Conviction cannot be based solely on the Testimony of a wholly unreliable witness- Supreme Court

The Supreme Court recently comprising of a Bench of Justice BR Gavai and, Justice Hima Kohli observed that when the Court finds that a witness is “wholly unreliable”, neither conviction nor acquittal can be based on the testimony of such a witness. (Mahendra Singh vs State of MP).

Facts of the case

In this case, the Trial court has earlier convicted 5 individuals under Section 148, 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.  This was appealed in the Madhya Pradesh High Court and was dismissed.  In the appeal before Supreme Court, it was contended that the witness Anmol Singh could not have witnessed the incident and therefore the conviction based on the testimony is impaired. 

This was opposed by the State, which contended that a minor contradiction or inconsistency that cropped up in the evidence of the witness cannot be a ground to disbelieve the truthfulness of the testimony of the witness. 

Mr. S. Nagamuthu, counsel on behalf of the submitted that the entire conviction of the appellants is based on the sole testimony of Amol Singh ( P.W.6). The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the evidence of Mahendra Singh (P.W.3) and Akhe Singh (P.W.4) along with the evidence of Mobat Singh (D.W.3) and Kok Singh Raghuvanshi (D.W.4) would reveal that Amol Singh (P.W.6) could not have witnessed the incident. He submits that Amol Singh (P.W.6) is the real brother of the deceased Bhagat Singh and therefore his testimony has to be scrutinized with greater care, caution and circumspection. The learned Senior Counsel relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Vadivelu Thevar vs. The State of Madras . It was submitted that the testimony of the said witness falls in the category of “wholly unreliable” witness and as such, the conviction on the basis of the testimony of such a witness could not be sustainable. Mr. Nagamuthu further submitted that on the basis of the same evidence/testimony, the learned Trial Court had acquitted six accused while convicting and sentencing the other five. 

Mr. Nagamuthu further submitted that there is also a doubt as to whether the FIR in the present case is a real FIR or not. It is further submitted that delayed FIR would create a doubt about the trustworthiness of the prosecution case. 

Learned counsel for the State on the contrary, submitted that the learned Trial Court as well as the High Court have rightly relied on the testimony of Amol Singh (P.W.6). It is submitted that merely because a minor contradiction/ inconsistency cropped up in the evidence of the witness, it cannot be a ground to disbelieve the truthfulness of the testimony of such a witness. It was submitted that the maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” is not accepted in India. She therefore submitted that grain has to be separated from the chaff to find out the truth from the testimony of the witness.

The bench at the very outset referred to case of Vadivelu Thevar vs The State of Madras (1957) SCR 981 wherein it was observed, "Witnesses are of three types, viz., (a) wholly reliable; (b) wholly unreliable; and (c) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. When the witness is “wholly reliable”, the Court should not have any difficulty in as much as conviction or acquittal could be based on the testimony of such single witness. Equally, if the Court finds that the witness is “wholly unreliable”, neither conviction nor acquittal can be based on the testimony of such a witness. It is only in the third category of witness that the Court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial."

The bench taking note of the above remarked, "From the evidence of these witnesses, it is amply clear that Amol Singh (P.W.6) could not have witnessed the incident. We therefore find that the evidence of Amol Singh (P.W.6) would fall in the category of “wholly unreliable” witness. As such, no conviction could be based solely on his testimony. We find that the corroboration sought by the High Court from the medical evidence was not justified. The medical evidence could only establish that the death was homicidal. However, it could not have been used to corroborate the version of Amol Singh (P.W.6) that he has witnessed the incident."

The bench disposing off the application remarked, "Insofar as the contention of learned DAG for the respondent-State that the prosecution has proved the motive is concerned, it is well settled that only because motive is established, the conviction cannot be sustained. 

In that view of the matter, we find that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and as such, the accused are entitled to be given the benefit of doubt."