसार, सीआरपीसी की धारा 82 के तहत उद्घोषणा जारी करने से पहले, एक गैर-जमानती वारंट जारी करना आवश्यक था।

मामला एक गैर-जमानती वारंट और सीआरपीसी की धारा 82 के तहत जारी आदेश को रद्द करने के लिए दायर याचिका धारा 482 से संबंधित है।  आरोपियों के खिलाफ आबकारी अधिनियम और आईपीसी के तहत आरोप लगाए गए थे।

 प्राथमिकी के अनुसार, शिकायतकर्ता के बेटे (धर्मेंद्र कुमार वर्मा) की लखनऊ में इलाज के दौरान मौत हो गई।  आरोप है कि उसने मौत से एक दिन पहले राजनाथ वर्मा के घर पर खाना खाया था।

 जांच के दौरान, आईओ ने मजिस्ट्रेट के समक्ष एक आवेदन दायर कर आरोपी के खिलाफ गैर जमानती वारंट की मांग की, क्योंकि आरोपी गिरफ्तारी से बच रहा था।  इसी के तहत मजिस्ट्रेट ने गैर जमानती वारंट जारी किया।

 विवाद:-

 याचिकाकर्ता के वकील ने तर्क दिया कि सीजेएम के पास नियमित तरीके से याचिकाकर्ता के खिलाफ गैर जमानती वारंट और धारा 82 सीआरपीसी के तहत उद्घोषणा जारी करने की शक्ति नहीं है।  उन्होंने आगे कहा कि चूंकि मामले की जांच चल रही है, अदालत के पास गैर जमानती वारंट जारी करने का कोई आधार नहीं है।  उन्होंने यह भी कहा कि मजिस्ट्रेट ने कानूनी दिमाग लगाए बिना गैर जमानती वारंट और धारा 82 के तहत उद्घोषणा जारी की थी।

 राज्य के वकील ने आवेदन का विरोध किया और प्रस्तुत किया कि यदि कोई आरोपी गिरफ्तारी से बचता है, तो आईओ आरोपी को पकड़ने में अदालत की मदद ले सकता है।  उन्होंने यह भी कहा कि गैर जमानती वारंट जारी करने और सीआरपीसी की धारा 82 के तहत उद्घोषणा में कोई अवैधता नहीं है।

 कोर्ट का निर्देश:-

 कोर्ट ने याचिकाकर्ता को आईओ के समक्ष पेश होने का निर्देश दिया क्योंकि मामला जहरीली शराब के सेवन से मरने वाले व्यक्ति से संबंधित था।

 इसने आगे कहा कि मजिस्ट्रेट को नियमित रूप से आईओ द्वारा दायर साधारण आवेदनों पर ऐसे आदेश पारित नहीं करने चाहिए।  कोर्ट ने आगे कहा कि इस तरह के आवेदनों को आईओ के हलफनामे द्वारा समर्थित किया जाना चाहिए जिसमें कहा गया हो कि एनबीडब्ल्यू और उद्घोषणा धारा 82 की आवश्यकता क्यों थी।

बीमा कंपनी ओवरलोडिंग साबित करने में विफल-अपील खारिज-हिमांचल प्रदेश हाइकोर्ट

मोटर वाहन अधिनियम, 1988 धारा 173, 166, 147 और 149 बीमा कंपनी की देयता - पॉलिसी के नियमों और शर्तों के उल्लंघन की याचिका - ट्रिब्यूनल ने रु।  19,56,000/- और अपीलकर्ता-बीमा कंपनी को अपीलकर्ता के इस निवेदन का भुगतान करने का निर्देश दिया कि नीति के अनुसार केवल 10 व्यक्ति वाहन में यात्रा कर सकते हैं, लेकिन प्रासंगिक समय पर 12 व्यक्ति 10 की अनुमत क्षमता के विरुद्ध यात्रा कर रहे थे - मोटर-मालिक ने साबित कर दिया है  उस चालक के पास वैध और प्रभावी लाइसेंस था - दूसरी ओर दुर्घटना के समय बीमा कंपनी ओवरलोडिंग साबित करने में विफल रही - अपील खारिज कर दी गई।  (हिमाचल प्रदेश हाई कोर्ट)

(LMASLFD1812153)

Plaintiff had not examined the vendor - Plaintiff filed to establish his ownership - Not entitled to declaration and injunction -Bombay High Court

Specific Relief Act, 1963 Sections 34 and 38 Suit for declaration of title and injunction - Plaintiff contended that he purchased suit property by way of sale - Defendants without any right issued notice to remove the encroachment - Therefore, suit filed for declaration of his title and injunction against defendants restraining them from disturbing his possession - Earlier, suit for declaration of ownership and injunction filed by vendor of plaintiff was dismissed as vendor failed to prove his ownership over plots in question - Vendor of plaintiff had no any title to sale the plots in question - Therefore plaintiff could not claim title by virtue of sale deeds executed by his vendor - Plaintiff had not examined the vendor - Plaintiff filed to establish his ownership - Not entitled to declaration and injunction.

(LMSLFD1818754)

पूर्व सूचना दिए बिना आम वाहक के खिलाफ उपभोक्ता शिकायतों को कायम नहीं रखा जा सकेगा: सर्वोच्च न्यायालय

सर्वोच्च न्यायालय ने पाया है कि यदि वाहक अधिनियम की धारा 6 के तहत पूर्व नोटिस नहीं दिया गया था, तो एक आम वाहक के खिलाफ एक उपभोक्ता शिकायत को बरकरार नहीं रखा जा सकता था।

न्यायमूर्ति हेमंत गुप्ता और न्यायमूर्ति एएस बोपन्ना की खंडपीठ ने कहा कि कार्यवाही शुरू करने से पहले नोटिस की तामील की जानी चाहिए न कि कार्यवाही की।

मौजूदा मामले में, एनसीडीआरसी ने एचपीसीडीआरसी के उस आदेश को बरकरार रखा जिसमें एसोसिएटेड रोड कैरियर्स के खिलाफ उपभोक्ता शिकायत की अनुमति दी गई थी।

 शीर्ष न्यायालय के समक्ष, यह तर्क दिया गया था कि वाहक अधिनियम की धारा 10 के अनुसार पूर्व नोटिस नहीं दिया गया था, और इसलिए, उपभोक्ता शिकायत को बनाए रखने योग्य नहीं था।

सर्वोच्च न्यायालय की टिप्पणियां और आदेश:-

 पीठ ने कहा कि अरविंद मिल्स बनाम एसोसिएटेड रोडवेज में, यह फैसला सुनाया गया था कि सिर्फ इसलिए कि उपभोक्ता संरक्षण अधिनियम के तहत प्रक्रिया प्रकृति में संक्षिप्त थी, इसका मतलब यह नहीं है कि कैरियर अधिनियम की धारा 10 के तहत नोटिस देने की आवश्यकता को समाप्त किया जा सकता है।  वाहकों पर दायित्व बन्धन से पहले के साथ।

यह देखते हुए कि शिकायत 1997 में बुक की गई एक खेप से संबंधित थी, पीठ ने फैसला सुनाया कि वह आक्षेपित आदेश में हस्तक्षेप नहीं करेगी।

क्या निचली अदालते न्यायालय सुप्रीम कोर्ट के उस फैसले का पालन करने के लिए बाध्य हैं, जिसे बड़ी बेंच के पास भेजा गया है?

दिल्ली उच्च न्यायालय ने टिप्पणी की थी कि एक बार सर्वोच्च न्यायालय की पीठ ने समान शक्ति वाली पिछली पीठ के फैसले की शुद्धता पर संदेह किया है, तो निचली अदालतें पहले के फैसले से बाध्य नहीं हो सकती हैं।

न्यायमूर्ति सी हरि शंकर ने पक्षों के बीच विवाद को सुलझाने के लिए मध्यस्थ नियुक्त करने के लिए मध्यस्थता और सुलह अधिनियम की धारा 11(5) के तहत दायर एक याचिका की सुनवाई के दौरान यह टिप्पणी की।

 प्रतिवादी के वकील (राकेश सैनी) ने इस आधार पर मध्यस्थ की नियुक्ति पर आपत्ति जताई कि पार्टियों के बीच समझौते पर पर्याप्त मुहर नहीं थी।  उन्होंने एनएन ग्लोबल मर्केंटाइल प्राइवेट लिमिटेड बनाम मेसर्स इंडो यूनिक फ्लेम लिमिटेड में सर्वोच्च न्यायालय के फैसले पर भरोसा किया। उन्होंने कहा कि जब तक उक्त दोष को ठीक नहीं किया जाता है, तब तक अदालत मामले को मध्यस्थता के लिए नहीं भेज सकती है।

दूसरी ओर, याचिकाकर्ता के वकील ने कहा कि यदि समझौते पर पर्याप्त रूप से मुहर नहीं लगाई गई थी, तो मध्यस्थ को उस पहलू पर फैसला करना होगा।

हालांकि, बेंच ने टिप्पणी की कि एनएन ग्लोबल में, सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने माना था कि वर्क ऑर्डर पर स्टांप ड्यूटी की कमी या भुगतान न करने से मुख्य अनुबंध अमान्य नहीं होगा।

 प्रतिवादी ने विद्या ड्रोलिया बनाम दुर्गा ट्रेडिंग कॉरपोरेशन में सर्वोच्च न्यायालय के फैसले पर भी भरोसा किया था।

 पीठ ने जवाब दिया कि एनएन ग्लोबल में, शीर्ष न्यायालय ने विद्या ड्रोलिया मामले की शुद्धता पर संदेह किया था।  इसने आगे कहा कि अदालत ने मामले को पांच न्यायाधीशों की संविधान पीठ के पास भेज दिया था।

 इस संदर्भ में, उच्च न्यायालय ने टिप्पणी की कि यदि कोई मामला सर्वोच्च न्यायालय द्वारा किसी बड़ी बेंच को भेजा गया है, तो निचली अदालतें उक्त निर्णय के निर्णय से बाध्य नहीं हो सकती हैं।

अंत में, पक्ष मध्यस्थता के लिए जाने के लिए सहमत हुए, और न्यायालय ने मध्यस्थ की नियुक्ति के लिए मामले को दिल्ली अंतर्राष्ट्रीय मध्यस्थता केंद्र को भेज दिया।

Delhi High Court: The term ‘other person’ under section 401(2) of Cr.P.C. does not include complainant

Justice Yogesh Khanna while disposing off a revision petition held that section 401 sub section (2) Cr. P.C. does not include complainant in revision.  The court further held that when the Court has to deal with the revision under Section 482 Cr P C, the victim can join the proceedings, but this position of law is different in revision before the Session’s Court in a state case as it is barred under Sections 401(2) Cr.P.C.

Facts of the case:

The petitions are filed to assail an impugned order dated 05.04.2021 by the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge (HQs), Delhi  against the orders dated 01.02.2021, 22.02.2021 and 06.03.2021 passed by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in case State vs S.P.Gupta & Others.  The impugned order the learned Revisional Court had directed the petitioner herein to file an amended memo of parties by impleading the complainant defacto as respondent No.2.

Contention of the petitioner:

The learned senior counsel for the petitioners made the following contentions:

1. It was contended that the complainant has no role to play before learned Revisional Court and it’s only the learned Public Prosecutor for the State, who has to take realm of the case before learned Session’s Court.
2. It was also argued that as per sub-section 2 to Section 401 Cr P C no order shall be passed to the prejudice of the accused or other person unless he has an liberty of being heard either personally or through pleader.
3. It is further argued that the word other person refers to person akin to the accused and it does not include the complainant and hence the learned Revisional Court erred to make the complainant defacto as respondent No.2.
4. It was also contended that Section 401(2) Cr P C does not give any right to the complainant to be heard in revision before the learned Session’s Court and hence the impugned order suffers from illegality.

Contention of the respondent:

The respondent submitted the followed contention:

1. It was argued that the power of revision is a suo moto power of correction and supervision over the subordinate Courts; to call for the records and to correct orders.
2. It is further argued that in Cr P C when amended in 2009, victim was given right to have a say in criminal proceedings.
3. It was also urged that the impugned order was perfectly justified and petitions needed to be dismissed at the outset.

Observation and judgement of the court:

The Hon’ble bench of the learned court made the following observation:

1. The case of Babloo Pasi vs. State of Jharkhand and Ors. 2008 (13) SCC 133 relied upon by the respondent is misplaced as revision in that case was filed under Section 53 of the Juvenile Justice Act and not under Section 401 Cr.P.C.
2. The bench also observed that in the case of Pandharinath Takaram Rout the judgment was on a revision pending before the High Court and not before the Session’s Court.
3. The bench while agreeing with the petitioner stated that if it allows the complainant to participate before the Session’s it shall change the entire nature of the proceedings from criminal to civil and hence shall hamper independence of prosecution.
4. The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is wider than the one under Section 401 Cr.P.C  but Session’s Court does not have such parallel power and it cannot implead anyone, except those mentioned under Section 401(2) Cr.P.C.

Thus, the bench in the light of the above set aside the impugned order passed by the passed by the learned Revisional Court. The court further held that this shall not disentitle the complainant to appear before the learned Revisional Court in the pending revision petitions.

Therefore, the petition was dismissed.

दिल्ली हाईकोर्ट ने 13 वर्षीय छात्रा के यौन उत्पीड़न मामले में कोच को जमानत देने से किया इनकार

न्यायमूर्ति प्रसाद (Justice Prasad) ने बुधवार को जारी अपने आदेश में कहा कि बच्चे के कल्याण पर सर्वोच्चता के साथ विचार किया जाए, क्योंकि शुरूआती चरण में उसकी मानसिक वृति नाजुक होती है और उसपर जल्द असर पड़ता है।

दिल्ली उच्च न्यायालय ने 13 वर्षीय अपनी एक छात्रा के यौन उत्पीड़न के आरोपी एक बॉस्केटबॉल कोच को जमानत देने इनकार कर दिया है. कोर्ट ने यह कहते हुए इनकार कर दिया कि जीवन के प्रारंभिक चरण में भरोसेमंद रिश्ते से विश्वास उठ जाने से बच्चे को भविष्य में अंतर-वैयक्तिक संबंध विकसित करने में बाधा आ सकती है. न्यायमूर्ति सुब्रमण्यम प्रसाद ने कहा कि ‘‘यौन हमला या यौन उत्पीड़न की हरकत सामाजिक विकास बाधित करने एवं कई तरह की मनोवैज्ञानिक समस्याएं पैदा कर सकती है. और उसके अलावा यह बच्चे में मानसिक अवसाद के अलावा भविष्य में उसकी चिंतन प्रक्रिया को प्रभावित कर सकती है.’’

न्यायमूर्ति प्रसाद ने बुधवार को जारी अपने आदेश में कहा, ‘‘ बच्चे के कल्याण पर सर्वोच्चता के साथ विचार किया जाए, क्योंकि शुरूआती चरण में उसकी मानसिक वृति नाजुक होती है और उसपर जल्द असर पड़ता है. बालपन में यौन हमले के दीर्घकालिक प्रभाव बेहद गहरे होते हैं. इससे बच्चे का सामान्य सामाजिक विकास अवरूद्ध होता है और कई मनोवैज्ञानिक समस्या हो सकती है जिसके लिए मनोचिकित्सकीय उपचार की जरूरत हो सकती है.’’ आरोपी की इस दलील पर कि पीड़िता ने सीधे-साधे व्यवहार का गलत मतलब निकाल लिया हो, अदालत ने कहा कि वह संभवत: जानबूझकर की गयी हरकत और असावधानीवश आचरण के बीच फर्क करना अच्छी तरह समझती है।

पीड़िता दिल्ली के एक पब्लिक स्कूल की नौवीं कक्षा की छात्रा है
अदालत ने कहा कि आरोप तय होने और पीड़िता से जिरह करने से पहले जमानत देने से बाल यौन अपराध संरक्षण (पोक्सो) अधिनियम , 2012 के पीछे का मकसद निष्फल हो सकता है. उच्च न्यायालय ने जमानत अर्जी खारिज करते हुए निचली अदालत को एक महीने के अंदर आरोप तय करने की दिशा में बढ़ने एवं आरोप तय हो जाने की स्थिति में अगले महीने पीड़िता से जिरह करने का निर्देश दिया. पीड़िता दिल्ली के एक पब्लिक स्कूल की नौवीं कक्षा की छात्रा है।

Appointment of advocate commissioner dose not suffer from any irregularity -Telangana High Court

Appointment of Advocate Commissioner Held, the intention of the Court below in appointing the advocate commissioner is to demarcate the two different survey numbers, but not to ascertain or cause any enquiry as to who is in possession of which property, therefore, it does not amount to collection or fishing of evidence, as rightly observed by the Trial Court in the order that when there is an attempt on the part of one of the parties to alter the physical features of the suit schedule property and it is necessary to take note of the same, it is always open to the court to appoint a commissioner for inspection of the suit schedule property with the help of Tahsildar/surveyor and village map, hence the appointment of advocate commissioner dose not suffer from any irregularity - Revision dismissed.

Changing of Stand by way of amendment can not be allowed-Uttarakhand High Court

Civil Procedure Code , 1908 , Order 6 , Rule 17 and Section 115 - Amendment application regarding valuation of suit on basis of market value of suit property - Held , a party cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate on same facts and take inconsistent shifting stands neither  Revisional challenged order of Trial Court regarding valuation of suit on basis of market value of suit property No compliance with the same - but changing their stand by way of amendment application reduced valuation of suit - Revision dismissed.  ( Uttarakhand ) 

(LMASLFD1746199)

Rajasthan High Court enhanced the award amount fixed by MACT

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 Section 173 Injury claim - Liability of Insurance Company - Enhancement of Compensation - Death of 7 persons out of 8 and only the claimant was survived - Appellant was 15 years old at the time of recording her statement - Disability certificate issued by  the Board of Doctors - Appellant suffered permanent physical disability to the extent of 34.35 %  - Rs.4,18,820 / - towards other heads - Appeal partly allowed Appellant is entitled to Rs.  9,18,820 / instead of 6,68,820 / - - Insurance Company shall deposit the enhanced amount along with interest @ 6 % p.a.  from the date of filing the claim petition till the date of payment , with the tribunal.

(LAMSLF1804332)

Ammendment to fill up the lacunae in the suit is not permissible- High Court (Jharkhand)

Constitution of India , 1950 Article 226 Application filed by plaintiffs under Order 1 , Rule 10 and Order 6 , Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code , 1908 – Application dismissed - Present petition filed seeking quashing of said order - In the present  case , the petitioner has neither pleaded nor averred any explanation to meet the delay caused in filing the amendment application - Though an application for amendment can be allowed even after commencement of the trial , the petitioner has failed to explain that in spite of due diligence he could not  seek amendment of the plaint before commencement of the trial - Court below , after taking into consideration the conduct of the petitioner has rejected the said application observing that the same has been filed to fill up the lacunae in the suit , which is not permissible - Court  below has also observed that by way of amendment application , the plaintiffs have not sought to add various plots in the Schedule of the plaint as also  to implead / delete some of the plaintiffs and defendants who were left either due to negligent or by willful omission - Thus , no relief can be granted to the petitioner at such a belated stage of the trial - No infirmity in the order dismissing amendment application Present  write petition , accordingly dismissed.

(LAMSLF1763210)

“bona fide need” of Landlord– The High Court Allahabad ordered to vacate shop.

Urban Building Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P.) – Section 21 – “bona fide need” – Interpretation of – Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant – Whether the need of the landlord for settling her son is bona fide ?

In the present case, the respondent-landlord has clearly established that shop in question is needed by her son to start on-line trading and share business and the need of the landlord is ‘bona fide’ and genuine. It is further evident from the bare reading of written statement of the tenant- petitioner that specifically he has not disputed the need of the landlord to establish her son in the shop in dispute and in view of the above set of facts, as per the interpretation of word “bona fide need” as given by the Apex Court and also by this Court, the need of the landlord is genuine and ‘bona fide’ as held by the courts below.

Urban Building Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P.) – Section 21 –Whether the question of comparative hardship in regard to the disputed shop favours the landlord or the tenant? – Since the specific findings has been recorded by the appellate court that the tenant-petitioner has unnecessarily held up the shop in question and therefore, the ground of comparative hardship is also in favour of the landlord and she will suffer irreparably if the shop is not released in her favour.

(LMSCL13082021)

Delay of 449 days in filing appeal condoned by Punjab & Haryana High Court

 

Limitation Act , 1963 , Section 5 Condonation of Delay of 449 days in filing appeal No straight - jacket formula for accepting or rejecting application seeking condonation of delay - Status of parties , reason given in application and also other surrounding facts , need to be appreciated while  arriving at decision whether to condone delay or not Regular First Appeal filed by similarly situated appellants already allowed - Therefore , Condonation of delay allowed.

(LMASLFD1829615)

No Income tax (TDS) shall be deducted on compensaation award fixed by MACT

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988- section 166, 168 and 173. Compensation-Deduction of income- tax-Appellant has not disputed quantum of compensation and liability-Deceased was salaried person also not in dispute-Tribunal itself deducted amount of income-tax from the awarded compensation- Amount awarded by the Tribunal cannot be subjected  to tax on flat rate-Deceased left behind him five legal representatives- Amount has to be distributed amongst all of them and cannot be said that income-tax would be payable-Amount cannot be said  to be income of one year when award was passed-Awarded amount of ?  42,75,000 to carry interest @ 7.5%-Other parts of the judgment maintained as lis is settled between the parties-Appeal partly allowed.  

LMASAWC-32(1)2021

सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने CCI जांच के खिलाफ अमेजन, फ्लिपकार्ट की याचिकाओं पर विचार से किया इंकार

 उस याचिका पर विचार करने से इनकार कर दिया, जिसमें भारतीय प्रतिस्पर्धा आयोग (सीसीआई) द्वारा प्रतिस्पर्धा कानून के कथित उल्लंघन की प्रारंभिक जांच करने को चुनौती दी गई थी।

मुख्य न्यायाधीश एन वी रमना की अध्यक्षता वाली तीन सदस्यीय पीठ ने कहा कि जांच को चुनौती देना, आपराधिक कानून के तहत प्राथमिकी दर्ज करने से पहले नोटिस चाहने जैसा है। इसके साथ ही पीठ ने ई-कॉमर्स कंपनियों को सीसीआई की जांच में सहयोग करने के लिए कहा। 

पीठ में जस्टिस विनीत सरन और जस्टिस सूर्यकांत भी शामिल हैं। पीठ ने कहा, ‘‘हम उम्मीद करते हैं कि अमेजन और फ्लिपकार्ट जैसे बड़े संगठन पूछताछ के लिए खुद आगे आएंगे, और आप ऐसा नहीं चाहते हैं। आपको पेश होना होगा और जांच की इजाजत देनी होगी।’’ फ्लिपकार्ट की ओर से पेश वरिष्ठ अधिवक्ता ए एम सिंघवी द्वारा यह बताए जाने पर कि सीसीआई को जवाब देने का समय नौ अगस्त को ही खत्म हो रहा है, पीठ ने इस समयसीमा को चार सप्ताह के लिए बढ़ा दिया। हालांकि, इस पर सीसीआई का प्रतिनिधित्व कर रहे सॉलिसिटर जनरल तुषार मेहता ने आपत्ति जताई। 

मेहता ने कहा कि इन फर्मों को एक सप्ताह का समय दिया जाना चाहिए, क्योंकि कोविड के दौर में लोग ज्यादातर इन कंपनियों के माध्यम से ऑनलाइन खरीदारी कर रहे हैं। इससे पहले कर्नाटक उच्च न्यायालय ने 23 जुलाई को प्रतिस्पर्धा कानून के कथित उल्लंघन के लिए सीसीआई जांच के खिलाफ अमेजन-फ्लिपकार्ट की याचिका खारिज कर दी थी।

Carrying out a further investigation even after filing of the charge-sheet is a statutory right of the police. Re-investigation without prior permission is prohibited. On the other hand, further investigation is permissible

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. BAIL APPLICATION No. – 27725 of 2020

Applicant :- Irfan And Another

Opposite Party :- State of U.P.

Counsel for Applicant :- Raghuvansh Misra

Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A., Khalid Mahmood, Sadaful Islam Jafri

Hon’ble Saumitra Dayal Singh,J.

1. Heard Sri Manish Tiwary, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Raghuvansh Misra, learned counsel for the applicants, Sri N.I. Jafri, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Khalid Mahmood, learned counsel for the informant and learned AGA for the State.

2. This is a second bail application. Earlier, the first bail application being Criminal Misc. Bail Application No.23105 of 2019 filed by the present applicants Irfan and Furkan came to be rejected by this Court vide order dated 28.11.2019. Since the arguments advanced in the present application do arise in part on the observations made in that order, it may be fruitful to extract that order in entirety. Thus, it is quoted below:-

1. Heard Sri Manish Tiwary, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Raghuvansh Misra, learned counsel for the applicants; Sri N.I. Jafri, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Sadaful Islam Jafri, learned counsel for the informant and; Sri Sanjay Kumar Singh, learned AGA for the State. Perused the material placed on record.

2. The instant bail application has been filed on behalf of the applicants – Irfan & Furkan, with a prayer to release them on bail in Case Crime No. – 0093 of 2017, under Sections -147, 148, 149, 307, 302, 504, 506 I.P.C., Police Station -Kharkhauda, District – Meerut, during pendency of trial.

3. The applicants and others are accused of having formed an unlawful assembly and murder of two individuals namely, Junaid & Bilal and of causing grievous injuries constituting attempt to murder two others namely, Mehraz & Shahid. Against FIR lodged on 10.02.2017, the applicants are in confinement since 10.04.2019.

4. Allegations exist of unlawful assembly and assault with firearm, ‘lathi’, ‘danda’ and ‘sariya’. Prima facie, the post-mortem and injury reports indicate, both, firearm and other injuries suffered due to blows of ‘lathi’, ‘danda’ and ‘saria’. As per the FIR, accusation has been made against eight persons of use of firearm and against six persons for assault with ‘lathi’, ‘danda’ and ‘sariya’.

5. It is also a fact that against the FIR lodged on 10.02.2017, initially the applicants had approached this Court by means of writ petition seeking quashing of the FIR. It was dismissed vide order dated 04.05.2017. Thereafter the applicants remained at large. In such facts and in the meantime, a chargesheet came to be filed against the applicants, in May 2017. The 482 Cr.P.C. Application No. 23132 of 2017 filed to question the same also came to be dismissed vide order dated 28.07.2017. Against that, a SLP is stated to have been filed before the Supreme Court which was dismissed as withdrawn on 25.08.2017.

6. Though the chargesheet had been submitted against the applicants, in May 2017, apparently, on some application filed by the father of the present applicants, further investigation was directed to be made by the administrative authorities on 28.08.2017. It is in the course of such further investigation, the Investigating Officer is claimed to have recorded further statements and collected further material especially recording available on a hard drive of the C.C.T.V. camera set-up, claimed to be installed at the own residential premises of the applicants. Based on that, the Investigating Officer reached a conclusion that the applicants had been wrongly implicated.

7. It is however undisputed that vide his order dated 18.09.2017, the learned Magistrate rejected the application seeking further investigation. That issue is pending before this Court in section 482 Cr.P.C. Application No. 35477 of 2017.

8. According to the applicants, vide another order dated 14.08.2018, non-bailable warrants came to be issued against the applicants. Then they again approached this Court in Application under section 482 Cr.P.C., No. 33621 of 2018, to challenge that order. An interim order was passed by this court to stay operation of the order dated 14.08.2018.

9. In such circumstances, it appears that on 03.04.2019, an order came to be passed in 482 Application No.33621 of 2018 wherein the following direction was issued :

“In the aforesaid backdrop, learned Sessions Judge/the concerned Trial Judge is directed to ensure that the guidelines given in the case of Hussain and another (supra) as well as in Brahm Singh and others(Supra) has to be carried out in its letter and spirit, failing which an adverse inference would be drawn against the erring officers and this Court would be compelled to take appropriate action against them, if found that there is laxity in adhering the above directions.

In the event, the bail application is not decided within seven days as contemplated above, the learned Judge will have to spell out the justifiable reasons and record the same on the order sheet of such cases. It is made clear that no further time would be allowed to the applicants for this purpose and after getting themselves surrendered and bailed out, if at all, the applicants want to press their prayer.

Let this 482 application may be listed before the court of competent jurisdiction along with the record of 35477 of 2017.

It is made clear that till the applicants being bailed out they are not entitled for any discretion in favour of the applicant.”

10. It is in pursuance of that order that the applicants appear to have surrendered before the learned court below on 10.04.2019 since when they are in confinement. In such circumstances, it has been submitted by learned Senior Counsel that the applicant no.1-Irfan is a business man of reputation running a cattle field {sic feed} unit at his village-Ghosipur, where the incident had taken place whereas applicant no.2-Furkan, who is his real brother is a government servant working at the postal department. They have absolutely clean record and have no criminal history to their discredit.

11. Second, the said applicants had been falsely implicated in the incident that had taken place involving the other accused persons. Purely on account of pre-existing disputes between the parties, they were falsely implicated and the chargesheet came to be submitted against them in May, 2017 on such false allegations. However, upon further investigation being conducted, other independent eye witness account {sic accounts} were recorded that establish that the applicants were not involved in commission of the aforesaid offence. Also, wholly credible evidence is available in the shape of video recording on the C.C.T.V. camera set-up installed at the residence of the applicants. It shows that the applicants had not left their house till about 6:30 p.m. on the date of the incident whereas the incident had taken place at 5:45 pm at a different place.

12. Third, it has been submitted that the role of causing gun shot injury has been ascribed to two other accused namely, Abid & Javed but not to either of the applicants. In such circumstances, in light of general and vague allegations made against other persons (including the applicants) of having caused injuries with blows of ‘lathi’, ‘danda’ and ‘sariya’, the applicants are entitled to bail at this stage.

13. The case of the present applicants is also stated to be wholly distinguishable from that of Imran who, on similar allegations had earlier been enlarged on bail by this court but whose bail came to be cancelled upon order by the Supreme Court on solitary ground and reason of criminal history of that accused person. The applicants have no criminal history.

14. The submissions so made have been opposed by Sri Jafri, who would submit that the applicants are not entitled to any discretion. Against the FIR lodged on 10.02.2017, they did not participate in the investigation and remained absconding for more than two years. In that circumstance, the chargesheet came to be filed against them in May, 2017. They never appeared before the court below till they were forced to, under order of this Court in Application 482 No. 33621 of 2018, dated 03.04.2019.

15. The submission that there is credible material and evidence available in the supplementary case diary to establish that the applicants were not present at the place and time of occurrence has been met by submitting that the plea of alibi may not be considered at this stage, and in any case, in the connected trial that is going on against the other accused person being ST No.473 of 2017 (State Vs. Abid), various witness of fact have been examined. They have wholly supported the prosecution story and named the applicants and others as the aggressors who assaulted the victims, in their statements recorded in oath.

16. Then, it has been submitted, the place of occurrence is very near to the residence of the applicants, and therefore, at this stage, no inference may be drawn on the basis of C.C.T.V. recording as it would remain purely speculative at that {sic this} stage and also it may remain a factor to be considered at the trial.

17. As to the status of the proceeding against the applicants, it has been submitted, at present, charges have been framed against the applicants but the trial is yet to commence. Enlarging the applicants on bail, at this stage, in light of their past conduct may only delay the trial as there is every likelihood that the applicants would again avoid the law and thus delay the trial proceedings.

18. In that regard, learned Senior Counsel for the applicants would submit that the order framing charge against the applicants suffers from manifest error of law, inasmuch as, charges had been framed against the applicants in absentia. It could never be done and that matter is engaging the attention of this Court in Criminal Revision No. 3358 of 2019 which is also pending.

19. Sri Sanjay Kumar Singh, learned AGA would submit, in the first place, the allegation is of common intention which was wholly consistent with the statement of the eye witness recorded during investigation. At the trial of the co-accused in ST No.473 of 2017 (State Vs. Abid), such evidence has also been adduced. Insofar as the recording of the C.C.T.V. camera is concerned, it has been submitted that probabilities and possibilities as may exist or arise owing to a fact that the residence of the applicants may not be more than 150 to 200 meters from the place of occurrence, cannot be examined at this stage. Again much emphasis has been laid on the conduct of the applicants in having avoided the law by absconding over a long period of time. Proceedings under Sections 82 and 83 Cr.P.C. had to be resorted to before the applicants offered their surrender. In totality of the facts and circumstances, learned AGA would submit, if enlarged on bail, there is every possibility that the applicants would avoid the process of law.

20. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, the learned Senior Counsel for the applicants may be absolutely right in his contention that the bail application of the present applicants may not be rejected on account of the bail cancellation application order passed by the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1274 of 2018 (Mohammad Abrar Alam Vs. Imran and Another), decided on 10.10.2018. Perusal of that order would clearly reveal that the Supreme Court cancelled the bail of that accused person, upon a solitary reasoning that he was alleged to be involved in multiple other offences. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, consideration of gravity of those offences should have been taken into account before granting bail for the present accusation. In absence of any criminal history of the present applicants, the cancellation of bail to Imran is found to be not relevant.

21. Insofar as emphasis has been laid to the material collected during further investigation that is recording of C.C.T.V. camera and the further statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., merits and credibility of that material apart, at present, for right or wrong reasons, the learned court below has rejected the application for further investigation. The material being thus referred to by learned Senior Counsel for the applicants cannot be examined at this stage as at present there is no judicial order enabling such material to be received on the record. The grievance of the applicants in that regard is engaging the attention of this Court in Application u/s 482 No. 35477 of 2017.

22. Therefore, till the order dated 14.08.2018 is set aside, no blind reliance may be placed on such material, at this stage. For the present limited purposes, it has to be assumed that such material is not part of the case diary. The claim of the applicants that such material must necessarily be considered as part of the case diary, would remain a matter to be considered in the Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C., referred to above.

23. Even otherwise, if for the purposes of grant of bail, that material were to be looked into, to any extent, the same cannot be examined in isolation. There are other materials available in the case diary being the statements of the victim and others as are part of the original case diary that clearly suggest that the applicants were equally involved in the commission of offence with common intent. The plea of alibi is a plea in defence. The stage to raise it would arise later. In any case, the material referred to by the learned senior counsel for the applicants, is not of unimpeachable credibility as may give rise to any satisfaction, to any extent, at this stage.

24. Grant of bail is discretionary. For any judicial discretion that may be exercisable in such matters, on account of the clean criminal record of the applicants and general allegations made as to injuries caused, it cannot be ignored or overlooked that the applicants themselves, undeniably did avoid the law for a long period of one year. The F.I.R. was lodged on 10.02.2017, whereas, the chargesheet was submitted within three months therefrom. Not only the applicants did not participate in the initial investigation but they remained at large for almost one year since then despite being fully aware of the proceedings as is clear from their conduct of filing proceedings to challenge the F.I.R. and orders passed at stage of inquiry and trial. In such circumstances, their trial came to be separated causing delay.

25. Clearly, the applicants appear to have surrendered in the situation arising from the order dated 03.04.2019. Therefore, at present the applicants are found to be not entitled to bail. An accused person who tests the long arm of the law in such matters for a long period of two years and who submits to it after resort is made to coercive measures accompanied with a positive direction issued by this Court, as has been done in this case, cannot, as of right claim bail at the time of his choosing. At present, looking at their past conduct, the court has no reason to be satisfied that the applicants, if enlarged on bail would continuously and regularly participate in the trial. In fact their past conduct indicates otherwise.

26. However, at the same time, it is made clear, no conclusion of fact has been drawn as to merits of issues that have been raised in the present matter as have also been noted above. All such and other matters as have arisen or may arise would remain to be considered before the appropriate forum in appropriate proceedings. Thus, it is clarified, the rights of the applicants to challenge the charge sheet, order framing charge and/or order refusing to take on record supplementary case diary may remain to be considered in appropriate proceedings before this Court.

27. Needless to add in event of challenge as has been raised by the applicants in other proceedings succeeding, the applicants will remain entitled to apply for bail afresh at that stage, in that light of changed circumstances, if required.

28. Accordingly, for the reasons noted above, the present application is rejected, at this stage.”

3. In the present second bail application, it has been pointed out that there has been change of circumstance since the first bail came to be rejected on 28.11.2019 entitling the applicants to bail on ground of such change. Thus, it is submitted, in the first place, the Court was not entirely right in observing that the material collected during further investigation was not existing on record. Here reliance has been placed on the order dated 09.05.2018 passed by the CJM Meerut wherein it was clearly observed that the material submitted by the Investigating Officer along with supplementary chargesheet pursuant to the order passed by the SP Meerut dated 29.08.2017, was placed on record. At that time, the matter had been committed to the Court of Sessions, and therefore, there was no discretion or jurisdiction remaining with the CJM except to allow such a material to be placed on record.

4. It has been further been submitted that the Court may not have been entirely correct in concluding that the applicants have been deliberately absconding for a long period of time, inasmuch as, pursuant to the material brought on record, by means of the above described further investigation vide communication dated 11.10.2018 the Investigation Officer informed the SSP Meerut that the applicants – Irfan and Furkan had been wrongly implicated and that they were no longer wanted in case crime no.93 of 2017. In such circumstances, the applicants were within their right to not surrender of their own. However, upon positive direction issued by this Court in Application u/s 482 no.33621 of 2018, they surrendered.

5. As to the change of circumstance, it has been vehemently urged that after rejection of the first bail application, Criminal Revision No.3358 of 2019 filed by the applicants came to be allowed by a learned Single Judge of this Court vide order dated 02.09.2020 wherein the order dated 21.08.2019 framing charges against the applicants was quashed and the matter remitted to the learned court below with a direction to frame charges afresh as per law, after affording opportunity of hearing to the applicants. In such changed circumstance, it has been submitted, now, in any case the further material placed on record as has also been noted in the order dated 14.08.2018 passed by the CJM Meerut has to be considered even by the learned court below, before it may proceed to frame charge. Thus, the applicants would be entitled to rely on that material for the purpose of seeking discharge as well.

6. Reliance has been placed on two decisions of the Supreme Court in Rama Chaudhary Vs. State of Bihar, (2009) 6 SCC 346 and Dharam Pal Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2016) 4 SCC 160. In Rama Chaudhary (supra), the prosecution relied on evidence led by witness contained alongwith the supplementary charge sheet. Upon challenge raised, the High Court rejected the challenge made by Rama Chaudhary the accused person. The challenge was then carried to the Supreme Court. That Court observed as under :

16. The law does not mandate taking of prior permission from the Magistrate for further investigation. Carrying out a further investigation even after filing of the charge-sheet is a statutory right of the police. Re-investigation without prior permission is prohibited. On the other hand, further investigation is permissible.

22. The law does not mandate taking prior permission from the Magistrate for further investigation. It is settled law that carrying out further investigation even after filing of the charge-sheet is a statutory right of the police (vide K. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala [(1998) 5 SCC 223 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1291] ). The material collected in further investigation cannot be rejected only because it has been filed at the stage of the trial. The facts and circumstances show that the trial court is fully justified to summon witnesses examined in the course of further investigation. It is also clear from Section 231 CrPC that the prosecution is entitled to produce any person as witness even though such person is not named in the earlier charge-sheet.

7. The same principle has been applied in Dharam Pal (supra) wherein it has been observed as under :

21. In this context, we may notice the statutory scheme pertaining to investigation. Section 173 CrPC empowers the police officer conducting investigation to file a report on completion of the investigation with the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. Section 173(8) CrPC empowers the officer-in-charge to conduct further investigation even after filing of a report under Section 173(2) CrPC if he obtains further evidence, oral or documentary. Thus, the power of the police officer under Section 173(8) CrPC is unrestricted. Needless to say, the Magistrate has no power to interfere but it would be appropriate on the part of the investigating officer to inform the Court. It has been so stated in Rama Chaudhary v. State of Bihar [Rama Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, (2009) 6 SCC 346 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1059].

8. Thus, in short, the applicants claim that the observations made by this Court while rejecting the first bail application may not have been entirely correct or may be harsh on the truth. In any case, in view of the changed circumstance and the resultant material now existing on record, it is clear that the applicants were falsely implicated in the occurrence. Here, reference has also been made to the fact that the role of causing firearm injury has been assigned to the other accused persons namely Abid and Javed whereas wholly general and vague role had been assigned to the applicants of carrying illicit firearm. However, no injury is attributable to the present applicants.

9. In the end, it has been concluded, in any case it cannot be denied that two police report containing material as may lead to opposite conclusions exist, and therefore, the applicants are entitled to the benefit of doubt even at this stage, for the purposes of grant of bail.

10. The bail application has been vehemently opposed by learned AGA and the learned Senior Counsel for the informant. He would submit that the decisions being relied upon by the applicants may not be laying down the correct principle to be applied in this case, inasmuch as while those two decisions are of bench constitutions of two Judges of the Supreme Court, in another decision of the Supreme Court of equal Bench strength being in Vinay Tyagi Vs Irshad Ali @ Deepak & Ors., 2013 (5) SCC 762, the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider whether the Investigation Officer can act on his own and file a supplementary report or whether a formal permission of the Court would be required for the same. It was accepted that there is no embargo on the Investigation Officer to carry out further investigation and to file supplementary report, yet, it was equally well recognized in that decision itself that it has been the practice adopted uniformly in such matters that a formal request is obtained by the Investigation Officer before such further investigation is carried out. Relevant to the submission advanced by learned counsel for the informant, in paragraph nos.49 and 50 of the said decision, it was observed as under :

“49. Now, we may examine another significant aspect which is how the provisions of Section 173(8) have been understood and applied by the courts and investigating agencies. It is true that though there is no specific requirement in the provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code to conduct “further investigation” or file supplementary report with the leave of the court, the investigating agencies have not only understood but also adopted it as a legal practice to seek permission of the courts to conduct “further investigation” and file “supplementary report” with the leave of the court. The courts, in some of the decisions, have also taken a similar view. The requirement of seeking prior leave of the court to conduct “further investigation” and/or to file a “supplementary report” will have to be read into, and is a necessary implication of the provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code. The doctrine of contemporanea expositio will fully come to the aid of such interpretation as the matters which are understood and implemented for a long time, and such practice that is supported by law should be accepted as part of the interpretative process.

50. Such a view can be supported from two different points of view: firstly, through the doctrine of precedent, as aforenoticed, since quite often the courts have taken such a view, and, secondly, the investigating agencies which have also so understood and applied the principle. The matters which are understood and implemented as a legal practice and are not opposed to the basic rule of law would be good practice and such interpretation would be permissible with the aid of doctrine of contemporanea expositio. Even otherwise, to seek such leave of the court would meet the ends of justice and also provide adequate safeguard against a suspect/accused.”

11. While the above apparent conflicting views of the Supreme Court may have posted some difficulty for this Court, however, at present it appears that a later decision of three judge bench of the Supreme Court in Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr., Criminal Appeal Nos. 478-479 of 2017 decided on 16.10.2019 as, relied upon by learned counsel for the informant. There, the principle enunciated in Vinay Tyagi (supra) has been confirmed. In that case, the following question had been framed :

“The question of law that therefore arises in this case is whether, after a charge-sheet is filed by the police, the Magistrate has the power to order further investigation, and if so, up to what stage of a criminal proceeding.”

12. While answering the same, the three Judges decision of the Supreme Court laid down the law, as below :

“40. Having analysed the provisions of the Code and the various judgments as aforeindicated, we would state the following conclusions in regard to the powers of a Magistrate in terms of Section 173(2) read with Section 173(8) and Section 156(3) of the Code :

40.1. The Magistrate has no power to direct “reinvestigation” or “fresh investigation” (de novo) in the case initiated on the basis of a police report.

40.2. A Magistrate has the power to direct “further investigation” after filing of a police report in terms of Section 173(6) of the Code.

40.3. The view expressed in Sub-para 40.2 above is in conformity with the principle of law stated in Bhagwant Singh case [Bhagwant Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1985) 2 SCC 537 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 267] by a three- Judge Bench and thus in conformity with the doctrine of precedent.

40.4. Neither the scheme of the Code nor any specific provision therein bars exercise of such jurisdiction by the Magistrate. The language of Section 173(2) cannot be construed so restrictively as to deprive the Magistrate of such powers particularly in face of the provisions of Section 156(3) and the language of Section 173(8) itself. In fact, such power would have to be read into the language ofSection 173(8).

40.5. The Code is a procedural document, thus, it must receive a construction which would advance the cause of justice and legislative object sought to be achieved. It does not stand to reason that the legislature provided power of further investigation to the police even after filing a report, but intended to curtail the power of the court to the extent that even where the facts of the case and the ends of justice demand, the court can still not direct the investigating agency to conduct further investigation which it could do on its own.

40.6. It has been a procedure of propriety that the police has to seek permission of the court to continue “further investigation” and file supplementary charge- sheet. This approach has been approved by this Court in a number of judgments. This as such would support the view that we are taking in the present case.”

13. The Rule of contemporanea expositio observed in the decision of Vinay Tyagi (supra) was reiterated. Therefore, applying that Rule of interpretation, as laid down by the Supreme Court, I am unable to accept the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the applicants that there was no permission required by the Investigation Officer before any further investigation may have been carried out or its material placed on record. Unless, there is a valid further investigation, it would be dangerous to consider any material that may have otherwise been placed in the record, pending evidence at the trial.

14. What therefore survives for consideration is whether in the facts of the present case, such permission was granted or may be necessarily read into the situation as the order framing the charges has been quashed by this Court. Here, it may be noted, undisputedly, on an earlier occasion the Investigation Officer had sought permission of the learned Magistrate to carry out further investigation. Rightly or wrongly, for reasons good or bad, that application was rejected by order dated 18.09.2017. It is also not disputed that the said order has been challenged by the applicants before this Court in 482 Application No. 35477 of 2017. That challenge is still pending. The order on which heavy reliance has been placed for the present purposes to press existence of such material being order dated 14.08.2018 is really not an order on any application filed by the Investigation Officer, seeking such permission.

15. It is an order passed on the application filed by the father of Irfan. The relevant part of the said order only states that the said material be placed on record. Certain material brought before the learned Magistrate after the matter had been committed to trial and grant of permission to conduct further investigation are two different things. The material has been brought on record at the instance of the father of the accused persons whereas the permission required to be obtained is to be sought by and is to be granted to the Investigation Officer. Perhaps the Chief Judicial Magistrate may have recognised the fact that the case had been committed to trial. Therefore, he may not be the proper court to pass any order granting permission to conduct further investigation. However, the Investigation Officer did not apply and he was never granted any permission.

16. In face of the specific challenge raised to the order dated 18.09.2017 refusing to grant that permission and the same being pending in a separate proceeding before this Court, it may also be not correct on part of the applicants to suggest that the application for grant of permission has been rendered infructuous as now the charges have been quashed. Merely, because the order framing charges being quashed for the defects noted in that order it would not result in reviving the investigation prior to the stage of trial till submission of the chargesheet. There is no principle shown to exist as may allow the Court to reach such a conclusion, since there are no charges framed against the applicants, therefore, further investigation must be permitted to be carried out because of that reason.

17. Further, submission advanced by learned Senior Counsel for the applicants that in the facts of the present case, the lack of permission of the learned Magistrate to carry out further investigation is a mere irregularity and not a defect inasmuch as there is no mandatory condition prescribed under the Code as may necessitate such permission to be sought, may not be open to contest at this stage, in view of conclusion drawn by the larger bench of the Supreme Court in Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya (supra). Though dealing with a question as to whether the learned Magistrate has power to order further investigation after submission of chargesheet, the Supreme Court in no uncertain terms did lay down in paragraph 40.6 quoted above that it is a procedure of propriety that the police has to seek permission to continue a further investigation.

18. There is no reason why that procedure of propriety may be read to have been done away in the face of a specific application moved by the Investigation Officer, that had been rejected by the learned Magistrate, vide order dated 18.09.2017. Once that application came to be rejected, it may not be open for the Court to completely ignore the effect of that order in these proceedings especially when the same forms subject matter of challenge in a separate proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. being Application No. 25477 of 2017.

19. In view of the above, at present, the applicants are not found entitled to bail at this stage. Accordingly, the present bail application is rejected.

20. While the Court has refused to exercise its discretion to grant bail for the reasons noted above, the conclusions drawn are only tentative and may not prejudice the rights of the parties that they may otherwise claim in any other proceedings arising from the same case crime number.

Order Date :- 28.7.2021 

पक्षकार को सुनवाई का कोई अवसर न देना प्राकृतिक न्याय के सिद्धांत के विरुद्ध : उच्च न्यायालय

इलाहाबाद उच्च न्यायालय के न्यायमूर्ति यशवंत वर्मा की एकल-न्यायाधीश पीठ ने एक रिट याचिका की अनुमति देते हुए टिप्पणी की है कि याचिकाकर्ता को सुनवाई का कोई अवसर प्रदान किए बिना आदेश पारित करना प्राकृतिक न्याय के सिद्धांत के खिलाफ है।
याचिकाकर्ता सरोज राम जिला महराजगंज में तैनात हेड जेल वार्डर हैं। वह 12 दिसंबर 2020 के उस आदेश से व्यथित है जिसके अनुसार प्रतिवादी द्वारा उससे वसूली का आदेश इस आधार पर दिया गया है कि उसे एसीपी लाभ गलत तरीके से दिया गया था।
याचिकाकर्ता ने अदालत के समक्ष प्रस्तुत किया है कि याचिकाकर्ता को सुनवाई का कोई अवसर दिए बिना उक्त आदेश पारित किया गया है।
कोर्ट ने इस तथ्य पर ध्यान दिया है कि आक्षेपित आदेश में याचिकाकर्ता को प्रस्तावित कार्रवाई के खिलाफ कारण बताने का कोई अवसर नहीं दिया गया है। कोर्ट ने यह भी पाया कि आदेश के स्पष्ट रूप से गंभीर सामाजिक परिणाम होंगे और इसलिए प्राकृतिक न्याय के सिद्धांतों का पालन किए बिना इसे पारित नहीं किया जा सकता था।
राज्य की ओर से वकील ने प्रस्तुत किया है कि न्याय के लिए  याचिकाकर्ता को नोटिस करने के बाद प्रतिवादियों को आगे की कार्यवाही करने का अवसर दिए जाने के साथ आक्षेपित आदेश को अलग रखा जाएगा।
कोर्ट ने वर्तमान रिट याचिका की अनुमति देते हुए कहा है कि,
“याचिकाकर्ता से संबंधित 15 जून 2020 और 12 दिसंबर 2020 के आक्षेपित आदेशों को रद्द कर दिया जाता है। हालांकि, यह प्रतिवादी इस बात के लिये स्वतंत्र है कि वे विधि के अनुसार मामले में नए सिरे से आगे बढ़ें और प्राकृतिक न्याय के सिद्धांतों की आवश्यकता को ध्यान में रखे।"

Stamp Act – How to admit insufficiently stamped document in evidence ?

Stamp Act, 1959 (Kerala) – If an insufficiently stamped document is to be admitted in evidence, deficient stamp duty and ten times the penalty is to be paid and the Court has no discretion in the matter of fixing the penalty.

Hence in order to admit the lease deed in evidence petitioners are bound to pay the deficit stamp duty together with penalty as provided under Sec.34(a) of the Act. Hence there is no illegality or error of jurisdiction in the impugned order calling for an interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the result, the Original Petition is found to be devoid of merit. Hence dismissed.

(LMS ICL07-2021)

Narcotic Control Bureau have jurisdiction to search and seize the syrups having codeine- Allahabad Highcourt (Lucknow)

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Ramesh Sinha; Narendra Kumar Johari, JJ.

Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substance Act, 1985 – Section 42 – Narcotic Control Bureau have jurisdiction to search and seize the syrups having codeine.

Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substance Act, 1985 – Section 67 – Power to call for information – Notice u/s. 67 is merely for enquiry / interrogation – a writ petition against such a kind of notice should not ordinarily be entertained.

J U D G M E N T

Ramesh Sinha, J.

Writ Petition (Misc. Bench) No.11190 of 2021 has been filed by the petitioner, Hemant Kumar Saini, one of the partners of the Firm M/s Preksha Trading Company, with the following main reliefs :-

(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari for quashment of the notice/summon issued under section 67 of Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 dated 13.05.2021 by the Narcotics Control Bureau Lucknow relating crime no.16/2021 registered at Police Station – Kotwali District – Varanasi on 05.04.2021 under section 8/21/29 of N.D.P.S. Act and similarly subsequent summon if any issued by investigating officer/opposite party no.3 contained as Annexure No.1 alongwith the present Writ Petition.

(ii) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of Mandamus Commanding and directing the opposite parties particularly opposite party no.2 to 4 not to arrest and harass the petitioner in pursuance of the impugned notice/summon issued under section 67 of NDPS Act dated 13.05.2021 by the N.C.B. Lucknow relating crime no.16/2021 registered at Police Station – Kotwali, District – Varanasi on 05.04.2021 under section 8/21/29 of N.D.P.S. Act during the pendency of the present writ petition, in the interest of justice.”

After amendment in the prayer clause (Crl. Misc. Application No.76529/2021), following prayer has been added by learned counsel for the petitioner :-

“(v) It is also prayed that this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing of FIR as recorded under section 42 of NDPS Act and entire investigation which is being carried in pursuance thereof conducted by the investigating officer of the department of Narcotics Control Bureau, Lucknow, in the interest of Justice.”

Almost on the same grounds, another Writ Petition (Misc. Bench) No.11396 of 2021 has been filed by petitioner Yogita Nand Yadav, the another partner of the Firm M/s Preksha Trading Company, with the following main reliefs :-

(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari to quash the investigation of NCB case crime no.16/2021 under section 8/21/29 of NDPS Act registered on 03.04.2021 in the office of Narcotics Control Bureau, Lucknow under section 42 of NDPS Act through Form NCB-1 and notice/summons issued under section 67 of Narcotics Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 dated 13.05.2021 by the Narcotics Control Bureau, Lucknow and subsequent recovery effected on 05.04.2021 at Varanasi and similarly subsequent summon if any issued by investigating officer/opposite party no.3 so far as against the petitioner is concern contained as Annexure No.1 along with the present Writ Petition.

(ii) It is further prayed that the petitioner is ready to appear again before investigating officer as already appeared on 12.04.2021 and this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the investigating officer to not arrest the petitioner after recording his statement if any and the investigating officer first consider about the question of jurisdiction for making search, seizure and investigation in the interest of justice.

(iii) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of Mandamus Commanding and directing the opposite parties particularly opposite party no.2 to 4 not to arrest and harass the petitioner in pursuance of the impugned notice/summon issued under section 67 of NDPS Act dated 13.05.2021 by the N.C.B. Lucknow relating crime no.16/2021 registered at Police Station – Kotwali, District – Varanasi on 05.04.2021 under section 8/21/29 of N.D.P.S. Act during the pendency of the present writ petition, in the interest of justice.

Since both the writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners on almost similar facts and grounds, therefore, both the writ petitions have been heard together and are being decided with a common judgment.

The brief facts which have emerged from the case of prosecution need to be noted at the very outset.

A specific information provided to Narcotics Control Bureau authority by an informer that huge quantity of codiene based syrup have illegally been stored in the shop/godown No.09 and Shop No.31 of Gyan Mondal Plaza @ Imam Mondal Plaza @ Aaj Press Building, Sant Kabir Marg near Maidagin Chauraha, Police Station Kotwali, Varanasi, by one Sunil Jaiswal. The information was reduced in writing by the authorities of the Narcotics Control Bureau (hereinafter referred to as “the N.C.B.”) in NCB-I format and submitted to superior officer, i.e. Superintendent, N.C.B., Lucknow on 03.04.2021.

A team was constituted consisting of Shri Raj Kumar Shaw, Intelligence Officer, Shri Kumar, Sepoy and Shri Manjeet, Driver, for further action as per provisions of Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substance Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “the N.D.P.S. Act,1985). The aforesaid team reached Varanasi along with necessary articles and meet the S.H.O., Kotwali Varanasi and shared the information to procure police party. The information was also communicated to Drug Inspector, Varanasi. The N.C.B. team along with police personnel and Drug Inspector, Varanasi reached at the suspected shops on 05.04.2021. The shops in question, i.e. Shop Nos. 09 and 31 were found locked. The team tried to contact to Sunil Jaiswal but after repeated calls and long waiting, said Sunil Jaiswal did not appear before the team to open the shops. The team inquired about Sunil Kumar Jaiswal through his brother’s shop also but Sunil Jaiswal could not be contacted. Then the team arranged a local key maker, Abhishek Jaiswal, who opened the lock of both the premises in presence of independent witnesses. The Shop No.09 was found fully packed with medicines.

The following medicines (Codeine based syrups) were recovered from Shop No.09 :- Serial No. Name of Medicine Quantity 1. Onerex Cs 30240 Bottles 2. Onerex Cs 42600 Bottles 3. Welcyre 4200 Bottles 4. Plencyre 6480 Bottles 5. CC Kuffs + 24624 Bottles 6. CC-Kuffs + 3888 Bottles Total 112032 Bottles From Shop No.31, following drugs were recovered :- Serial No. Name of Drug Quantity 1. Onerex CC cough syrup 2520 Bottles 2. Welcyrex 720 Bottles Total 3240 Bottles Certain documents, like registration certificate, copies of bank pass-book, PAN Card, AADHAR Card, GST Certificate, appointment receipt of passport and ITR were also recovered from the Shop No.31.

The Drug Inspector took four bottles of each batch of Codeine based syrup as sample, rest of the recovered medicines were seized and sealed by the N.C.B. Brass seal. After completion of search and seizure of both the shops in presence of independent witnesses and joint team of N.C.B., Police and Drug Inspector, search-cum-seizure memo was prepared on the spot. All the legal formalities were completed by the team without causing any damage to any person or property. Both the shops were locked by the new locks purchased by the N.C.B. team.

Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that petitioners are running a medical shop for sale and purchase of medicines under the valid license granted by the competent authority under partnership with other person, namely, Sunil Kumar Jaiswal under the name and style of M/s New Preksha Trading Company, having its godown in House No.62/16, Saptsagar, Medicine Market, Maidagin, Post Visheswarganj, Police Station – Kotwali, District Varanasi. The licence was effective from 19.07.2018 for sale, purchase and stocking of medicines. The petitioners have no criminal history in their credit and they are ready to co-operate with the investigation, but well established apprehension is that whenever they will appear before the Investigating Officer, without fair and proper investigation, by making pressure and threat, just to get undue advantage being in custody, the petitioners may be arrested and send to jail. The authorities of N.C.B. have no jurisdiction to make search and seizure and also to issue notice under Section 67 of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985.

Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that on the basis of seizure memo dated 05.04.2021, the N.C.B. officials registered a case vide Crime No.16/2021, on 05.04.2021, under Section 8/21/29 of N.D.P.S. Act,1985, against the accused Sunil Kumar Jaiswal. The authorities of N.C.B. also issued notice to petitioners under Section 67 of N.D.P.S. Act,1985, which is without jurisdiction and against the mandates of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 as well as Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. The officers of N.C.B. broken the locks and seized the shop illegally and without any jurisdiction. The medicines were kept in godown under the valid licence granted by the concerned authorities. The cough syrup Onerex, CC cough syrup, Welcyrex, Plencyrex cough syrup, Plencyrex and RC-KUFFS (Plus) are medicines of schedule H (1) of the Drugs & Cosmetics Act with the leveling of Rx. The cough syrups were purchased by the Wind Biotech [manufactured Onerex and RC-KUFFS (Plus)] and so far as Welcyrex and Plencyrex are concerned, the same were manufactured by the Similax Health Care Pvt. Ltd., Baddi, Himanchal Pradesh. Both firms are reputed and having valid license for manufacturing medicines. The said cough syrups were purchased from the firms which are registered, namely, Sri Radha Medical Agency and M/s A.R. Pharma and S.K. Drug Agency, situated at Varanasi. All the three firms are also running under the valid licence granted by the Drugs and Cosmetics Authority. The partnership firm of petitioners M/s Preksha Ayurvedics is having valid licence to carry the business of sale and purchase. If the entire prosecution story is taken as it is, even the provisions of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 are not attracted at all. It may be the case of petitioners falling under the provisions of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. The petitioners have been sent a notice which is cryptic in nature and on the printed proforma without recording any ground of enquiry or fact which is necessitated to send in the name of petitioners.

It has further been submitted by learned counsel that the petitioners have been granted licence for carrying out the medical store business for sale, stock, exhibit for sale or distribute by whole sale drugs specified in Schedule C and C (1) of the Schedule of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.

Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that the co-accused (one of the partners, namely, Sunil Jaiswal) was arrested when he appeared to record statement and to cooperate in the investigation and inquiry, on 15.05.2021, which is illegal. The petitioners also apprehend that they may be arrested by Investigating Officer on his appearance. No illegal act has been done by the petitioners because the alleged codeine syrup is medicine of Schedule ‘H’, for which they have been granted license for its stock, sale, purchase, etc.

Learned counsel for petitioners submitted that the cases of petitioners are squarely covered by the judgment of this Court passed in the case of Ashok Kumar through (Brother) Rakesh Kumar Pawar Vs. Union of India, under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No.2976 of 2014, decided on 15.10.2014, as well as Writ Petition No.8953 of 2013 (MB) Ram Dayal Mathur Vs. Union of India, in which the Court has quashed the notice under Section 67 of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985.

Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that notification issued on 26.10.2005, by the Directorate General of Health Service and again issued in March, 2009, by which it has been clarified by the highest authority under the Drug and Cosmetics Act, 1940 that number of cough syrup preparations contained codeine only by virtue of the fact that these preparation contains codeine and its salts, did not fall under the provisions of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 and Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Rules, 1985. They fall under Schedule ‘H’ of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 and such drugs are governed by the said rules. The recovered cough syrup contains less than the permitted quantity of codeine per does unit and it will not fall within the definition of Section 2 (xi) (b) of the N.D.P.S. Act, 1985. The present case is covered by the Rules of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the provisions of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 provides punishment for the defined offences and only complaint can be filed against the wrong doer under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 by the authorities authorized under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, not by the authorities under the provisions of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985. The alleged cough syrup have been purchased by the petitioner firm through proper receipts. The alleged cough syrup is a schedule ‘H’ drug which includes “Codeine” as one of the ingredients which is required for the therapeutic purposes. The “Codeine” contained in the recovered syrup is within the prescribed limit and percentage and the same has been purchased by the firm authorized legally for sale and supply of the medicines by the petitioner. The petitioner has already submitted his reply to the notice issued under Section 67 of the N.D.P.S. Act,1985 through registered post. The provisions of N.D.P.S. Act,1985 itself speaks that the N.D.P.S. Act,1985 would not be applicable if the drug in question has been stored for sale and purchase for medical and scientific purposes, and according to the terms and conditions of the licence granted under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. In the present case, petitioners are running the medical shop business under the licence granted by the authority authorized under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 for medical purposes, therefore, the provisions of N.D.P.S. Act,1985 would not be applicable at all.

Per contra, the learned counsel for the Narcotics Control Bureau has submitted that on a reliable information the team of N.C.B. searched and seized the codeine based cough syrup and prepared its search and seizure memo dated 05.04.2021, which is in accordance with law. The investigation of the offence is continuing. It has been mentioned in the petition that the Firm of petitioners had purchased the codeine based cough syrup by M/s A.R. Pharma, Varanasi through proper bills but during the course of investigation, when N.C.B. team along with Drug Inspector, Varanasi visited the premises of M/s A.R. Pharma on 04.06.2021, it has been found that the said firm did not exist on the ground. On that premises a Chamber of one Advocate was found. The said observations were noted by the Drug Inspector, Varanasi for their own inquiry too. Since the firm M/s A.R. Pharma does not exist on the ground, thus, all codeine phosphate cough syrup bottles claimed to be supplied by the firm M/s A.R. Pharma are illegal.

Learned counsel for N.C.B. further submitted that on further enquiry, the concerned courier company SPOTON LOGISTICS PVT. LTD. VARANASI, has supplied the information that the consignment of medicines never reached at the premises on M/s A.R. Pharma. It was not received by the owner of the M/s A.R. Pharma. The said consignment was directly delivered to one Deepak, at Shop No.09, Second Floor, Gyanmandal Plaza, SaptaSagar, Varanasi. This premises belongs to New Preksha Trading Company. Thus the firm M/s A.R. Pharma illicitly diverted the said consignment from transport courier agency to New Preksha Trading, without proper receiving, stock taking and checking the physical veracity of the said consignment. Thus, a physically non-existing company is getting deliveries of Codeine based cough syrup bottles and directly diverting it to new wholesaler without proper receiving, stock taking and without checking physical veracity of consignment. It is clear illegal act of diversion of codeine containing cough syrup bottles done by M/s A.R. Pharma and New Preksha Trading Company. The receipt and further sale of all codeine phosphate consignments of M/s A.R. Pharma are under investigation. In his statement under Section 67 of NDPS Act, 1985 the proprietor of M/s A.R. Pharma failed to provide all sale, purchase documents of codeine based cough syrup which is supplied to New Preksha Trading Company and Preksha Ayurvedics.

He also admitted that he has illegally diverted the consignment of codeine based cough syrup directly to his customers without checking the veracity of consignment. The codeine based cough syrups were sold for other purposes than the therapeutic purposes.

Learned counsel for the Narcotics Control Bureau has further submitted that during course of investigation the team of Narcotics Control Bureau along with Drug Inspector, Varanasi also visited to the given address of M/s S.K. Drug Agency on 04.06.2021. The said firm also did not exist on the ground. On that premises, one cosmetic/bridal make up shop is being run. Since the said firm does not physically exist on ground, thus, all codeine phosphate cough syrup bottles claimed to be supplied by it to New Preksha Trading Company and Prechcha Ayurvedic are illegal.

Learned counsel further contended that no licence has been issued in the name of the present petitioners. The licence issued by the competent authority is for the therapeutic and medical use only and not for the use of intoxication or for getting a stimulant effect.

Possession, sale and purchase of codeine based cough syrup for non therapeutic and non medical usage is illegal and hence provisions of N.D.P.S. Act,1985 shall be attracted. The petitioner Hemant Kumar Saini till now has not appeared before the Investigating Officer and has not shown or submitted any document to Investigating Officer in support of his claim and petitioner Yogita Nand Yadav is avoiding to appear after once appearing before enquiry officer and after assurance to appear again, despite repeated summons and is not co-operating with the on going investigation. The investigation of the case is going on and the Investigating Officer is still in the process of collecting the criminal case history, if any, against the petitioners.

Learned counsel has further argued that the Narcotics Control Bureau has bonafide jurisdiction of search, seizure, inquiry and investigation under the provisions of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 which is a special Act enacted by the Parliament with the objective to control and regulate the illicit trafficking relating to Narcotic Drug and Psychotropic Substance. The Drug and Cosmetics Act, 1940 deals with drugs which are intended to be used for therapeutic or medical usage, on the other hand, the N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 intend to curb and penalize the usage of drugs which are used for intoxication or for getting a stimulant effect. Any diversion and illegal sale, purchase, possession of drugs intended for therapeutic or medical usage must attract provisions of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985. Under the provisions of Section 67 of N.D.P.S. Act,1985 the authorized officers may call for information from any person to satisfy himself whether there has been any contravention of the provision of the N.D.P.S. Act, 1985. The investigation of the case is being conducted with fair and proper manner and and with clean hands. The provisions of Section 80 of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 and Section 2 of Drugs and Cosmetics Act give power to proceed and investigate the case under the N.D.P.S. Act,1985 also. Thus, the provisions of N.D.P.S. Act,1985 can be applied along with the provisions of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.

Learned counsel has further submitted that N.C.B. Case No.16 of 2021, under Section 8/21/29 of N.D.P.S. Act,1985 has not been registered in Police Station Kotwali, District Varanasi, as mentioned by the petitioners. The police team had joined N.C.B. raiding team during course of search for assistance only. The N.C.B. has jurisdiction and power under the provisions of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 to make search and seizure, investigate and during enquiry may call for information from any person to satisfy whether there has been any contravention of provisions of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985. The petitioners are not co-operating in the investigation. Summons under Section 67 of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 had been issued on 07.04.2021, 20.04.2021, 13.05.2021 and on 02.06.2021 to provide opportunity to the petitioners to show their claim over seized items. On each occasion, petitioners deliberately avoided investigation. The petitioners should disclose all the sale and purchase record which has yet not been disclosed by them as they are not co-operating in the investigation and enquiry. The petitioners have not come with clean hands before the Court.

Learned counsel has also submitted that the GST return filing statement was checked and it was found that the said Firm had filed last GST return on 23.04.2021 but the petitioners and partner have not shown full record of corresponding sale and purchase shown by the Firm, particularly, regarding the recovered 1,15,244 bottles of codeine based cough syrup seized under seizure memo dated 05.04.2021.

Learned counsel has further mentioned that one of the partner of Firm Preksha Ayurvedic Mr. Yogitanand Yadav [the petitioner in Writ Petition No.11396 (MB) of 2021] appeared before the N.C.B. team under the compliance of Section 67 of NDPS Act, 1985 on 12.04.2021 but N.C.B. officials did not arrest him, although further he did not appear before the Investigating Officer. Hence, it is wrong to say that petitioners have every apprehension that when they will appear before the Investigating Officer, in compliance of notice issued against him under Section 67 of N.D.P.S. Act,1985 they will be arrested.

Learned counsel has further submitted that the judgment passed by this Court in Ashok Kumar Vs. Union of India, Crl. Misc. Case No.2976 of 2014 is under challenge in Hon’ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No. 000115/2018 (Union of India Vs. Ashok Kumar) which is pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the judgment is awaited.

Learned counsel has further submitted that the writ petitions filed by the petitioners are misconceived and against the provisions of law. Mere notice under Section 67 of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985, cannot be challenged under writ jurisdiction of the Court, as this is the process of investigation, hence the present writ petitions are liable to be dismissed.

We have heard arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri A.P. Mishra, and Shri Akhilesh Awasthi, learned counsel for Narcotics Control Bureau and perused the material brought on record.

Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that in the present case the provisions of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 are not attracted, rather this may be a case falling under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.

So far as the applicability of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 is concerned, this Act has been enacted by the Parliament to regulate the import, manufacture, distribution and sales of drugs and cosmetic, whereas the N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 has been enacted with a view to make stringent provision for the control and regulation of operations relating to Narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. In this context, it has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Rakesh Kumar, (2019) 2 SCC 466 in paragraph 7 that : –

“7. At the outset it is essential to note the objectives of the two legislations before us i.e. the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the NDPS Act. The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 was enacted to specifically prevent substandard drugs and to maintain high standards of medical treatment. (Chimanlal Jagjivan Das Sheth v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 665) : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 621). The Drugs and Cosmetics Act,1940 was mainly intended to curtail the menace of adulteration of drugs and also of production, manufacture, distribution and sale of spurious and substandard drugs. On the other hand, the NDPS Act is a special law enacted by the Parliament with an object to control and regulate the operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

After analyzing the objectives of both the Acts, we can safely conclude that while the Drugs and Cosmetics Act deals with drugs which are intended to be used for therapeutic or medicinal usage, on the other hand, the NDPS Act intends to curb and penalize the usage of drugs which are used for intoxication or for getting a stimulant effect.”

Subject matter of the case is the recovery of medicines in the form of syrup, namely, Onerex Cs, Welcyre, Plencyre and CC KUFFs, which contain codeine as one of its ingredients. The Codeine is derived from opium and comes under the provisions of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985.

For its operations, Section 2 of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 essentially provides for three kinds of offending substance, i.e. “Manufactured Drug”, “Narcotic Drug” and “Psychotropic Substance”.

“2(xi) “Manufactured Drug” means:- “(a) All coca derivatives, medicinal cannabis, opium derivatives and poppy straw concentrate; (b) Any other narcotic substance or preparation which the Central Government may, having regard to the available information as to its nature or to a decision, if any, under any International Convention, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a manufactured drug, but does not include any narcotic substance or preparation which the Central Government may, having regard to the available information as to a decision, if any, under any International Convention, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare not to be a manufactured drug;”

2(xiv) “Narcotic drug means coca leaf, cannabis (hemp), opium, poppy straw and includes all manufactured goods.

2(xxiii) “Psychotropic Substance” means :- “Psychotropic substance means any substance, natural or synthetic, or any natural material or any salt or preparation of such substance or material included in the list of psychotropic substances specified in the Schedule.”

Reference also needs to be made to Section 2(xvi)(c), which defines ‘Opium Derivative’, which reads as under :- 2 (xvi) :

“Opium derivative” means- (a)…………………………………………….

(b)…………………………………………….

(c) “Phenanthrene alkaloids, namely, morphine, codeine, thebaine and their salts” (d)…………………………………………… (e)…………………………………………………

From the above wording of definitions, it is apparent that medicine syrup which contains codeine as its ingredient, that codeine is an opium derivative and opium comes under the definition of Narcotic Drug. In this regard Section 8 of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 make provision and certain restrictions, which reads as under :-

“8. Prohibition of certain operations.-No person shall-

(a) cultivate any coca plant or gather any portion of coca plant; or

(b) cultivate the opium poppy or any cannabis plant; or

(c) produce, manufacture, possess, sell, purchase, transport, warehouse, use, consume, import inter-State, export inter-State, import into India, export from India or tranship any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, except for medical or scientific purposes and in the manner and to the extent provided by the provisions of this Act or the rules or orders made thereunder and in a case where any such provision, imposes any requirement by way of licence, permit or authorisation also in accordance with the terms and conditions of such licence, permit or authorisation:

Provided that, and subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, the prohibition against the cultivation of the cannabis plant for the production of ganja or the production, possession, use, consumption, purchase, sale, transport, warehousing, import inter-State and export inter-State of ganja for any purpose other than medical and scientific purpose shall take effect only from the date which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf: Provided further that nothing in this section shall apply to the export of poppy straw for decorative purposes.”

Learned counsel for the Narcotic Control Bureau has vehemently argued that from the shop/godown of petitioners manufactured drug has been seized in bulk which was kept there without any valid authorization, which amounts to clear violation of Section 8 of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985. Section 8 of NDPS Act, 1985, clearly prohibits possession of narcotic substance, except for medical or scientific purposes and that too, in accordance with relevant provisions of law. In support of his contention learned counsel for the Narcotic Control Bureau has placed reliance in the dictum of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Sanjeev V. Despande, MANU/SC/0688/2014. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :-

“25. In other words, DEALING IN narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances is permissible only when such DEALING is for medical purposes or scientific purposes. Further, the mere fact that the DEALING IN narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances is for a medical or scientific purpose does not by itself lift the embargo created under section 8(c). Such a dealing must be in the manner and extent provided by the provisions of the Act, Rules or Orders made thereunder. Sections 9[9] and 10[10] enable the Central and the State Governments respectively to make rules permitting and regulating various aspects (contemplated under Section 8(c), of DEALING IN narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.”

In case in hand, the proceedings against the petitioners are at the stage of enquiry/investigation. It has to be ascertained by the Investigating Officer that whether the Rules of 1945 (Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945) has been followed by the petitioners/firm or not. It is also in embryo that the recovered medicines which were kept by petitioners’ firm in his shop/godown, are for the purpose of medicines and therapeutic use or not and whether they followed the provisions of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and Rules of 1945 and in the transaction of drugs the proper accounts and records are being maintained or not, as it is mandatory by the provisions Section 18-B of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, which reads as under :-

“[18-B. Maintenance of records and furnishing of information. Every person holding a license under clause (c) of section 18 shall keep and maintain such records, registers and other documents as may be prescribed and shall furnish to any officer or authority exercising any power or discharging any function under this Act such information as is required by such officer or authority for carrying out the purposes of this Act.]”

The provisions of Rule 65 of Rules of 1945 makes provisions regarding conditions of licence. Learned counsel for the N.C.B. has argued that during the search no register, record/entries were found which may validate the stock.

Therefore, whether the petitioners-firm is holding a valid licence or not and whether conditions for licence are being followed by the petitioners-firm or not; whether the necessary records are being maintained by the petitioners-firm or not, all these points are the subject matter of enquiry/investigation, which is continuing.

Therefore, any conclusion, in this regard can be drawn only after finalization of inquiry/investigation.

In the present facts of the case according to provision of Section 80 of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 and Section 2 of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the proceedings can be initiated and inquiry can be made under the provisions of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 as well as under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Section 80 of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985, reads as under :-

“80. Application of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 not barred.-The provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940) or the rules made thereunder.”

Section 2 of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, makes following provision :-

“2.Application of other laws not barred.- The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of, the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930 (2 of 1930), and any other law for the time being in force.

The above provisions clearly indicates that provisions of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and Rules of 1945 have co-relation with the provisions of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 and Rules. They cannot stand in isolation. Therefore, at this stage of proceedings, it cannot be said that the case of petitioners is covered by the provisions of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 only and action taken by prosecution (N.C.B.) under the provisions of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 is illegal and without jurisdiction.

Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued also on the point that the recovered syrups fall under Schedule ‘H’ and H1 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, hence in the case the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 are applicable.

In this regard, whether the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 as well as provisions of Rule 97 (c), (d), (e) and (f) of 1945 Rules, are being followed or not, this is also the matter of enquiry/investigation. Rule 97 (c), (d), (e) and (f) of Rules of 1945 reads as under :-

“97. Labelling of medicines.- (1) The container of a medicine for internal use shall-

(a)………………………………………………………………………

(b) if it contains a drug substance specified in Schedule H, be labeled with the symbol Rx and conspicuously displayed on the left top corner of the label and be also labeled with the following words in legible black coloured font size in completely red rectangular box:

SCHEDULE H PRESCRIPTION DRUG-CAUTION

Not to be sold by retail without the prescription of a Registered Medical Practitioner.

(c) if it contains a substance specified in Schedule H and comes within the purview of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985) be labeled with the symbol NRx, which shall be in red and conspicuously displayed on the left top corner of the label, and be also labeled with the following words in legible black coloured font size in completely red rectangular box :

SCHEDULE H PRESCRIPTION DRUG-WARNING

To be sold by retail on the prescription of a Registered Medical Practitioner only.

(d)…………………………………………………………………

(e) if it contains a drug substance specified in Schedule H1, be labeled with symbol Rx, which shall be in red conspicuously displayed on the left top corner of the label and shall also be labeled with the following words in legible black coloured font size in completely red rectangular box :

SCHEDULE H1 PRESCRIPTION DRUG – CAUTION -It is dangerous to take this preparation except in accordance with the medical advice.

– Not to be sold by retail without the prescription of a Registered Medical Practitioner (f) if it contains a drug substance specified in Schedule H1 and comes within the purview of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985) be labeled with symbol NRx, which shall be in red and conspicuously displayed on the left top corner of the label and shall also be labeled with the following words in legible black coloured font size in completely red rectangular box :

SCHEDULE H1 PRESCRIPTION DRUG-CAUTION -It is dangerous to take this preparation except in accordance with the medical advice.

-Not to be sold by retain without the prescription of a Registered Medical Practitioner.

Hence whether the provisions of above Rule 97 along with other relevant provisions of Act of 1940 are being followed in the case or not is also subject matter of enquiry/investigation as there is nothing on record at this stage which may prove it.

Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that the recovered syrup is a medicine which contains the quantity of codeine under permissible limit and vide notification of Central Government dated 14.11.1985 the medicine has been prepared by the manufacturer for therapeutic purposes, for the above point of argument, learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on paragraph 46 of the case law of Ashok Kumar Vs. Union of India and others, decided by this Court on 15.10.2014, which reads as under :-

“46. Central Notification Dated 14.11.1985 and published in Gazette of India has been issued under Section 2 (xi) (b) of N.D.P.S. Act wherein “Manufactured Drugs” have been mentioned.

Relevant portion of notification, Annexure-5, issued under N.D.P.S. Act reads as under :

“S.O.526(E), dated 14th November, 1985.- In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-clause (b) of clause (xi) of section 2 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), the Central Government hereby declare the following narcotic substance and preparation to the (be) manufactured drugs, namely:

X X X X X X

(35) Methyl morphine (commonly known as ‘Codeine’) and Ethyl morphine and their salts (including Dionine), all dilutions and preparations except those which are compounded with one or more other ingredients and containing not more than 100 milligrams of the drug per dosage unit and with a concentration not more than 2.5 percent in undivided preparations and which have been established in therapeutic practice.”

Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitionersfirm is also entitled to get the benefit of above notification.

On the above point of argument, it is to be noted that as according to the definition mentioned in Section 2 (XIV) of N.D.P.S. Act,1985, opium has been kept under the definition of “Narcotic Drugs”. The Section 2 (xiv) reads as under :-

“2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-

(i)……………………………………………………………..

(ii)…………………………………………………………….

(iii)…………………………………………………………..

(iv)………………………………………………………….

(vi)…………………………………………………………

(vii)……………………………………………………….

(viii)………………………………………………………

(ix)…………………………………………………………

(x)…………………………………………………………….

(xi)……………………………………………………………..

(xii)……………………………………………………………..

(xiii)……………………………………………………………..

(xiv) “narcotic drug” means coca leaf, cannabis (hemp), opium, poppy straw and includes all manufactured goods.

‘Codeine’ is derivative of opium. What is the percentage/ratio of ‘codeine’ in the recovered and seized syrup, is not on record. The same has to be ascertained during the course of investigation/enquiry/ laboratory report, as it has been shown in search memo that the samples of recovered syrup has been taken by Drug Inspector for investigation, hence in the context of seized syrups no conclusion can be drawn taking into account the said notification dated 14.11.1985, at this stage.

Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the search and seizure made by the team of Narcotic Control Bureau by breaking the lock of petitioners- firm was illegal and without jurisdiction.

In this regard, Section 42 of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985, reads as under :-

“42. Power of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrant or authorisation.- (1) Any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the departments of central excise, narcotics, customs, revenue intellegence or any other department of the Central Government including para-military forces or armed forces as is empowered in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government, or any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the revenue, drugs control, excise, police or any other department of a State Government as is empowered in this behalf by general or special order of the State Government, if he has reason to believe from persons knowledge or information given by any person and taken down in writing that any narcotic drug, or psychotropic substance, or controlled substance in respect of which an offence punishable under this Act has been committed or any document or other article which may furnish evidence of the commission of such offence or any illegally acquired property or any document or other article which may furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which is liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this Act is kept or concealed in any building, conveyance or enclosed place, may between sunrise and sunset, (a) enter into and search any such building, conveyance or place; (b) in case of resistance, break open any door and remove any obstacle to such entry; (c) seize such drug or substance and all materials used in the manufacture thereof and any other article and any animal or conveyance which he has reason to believe to be liable to confiscation under this Act and any document or other article which he has reason to believe may furnish evidence of the commission of any offence punishable under this Act or furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which is liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this Act; and (d) detain and search, and, if he thinks proper, arrest any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed any offence punishable under this Act : Provided that in respect of holder of a licence for manufacture of manufactured drugs or psychotropic substances or controlled substances, granted under this Act or any rule or order made thereunder, such power shall be exercised by an officer not below the rank of sub-inspector : Provided further that if such officer has reason to believe that a search warrant or authorisation cannot be obtained without affording opportunity for the concealment of evidence or facility for the escape of an offender, he may enter and search such building, conveyance or enclosed place at any time between sunset and sunrise after recording the grounds of his belief.

(2) Where an officer takes down any information in writing under sub-section (1) or records grounds for his belief under the proviso thereto, he shall within seventy-two hours send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior.”

In view of the provisions of Section 42 of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985, prima facie, it cannot be said that the team of Narcotic Control Bureau was having no jurisdiction to search and seize the syrups having codeine.

Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that the case of petitioners is squarely covered by the case of Ram Dayal Mathur Vs. Union of India [ MB No. 8953 of 2013, decided by this Court on 03.04.2015, and Ashok Kumar Vs. Union of India (supra) decided by this Court on 15.10.2014, wherein it has been held that the cough syrups having codeine in permissible limit and ratio, the case will be governed by the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and Rules of 1945 and the provisions of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 are not applicable. The conclusion in the above case has been mentioned in paragraph 101 of the judgment, which reads as under :-

“101. Considering the above noted discussion, relevant provisions of N.D.P.S. Act and Rules, relevant provisions of D & C Act and Rules, judgments rendered by various courts and documents appended with the petition which have neither been disputed nor controverted referred to hereinabove, this Court concludes as follows:

(i) Even if all the facts and circumstances alleged by the prosecuting agency are admitted to be correct, it cannot be said that the petitioner, who was serving as Territory Sales Manager in M/s Abbott Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. (manufacturer of Phensedyl Cough Syrup), Division at Lucknow, in any way abetted or conspired to commit offence under Section 8 of the N.D.P.S Act as punishable under Section 21 of the said Act. It was the duty of the petitioner to procure orders of Phensedyl Cough Syrup from licenced stockists or distributors and ensure its supply from licenced manufacturer viz; employer of the petitioner.

(ii) Phensedyl Cough Syrup is a Schedule ‘H’ drug under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act; has been manufactured by M/s Abbott Healthcare Pvt. Ltd, a licenced manufacturer under the D & C Act and Rules; had been stocked by a licenced stockist viz; M/s Simran Pharma, owned by co-accused, at licenced premises.

(iii) Phensedyl Cough Syrup is a therapeutic drug containing ‘codeine’ within specified limits, as provided under licence of the licenced manufacturer, under Drugs and Cosmetics Act.

(iv) Phensedyl Cough Syrup, as recovered, is covered under exception provided under entry no.35 of Central Government Notification dated 14.11.1985 isued under Section 2 (xi)(b) of the N.D.P.S.Act and, therefore, cannot be construed as a Narcotic Drug or Manufactured Drug, hence, Section 8 of the N.D.P.S.Act would not be attracted.

(v) The Directorate General of Health Services has issued clarification dated 26.10.2005 to specify that Phensedyl is a Schedule ‘H’ drug under the D & C Act and Rules and although it contains ‘codeine’ in limited prescribed quantity, would not fall under the provisions of N.D.P.S.Act and Rules.

(vi) Considering the Narcotic contents and nature of Schedule ‘H’ drug, the manufacture and distribution of the drug has been regulated under the D & C Act and Rules. For that purpose the provisions require the manufacturer, stockist, distributor and seller etc. to obtain licence, which is issued on compliance of certain conditions. If it is ensured that these conditions are adhered and complied with and the Schedule ‘H’ drug is sold only on prescription, there would be no misuse of the drug. The authorities therefore are required to ensure strict compliance of the conditions of licence so as to prevent its misuse. In the case in hand, if at all, an offence has been committed, it would be under the D & C Act, committed by the stockist viz; the co-accused, for violation of the provisions of Section 18-B punishable under Section 28-A of the D & C Act and/or other provisions.

(vii) This Court is also persuaded in concluding as above by judgments rendered by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in 1996 Cr.L.J. 3329, Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab; 1998 Cr.L.J. 1460 titled ‘Rajeev Kumar v. State of Punjab’; 1997 Cr.L.J. 3104 titled ‘Deep Kumar v. State of Punjab’ and judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Md. Sahab Uddin and another v. State of Assam, decided on 5.10.2012 in Criminal Appeal No.1602 of 2012, S.L.P.(Crl.) No.5503 of 2012 read with judgment of Gauhati High Court in Md.Sahab Uddin and another v. State of Assam (Bail Application no.885 and 886 of 2012, decided on 25.5.2012). Likewise the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Rajesh Kumar Gupta’s case (supra) favours the legal proposition propounded on behalf of the petitioner.

(viii) This Court has also taken into account that N.D.P.S. Act and Drugs and Cosmetics Act, both are Central Legislations. N.D.P.S. Act specifically provides exceptions whereunder a ‘narcotic drug’ (codeine) can be used for medicinal/therapeutic purposes. Under the provisions of the Act, Central Notification dated 14.11.1985, whereunder prescribed quantity of codeine has been allowed to be included, per dosage unit, has been issued. Admittedly, Phensedyl Cough Syrup contains ‘codeine’ within the prescribed quantity.

Thus, in the considered opinion of this Court Phensedyl Cough Syrup falls within the exception provided under the N.D.P.S.Act and, therefore, its possession with licenced stockists would not invite the penalties under N.D.P.S. Act. Phensedyl Cough Syrup, in the facts and circumstances of this case is required to be considered as a drug under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act.”

In reply of above argument, learned counsel for the N.C.B. has submitted that the case of State of Uttaranchal Vs. Rajesh Kumar Gupta, 2007 (1) SCC 355, which has been relied upon by this Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Vs. Union fo India (supra), has been over ruled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Sanjeev V. Despande (supra) and the Court while deciding the case of Ashok Kumar Vs. Union of India (Supra), decided on 15.10.2014, has not discussed the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Sanjeev V. Despande (supra), which was decided earlier, i.e. on 12.08.2014.

Therefore, the case of Ashok Kumar Vs. Union of India (supra), in the light of law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India Vs. Sanjeev V. Despande (supra) lost its binding effect. It has also been submitted that the judgment of Ashok Kumar (supra) has been challenged by prosecution in Apex Court vide Criminal Appeal No.000115/2018 (Union of India Vs. Ashok Kumar), which is subjudice, The argument of learned counsel for N.C.B. finds force. In view of the court, at this stage the petitioners are not entitled for any relief on the basis of findings of the above case of Ashok Kumar (Supra).

Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that the notice issued by Narcotics Control Bureau under Section 67 of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 is without jurisdiction and is liable to be quashed.

Section 67 of NDPS Act, 1985 reads as under :-

“67. Power to call for information, etc.-Any officer referred to in section 42 who is authorised in this behalf by the Central Government or a State Government may, during the course of any enquiry in connection with the contravention of any provisions of this Act,-

(a) call for information from any person for the purpose of satisfying himself whether there has been any contravention of the provisions of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder;

(b) require any person to produce or deliver any document or thing useful or relevant to the enquiry;

(c) examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.”

The case of petitioners is at the stage of collection of evidence/enquiry/investigation and the notice/summon under Section 67 has been issued to petitioners only for the satisfaction of investigating officer that whether there has been any contravention of the provisions of the N.D.P.S. Act,1985 or Rule or Order or not. It is quite possible that in the enquiry if the evidence comes before the Investigating Officer that the Firm of petitioners has not violated the Rules and Regulations and orders of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985 as well as Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the enquiry/Investigating Officer of NCB may submit its report accordingly and the petitioners may be exonerated from prosecution. The wording mentioned in Section 67 of N.D.P.S. Act, 1985, makes it clear that notice is merely for enquiry/interrogation. In the opinion of Court, a writ petition against such a kind of notice should not ordinarily be entertained. It is premature in nature because the notice by itself does not give a rise of cause of action, as no adverse order has yet been passed. It is quite possible that if the transaction is in accordance with law, the authorities may be satisfied by the enquiry and in the event of adverse decision, it will certainly be opened to accused persons/petitioners to assail the same in appropriate proceedings under the law. Undoubtedly in certain conditions, when there is a question of infringement of fundamental right or on the point of lack of jurisdiction, the such notice/summon can be challenged, but it is not in the present case.

Hence, at this stage of proceeding, it is not permissible in law to quash the notice/summon which has been issued to the petitioners for the purpose of enquiry/investigation, to satisfy himself that whether there has been any contravention of the provision of the Act, Rule or order of relevant inactment. Present case is at the stage of enquiry/investigation of fact that whether the offence has been committed by the petitioners-firm or not. By discussing many judgments, Hon’ble Supreme Court held in the case of Niharika Infrastructure Vs. State of Maharashtra, MANU/SC/0272/2021, that the Court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit investigation into the offence, alleged to be completed. The intention of law is always that the investigating agency may be permitted to complete the investigation. Therefore, it will not be justified that the until investigation/enquiry is completed the FIR in question be nipped into bud by quashing same at the early stage of proceedings.

In view of the above discussion, the court is not inclined to quash the notice/summons issued against petitioners in both the writ petitions as well as the FIR as prayed in Writ Petition (Misc.Bench) No.11190/2021 (Hemant Kumar Saini Vs. Union of India & others).

The Court finds that present writ petitions are misconceived and are liable to be dismissed.

Accordingly, both the writ petitions are dismissed.