Criminal complaints cannot be quashed only on ground that the allegations made therein appear to be of civil nature- Karnataka High Court.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 Section 482 Case registered against petitioners for offence punishable under Sections 120B, 406, 415, 418 and 420 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code Prayer for quashing of FIR - Complaint is %3D specific that with dishonest intention, the MSA was entered into between the parties Criminal complaints cannot be quashed only on the ground that the allegations made therein appear to be of civil nature If the ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused are prima facie made out in the complaint, the criminal proceeding shall not be interdicted - There was MSA between the parties and also an agreement between the parties - No doubt, there is a clause to withhold the amount- Questionarose whether there was dishonest intention at the inception of the entering into question has to be probed by the IO contract - Said if the complaint prima facie discloses the cognizable offence and hence, once the cognizable offence is found in the allegations made in the complaint, the IO has to be probe the matter as established under law - Present petition accordingly dismissed

LMASLFD.

Mutual divorce - Parties lived together only for three days, after which they have Mutual divorce - Parties lived together only for three days, after which they have separated on account of irreconcilable differences Decree of mutual divorce by waiving separated on account of irreconcilable differences Decree of mutual divorce by waiving statutory waiting period of six months- Supreme Court

Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955,  Section Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955,  Section  13B 13B(2)  -  Mutual  divorce  -  Waiving  off  cooling  period  of (2)  -  Mutual  divorce  -  Waiving  off  cooling  period  of six  months  -  Parties  are  both  well-educated  and  highly  placed  government  officers  and six  months  -  Parties  are  both  well-educated  and  highly  placed  government  officers  and married  for  about  15  months  -  Marriage  was  nonÂstarter  -  Admittedly,  parties  lived married  for  about  15  months  -  Marriage  was  nonÂstarter  -  Admittedly,  parties  lived together  only  for  three  days,  after  which  they  have  separated  on  account  of together  only  for  three  days,  after  which  they  have  separated  on  account  of irreconcilable  differences  -  Parties  lived  apart  for  entire  period  of  their  marriage  except irreconcilable  differences  -  Parties  lived  apart  for  entire  period  of  their  marriage  except three  days  -  Joint  statement  of  parties  that  efforts  at  reconciliation  failed  -  Parties  are three  days  -  Joint  statement  of  parties  that  efforts  at  reconciliation  failed  -  Parties  are unwilling  to  live  together  as  husband  and  wife  -  Even  after  over  14  months  of unwilling  to  live  together  as  husband  and  wife  -  Even  after  over  14  months  of separation,  parties  still  want  to  go  ahead  with  divorce  -  No  useful  purpose  would  be separation,  parties  still  want  to  go  ahead  with  divorce  -  No  useful  purpose  would  be served  by  making  parties  wait,  except  to  prolong  their  agony  -  Therefore,  rejection  of served  by  making  parties  wait,  except  to  prolong  their  agony  -  Therefore,  rejection  of application  for  waiving  statutory  waiting  period  of  six  months  set  aside  -  Decree  of application  for  waiving  statutory  waiting  period  of  six  months  set  aside  -  Decree  of mutual  divorce  by  waiving  statutory  waiting  period  of  six  months. mutual  divorce  by  waiving  statutory  waiting  period  of  six  months. [Para  28 ] Cases  Referred  :Cases  Referred  :Amardeep  Singh  v.  Harveen  Kaur,  2017(4)  RCR  (Civil)  608  :  (2017)  8  SCC  746. Anil  Kumar  Jain  v.  Maya  Jain,  (2009)  10  SCC  415  :  (2009)  4  SCC  (Civ)  226. Devinder  Singh  Narula  v.  Meenakshi  Nangia,  (2012)  8  SCC  580. Kiran  v.  Sharad  Dutt,  (2000)  10  SCC  243. Soni  Kumari  v.  Deepak  Kumar,  (2016)  16  SCC  346.

JUDGMENT Indira  Banerjee,  J. Indira  Banerjee,  J.  -  Leave  granted. 2.  This  appeal  is  against  a  judgment  and  order  dated  17th  November  2021  passed  by  the  High  Court of  Punjab  and  Haryana  dismissing  the  Civil  Revisional  Application  being  CRA  No.  2537/2021(O&M) filed  by  the  Appellant  against  an  order  dated  12th  October  2021  passed  by  the  Family  Court,  Hissar, refusing  the  prayer  of  the  Appellant  and  the  Respondent,  to  waive  the  requirement  under  section 13B(2)  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955  to  make  the  motion  for  a  decree  of  divorce  after  at  least  six months  from  the  date  of  filing  the  petition  for  divorce  by  mutual  consent  under  Section  13B(1)  of the  said  Act. 3.  The  Appellant  and  the  Respondent,  both  of  whom  are  educated  and  well  placed  in  life  (the Appellant  being  an  IPS  officer  and  the  Respondent  an  IFS  officer),  were  married  according  to  Hindu rites  on  10th  September  2020.  Admittedly,  on  account  of  irreconciliable  differences,  the  Appellant and  Respondent  separated  on  13th  September  2020,  that  is,  precisely  three  days  after  marriage. 4.  On  or  about  30th  September  2021,  after  over  one  year  of  separation,  the  Appellant  and  the Respondent  filed  a  petition  in  the  Family  Court  under  section  13B  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act  for  a decree  of  divorce  by  mutual  consent.  section  13B  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act  reads  as  under:Â "13B  Divorce  by  mutual  consent. 13B  Divorce  by  mutual  consent.  (1)  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act  a  petition  for dissolution  of  marriage  by  a  decree  of  divorce  may  be  presented  to  the  district  court  by  both the  parties  to  a  marriage  together,  whether  such  marriage  was  solemnised  before  or  after  the commencement  of  the  Marriage  Laws  (Amendment)  Act,  1976  (68  of  1976)*,  on  the  ground  that they  have  been  living  separately  for  a  period  of  one  year  or  more,  that  they  have  not  been able  to  live  together  and  that  they  have  mutually  agreed  that  the  marriage  should  be dissolved. (2)  On  the  motion  of  both  the  parties  made  not  earlier  than  six  months  after  the  date  of  the presentation  of  the  petition  referred  to  in  subÂsection  (1)  and  not  later  than  eighteen  months after  the  said  date,  if  the  petition  is  not  withdrawn  in  the  meantime,  the  court  shall,  on  being satisfied,  after  hearing  the  parties  and  after  making  such  inquiry  as  it  thinks  fit,  that  a marriage  has  been  solemnised  and  that  the  averments  in  the  petition  are  true,  pass  a  decree of  divorce  declaring  the  marriage  to  be  dissolved  with  effect  from  the  date  of  the  decree." 5.  In  terms  of  section  13B(1)  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  the  parties  to  a  marriage  might  file  a petition  for  dissolution  of  marriage,  by  decree  of  divorce  by  mutual  consent,  on  the  ground  that  that they  have  been  living  separately  for  a  period  of  one  year  or  more,  and  that  they  have  not  been able  to  live  together  and  have  mutually  agreed  that  the  marriage  should  be  dissolved. 6.  SubÂsection  (2)  of  section  13B  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act  provides  that  the  Court  shall  pass  a decree  of  divorce,  declaring  the  marriage  to  be  dissolved  with  effect  from  the  date  of  the  decree,  on the  motion  of  both  the  parties,  made  not  earlier  than  six  months  after  the  date  of  presentation  of the  petition  referred  to  in  subÂsection  (1)  of  Section  13B,  but  not  later  than  18  months  after  the said  date,  after  making  necessary  enquiries,  if  the  petition  is  not  withdrawn  in  the  meantime. 7.  Section  14  provides  that  notwithstanding  anything  contained  elsewhere  in  the  Hindu  Marriage Act,  it  shall  not  be  competent  to  the  Court  to  entertain  any  petition  for  dissolution  of  a  marriage  by a  decree  of  divorce,  unless  on  the  date  of  presentation  of  the  petition,  one  year  has  elapsed  since the  date  of  marriage.

8.  In  terms  of  the  proviso  to  Section  14,  the  Court  may,  on  application  made  to  it,  in  accordance  with such  rules  as  may  be  made  by  the  High  Court,  allow  a  petition  to  be  presented  before  one  year  has elapsed  since  the  date  of  marriage,  on  the  ground  that  the  case  is  one  of  exceptional  hardship  to the  Appellant  or  of  exceptional  depravity  on  the  part  of  the  respondent.  In  this  case,  the  petition under  Section  13B  was  filed  after  one  year  had  elapsed  from  the  date  of  marriage 9.  On  or  about  12th  October  2021,  the  Appellant  and  the  Respondent  moved  an  application  before the  Family  Court,  seeking  waiver  of  the  sixÂmonth  waiting  period  under  section  13B(2)  of  the  Hindu Marriage  Act,  to  make  the  motion  for  the  Court  to  pass  a  decree  of  divorce. 10.  By  the  order  dated  12th  October  2021,  impugned  before  the  High  Court,  the  Family  Court dismissed  the  application  as  devoid  of  merits  and  not  maintainable.  The  case  file  was  directed  to  be put  up  on  4th  April  2022  for  the  purpose  of  recording  statement  on  2nd  motion  of  the  parties.  The Family  Court  held: "As  per  the  guidelines  laid  down  by  the  Hon'ble  Supreme  Court  in  case  titled  Amardeep  Singh Amardeep  Singh v.  Harveen  Kaur,  2017(4)  RCR  (Civil)  608 v.  Harveen  Kaur,  2017(4)  RCR  (Civil)  608  the  case  of  the  petitioners  does  not  fall  within  the parameters  fixed  to  waive  off  the  stipulated  period  of  six  months  as  mentioned  under  section 13B(2)  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act.  In  the  above  mentioned  case  it  has  been  clearly  laid  down that  where  the  Court  dealing  with  the  matter  is  satisfied  that  a  case  is  made  out  to  waive  the statutory  period  under  section  13B(2)  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  it  can  do  so  after  considering the  following: 1)  The  statutory  period  of  six  months  specified  in  Section  13B(20  in  addition  to  the  statutory period  of  one  year  under  Section  13B  of  separation  of  parties  is  already  over  before  the  first motion  itself. 2) 3) . . 4)  . 6.  In  the  present  case,  the  statement  of  first  motion  was  recorded  on  30.09.2021  and  the  parties are  residing  separately  since  13.09.2020.  Meaning  thereby  on  the  date  of  recording  the statement  of  first  motion,  the  period  of  separation  of  18  months  was  not  complete.  The  present case  is  not  covered  by  the  guidelines  laid  down  by  the  Hon'ble  Supreme  Court  in  para  no.19  of the  judgment.  In  such  circumstances,  this  Court  cannot  grant  permission  for  waiving  off  the stipulated  period  of  six  months  under  section  13B(2)  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act.  The application  is  accordingly  dismissed  being  devoid  of  merits  and  not  maintainable.  Now  the  file be  put  upon  04.04.2022  for  the  purpose  already  fixed  i.e.,  for  recording  statement  of  second motion  of  the  parties." 11.  The  Appellant  filed  a  Civil  Revisional  Application  under  Article  227  of  the  Constitution  of  India, being  CR  2527  2021  (O&M)  in  the  High  Court,  challenging  the  aforesaid  order  dated  12th  October 2021  passed  by  the  Family  Court. 12.  The  said  Civil  Revisional  Application  has  been  dismissed  by  the  High  Court,  by  the  judgment  and order  impugned  in  this  appeal.  The  High  Court,  inter  alia,  held: "5.  The  judgment  in  Amardeep  Singh  (supra)  is  unambiguous.  It  lays  down  that  the  object  of Section  13ÂB  of  the  Act  is  to  enable  parties  to  dissolve  a  marriage  by  consent  if  it  has  broken down  irretrievably.  This  would  enable  them  to  explore  other  options  and  to  move  on  in  life.  A period  of  six  months  has  been  provided  in  Section  13B(2)  of  the  Act  to  safeguard  against  a hurried  decision.  However,  if  a  Court  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  there  is  no  chance  of  a reunion,  it  should  not  be  powerless  to  waive  the  statutory  period  of  six  months  so  that  the parties  may  not  be  subjected  to  further  agony.  Thus,  it  has  been  held  that  six  months  statutory period  prescribed  is  directory  in  nature.  However,  the  power  has  been  made  subject  to  certain conditions  which  are  reproduced  below: i)  the  statutory  period  of  six  months  specified  in  Section  13B(2),  in  addition  to  the  statutory period  of  one  year  under  Section  13B(1)  of  separation  of  parties  is  already  over  before  the  first motion  itself; ii)  ii)  all  efforts  for  mediation/conciliation  including  efforts  in  terms  of  Order  XXXIIA  Rule  3 CPC/Section  23(2)  of  the  Act/section  9  of  the  Family  Courts  Act  to  reunite  the  parties  have  failed and  there  is  no  likelihood  of  success  in  that  direction  by  any  further  efforts; iii)  the  parties  have  genuinely  settled  their  differences  including  alimony,  custody  of  child  or any  other  pending  issues  between  the  parties;  iv)  the  waiting  period  will  only  prolong  their agony. 5.  A  perusal  of  the  aforementioned  conditions  shows  that  all  of  them  are  fulfilled  except  the condition  of  a  period  of  1  ½  years  having  elapsed  before  the  first  motion.  Thus,  the  Family Court  had  no  option  but  to  dismiss  the  application  filed  for  waiving  the  period  of  six  months.  In this  view  of  the  matter  no  error  has  been  committed  by  it  warranting  any  interference  by  this Court.  The  judgments  in  Jobanpreet  Kaur  (supra);  Nav  Raj  Bhatta  (supra)  and  Priyanka Chauhan  (supra)  cannot  be  relied  upon  even  though  in  the  said  cases  a  period  of  1  ½  years had  not  elapsed  before  the  first  motion  for  the  reason  that  none  of  them  have  considered  the issue  of  waiver  being  subject  to  period  of  1  ½  years  having  elapsed  before  first  motion. 6.  In  view  of  the  above,  the  revision  petition  has  no  merit  and  is  dismissed." 13.  section  13B(1)  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act  read  with  Section  13B(2)  envisages  a  total  waiting period  of  1  ½  years  from  the  date  of  separation  to  move  the  motion  for  a  decree  of  divorce.  The High  Court  correctly  found  that  Section  13B  (2)  is  directory,  but  rejected  the  Criminal  Revisional Application  with  the  observation  that  the  Family  Court  had  no  option  but  to  dismiss  the  application for  waiving  the  waiting  period  of  six  months,  since  the  condition  of  waiting  for  1½  years  from  the date  of  separation  for  moving  the  motion  for  passing  of  a  decree  of  divorce  had  not  been  fulfilled. 14.  The  provisions  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act  evince  an  inherent  respect  for  the  institution  of marriage,  which  contemplates  the  sacramental  union  of  a  man  and  a  woman  for  life.  However, there  may  be  circumstances  in  which  it  may  not  reasonably  be  possible  for  the  parties  to  the marriage  to  live  together  as  husband  and  wife. 15.  The  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  therefore  has  provisions  for  annulment  of  marriage  in  specified circumstances,  which  apply  to  marriages  which  are  not  valid  in  the  eye  of  law  and  provisions  of judicial  separation  and  dissolution  of  marriage  by  decree  of  divorce  on  grounds  provided  in  Section 13(1)  of  the  said  Act,  which  apply  to  cases  where  it  is  not  reasonably  possible  for  the  parties  to  a marriage  to  live  together  as  husband  and  wife. 16.  Section  13B  incorporated  in  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act  with  effect  from  27.5.1976,  which  provides for  divorce  by  mutual  consent,  is  not  intended  to  weaken  the  institution  of  marriage.  Section  13B puts  an  end  to  collusive  divorce  proceedings  between  spouses,  often  undefended,  but  time consuming  by  reason  of  a  rigmarole  of  procedures.  Section  13B  also  enables  the  parties  to  a marriage  to  avoid  and/or  shorten  unnecessary  acrimonious  litigation,  where  the  marriage  may  have irretrievably  broken  down  and  both  the  spouses  may  have  mutually  decided  to  part.  But  for  Section 13B,  the  defendant  spouse  would  often  be  constrained  to  defend  the  litigation,  not  to  save  the marriage,  but  only  to  refute  prejudicial  allegations,  which  if  accepted  by  Court,  might  adversely affect  the  defendant  spouse. 17.  Legislature  has,  in  its  wisdom,  enacted  section  13B  (2)  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act  to  provide  for  a cooling  period  of  six  months  from  the  date  of  filing  of  the  divorce  petition  under  Section  13B  (1),  in case  the  parties  should  change  their  mind  and  resolve  their  differences.  After  six  months  if  the parties  still  wish  to  go  ahead  with  the  divorce,  and  make  a  motion,  the  Court  has  to  grant  a  decree of  divorce  declaring  the  marriage  dissolved  with  effect  from  the  date  of  the  decree,  after  making such  enquiries  as  it  considers  fit. 18.  The  object  of  Section  13B(2)  read  with  Section  14  is  to  save  the  institution  of  marriage,  by preventing  hasty  dissolution  of  marriage.  It  is  often  said  that  "time  is  the  best  healer".  With  passage of  time,  tempers  cool  down  and  anger  dissipates.  The  waiting  period  gives  the  spouses  time  to forgive  and  forget.  If  the  spouses  have  children,  they  may,  after  some  time,  think  of  the consequences  of  divorce  on  their  children,  and  reconsider  their  decision  to  separate.  Even otherwise,  the  cooling  period  gives  the  couple  time  to  ponder  and  reflect  and  take  a  considered decision  as  to  whether  they  should  really  put  an  end  to  the  marriage  for  all  time  to  come. 19.  Where  there  is  a  chance  of  reconciliation,  however  slight,  the  cooling  period  of  six  months  from the  date  of  filing  of  the  divorce  petition  should  be  enforced.  However,  if  there  is  no  possibility  of reconciliation,  it  would  be  meaningless  to  prolong  the  agony  of  the  parties  to  the  marriage.  Thus,  if the  marriage  has  broken  down  irretrievably,  the  spouses  have  been  living  apart  for  a  long  time,  but not  been  able  to  reconcile  their  differences  and  have  mutually  decided  to  part,  it  is  better  to  end the  marriage,  to  enable  both  the  spouses  to  move  on  with  the  life. 20.  In  Amardeep  Singh  v.  Harveen  Kaur,  (2017)  8  SCC  746 Amardeep  Singh  v.  Harveen  Kaur,  (2017)  8  SCC  746,  relied  upon  by  the  Family  Court and  the  High  Court,  this  Court  held: "19.  Applying  the  above  to  the  present  situation,  we  are  of  the  view  that  where  the  court dealing  with  a  matter  is  satisfied  that  a  case  is  made  out  to  waive  the  statutory  period  under Section  13ÂB  (2),  it  can  do  so  after  considering  the  following: (i)  The  statutory  period  of  six  months  specified  in  Section  13ÂB(2),  in  addition  to  the  statutory period  of  one  year  under  Section  13ÂB(1)  of  separation  of  parties  is  already  over  before  the first  motion  itself; (ii)  All  efforts  for  mediation/conciliation  including  efforts  in  terms  of  Order  32ÂA  Rule  3 CPC/Section  23(2)  of  the  Act/section  9  of  the  Family  Courts  Act  to  reunite  the  parties  have  failed and  there  is  no  likelihood  of  success  in  that  direction  by  any  further  efforts; (iii)  The  parties  have  genuinely  settled  their  differences  including  alimony,  custody  of  child  or any  other  pending  issues  between  the  parties; (iv)  The  waiting  period  will  only  prolong  their  agony. The  waiver  application  can  be  filed  one  week  after  the  first  motion  giving  reasons  for  the 

prayer  for  waiver.  If  the  above  conditions  are  satisfied,  the  waiver  of  the  waiting  period  for the  second  motion  will  be  in  the  discretion  of  the  court  concerned. 20.  Since  we  are  of  the  view  that  the  period  mentioned  in  Section  13ÂB(2)  is  not  mandatory but  directory,  it  will  be  open  to  the  court  to  exercise  its  discretion  in  the  facts  and circumstances  of  each  case  where  there  is  no  possibility  of  parties  resuming  cohabitation  and there  are  chances  of  alternative  rehabilitation." 21.  The  factors  mentioned  in  Amardeep  Singh  v.  Harveen  Kaur Amardeep  Singh  v.  Harveen  Kaur  (supra),  in  Paragraph  19  are illustrative  and  not  exhaustive.  These  are  factors  which  the  Court  is  obliged  to  take  note  of.  If  all the  four  conditions  mentioned  above  are  fulfilled,  the  Court  would  necessarily  have  to  exercise  its discretion  to  waive  the  statutory  waiting  period  under  Section  13B  (2)  of  the  Marriage  Act. 22.  The  Family  Court,  as  well  as  the  High  Court,  have  misconstrued  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in Amardeep  Singh  v.  Harveen  Kaur Amardeep  Singh  v.  Harveen  Kaur  (supra)  and  proceeded  on  the  basis  that  this  Court  has  held that  the  conditions  specified  in  paragraph  19  of  the  said  judgment,  quoted  hereinabove,  are mandatory  and  that  the  statutory  waiting  period  of  six  months  under  Section  13B  (2)  can  only  be waived  if  all  the  aforesaid  conditions  are  fulfilled,  including,  in  particular,  the  condition  of separation  of  at  least  one  and  half  year  before  making  the  motion  for  decree  of  divorce. 23.  It  is  well  settled  that  a  judgment  is  a  precedent  for  the  issue  of  law  that  is  raised  and  decided.  A judgment  is  not  to  be  read  in  the  manner  of  a  statute  and  construed  with  pedantic  rigidity.  In Amardeep  Singh  v.  Harveen  Kaur Amardeep  Singh  v.  Harveen  Kaur  (supra),  this  Court  held  that  the  statutory  waiting  period  of  at least  six  months  mentioned  in  section  13B  (2)  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act  was  not  mandatory  but directory  and  that  it  would  be  open  to  the  Court  to  exercise  its  discretion  to  waive  the  requirement of  Section  13B(2),  having  regard  to  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case,  if  there  was  no possibility  of  reconciliation  between  the  spouses,  and  the  waiting  period  would  serve  no  purpose except  to  prolong  their  agony. 24.  In  Devinder  Singh  Narula  v.  Meenakshi  Nangia,  (2012)  8  SCC  580 Devinder  Singh  Narula  v.  Meenakshi  Nangia,  (2012)  8  SCC  580,  this  Court  observed:Â "8.  We  have  carefully  considered  the  submissions  made  on  behalf  of  the  parties  and  have  also considered  our  decision  in  Anil  Kumar  Jain  case  [Anil  Kumar  Jain  v.  Maya  Jain,  (2009)  10 Anil  Kumar  Jain  v.  Maya  Jain,  (2009)  10 SCC  415  :  (2009)  4  SCC  (Civ)  226 SCC  415  :  (2009)  4  SCC  (Civ)  226].  It  is  no  doubt  true  that  the  legislature  had  in  its  wisdom stipulated  a  cooling  off  period  of  six  months  from  the  date  of  filing  of  a  petition  for  mutual divorce  till  such  divorce  is  actually  granted,  with  the  intention  that  it  would  save  the institution  of  marriage.  It  is  also  true  that  the  intention  of  the  legislature  cannot  be  faulted with,  but  there  may  be  occasions  when  in  order  to  do  complete  justice  to  the  parties  it  becomes necessary  for  this  Court  to  invoke  its  powers  under  Article  142  in  an  irreconcilable  situation.  In fact,  in  Kiran  v.  Sharad  Dutt Kiran  v.  Sharad  Dutt  [Kiran  v.  Sharad  Dutt,  (2000)  10  SCC  243 Kiran  v.  Sharad  Dutt,  (2000)  10  SCC  243]  ,  which  was considered  in  Anil  Kumar  Jain  case  [Anil  Kumar  Jain  v.  Maya  Jain,  (2009)  10  SCC  415  : Anil  Kumar  Jain  v.  Maya  Jain,  (2009)  10  SCC  415  : (2009)  4  SCC  (Civ)  226 (2009)  4  SCC  (Civ)  226],  after  living  separately  for  many  years  and  11  years  after  initiating the  proceedings  under  section  13  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  the  parties  filed  a  joint application  before  this  Court  for  leave  to  amend  the  divorce  petition  and  to  convert  the  same into  a  proceeding  under  Section  13ÂB  of  the  Act.  Treating  the  petition  as  one  under  Section 13ÂB  of  the  aforesaid  Act,  this  Court  by  invoking  its  powers  under  Article  142  of  the Constitution  granted  a  decree  of  mutual  divorce  at  the  stage  of  the  SLP  itself.  In  different cases,  in  different  situations,  this  Court  had  invoked  its  powers  under  Article  142  of  the Constitution  in  order  to  do  complete  justice  between  the  parties."

25.  In  Soni  Kumari  v.  Deepak  Kumar,  (2016)  16  SCC  346 Soni  Kumari  v.  Deepak  Kumar,  (2016)  16  SCC  346,  this  Court  exercised  its  power  under Article  142  of  the  Constitution  of  India  to  waive  the  statutory  waiting  period  of  six  months,  where the  wife  had  received  the  entire  compensation  of  Rs.15  lacs  in  full  and  final  settlement  of  her claims  as  per  the  settlement  arrived  at  between  the  parties,  and  further  granted  a  decree  of divorce  to  the  parties  by  mutual  consent. 26.  In  Anil  Kumar  Jain  v.  Maya  Jain,  (2009)  10  SCC  415 Anil  Kumar  Jain  v.  Maya  Jain,  (2009)  10  SCC  415,  this  Court  held:Â "29.  In  the  ultimate  analysis  the  aforesaid  discussion  throws  up  two  propositions.  The  first proposition  is  that  although  irretrievable  breakdown  of  marriage  is  not  one  of  the  grounds indicated  whether  under  Section  13  or  13ÂB  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955  for  grant  of divorce,  the  said  doctrine  can  be  applied  to  a  proceeding  under  either  of  the  said  two provisions  only  where  the  proceedings  are  before  the  Supreme  Court.  In  exercise  of  its extraordinary  powers  under  Article  142  of  the  Constitution  the  Supreme  Court  can  grant  relief to  the  parties  without  even  waiting  for  the  statutory  period  of  six  months  stipulated  in  Section 13ÂB  of  the  aforesaid  Act." 27.  For  exercise  of  the  discretion  to  waive  the  statutory  waiting  period  of  six  months  for  moving  the motion  for  divorce  under  section  13B  (2)  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  the  Court  would  consider  the following  amongst  other  factors:  Â (i)  the  length  of  time  for  which  the  parties  had  been  married; (ii)  how  long  the  parties  had  stayed  together  as  husband  and  wife; (iii)  the  length  of  time  the  parties  had  been  staying  apart; (iv)  the  length  of  time  for  which  the  litigation  had  been  pending; (v)  whether  there  were  any  other  proceedings  between  the  parties; (vi)  whether  there  was  any  possibility  of  reconciliation; (vii)  whether  there  were  any  children  born  out  of  the  wedlock; (viii)  whether  the  parties  had  freely,  of  their  own  accord,  without  any  coercion  or  pressure, arrived  at  a  genuine  settlement  which  took  care  of  alimony,  if  any,  maintenance  and  custody of  children,  etc. 28.  In  this  Case,  as  observed  above,  the  parties  are  both  well-educated  and  highly  placed government  officers.  They  have  been  married  for  about  15  months.  The  marriage  was  a  nonÂstarter.  Admittedly,  the  parties  lived  together  only  for  three  days,  after  which  they  have  separated on  account  of  irreconcilable  differences.  The  parties  have  lived  apart  for  the  entire  period  of  their marriage  except  three  days.  It  is  jointly  stated  by  the  parties  that  efforts  at  reconciliation  have failed.  The  parties  are  unwilling  to  live  together  as  husband  and  wife.  Even  after  over  14  months  of separation,  the  parties  still  want  to  go  ahead  with  the  divorce.  No  useful  purpose  would  be  served by  making  the  parties  wait,  except  to  prolong  their  agony. 29.  The  appeal  is,  therefore,  allowed.  The  impugned  order  dated  17th  November,  2021  passed  by  the High  Court  and  the  impugned  order  dated  12th  October,  2021  passed  by  the  Family  Court,  Hissar are  set  aside. 30.  In  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  this  case,  this  Court  deems  it  appropriate  to  exercise  its  power 

under  Article  142  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  to  grant  the  Appellant  and  the  Respondent  a  decree of  divorce  by  mutual  consent  under  section  13B  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955,  waiving  the statutory  waiting  period  of  six  months  under  Section  13(B)  (2)  of  the  said  Act. 31.  There  will  accordingly  be  a  decree  of  divorce  by  mutual  consent  under  section  13B  of  the  Hindu Marriage  Act,  1955  dissolving  the  marriage  of  the  Appellant  and  the  Respondent. 32.  Pending  Applications,  if  any,  stand  disposed  of.

LMASLFD1926592 

Judgement date 11.12.2021

Is it mandatory for plaintiff to give full description of suit property?

Brief of the case- The plaintiff must

be vigilant to give description of the immovable suit property
with its full description including boundaries thereof as
required in Order 7 rule 3 of the civil procedure code, as
amended in state of Maharashtra and cannot suppress the

market value of the Suit property from the court, as required to

be stated for the purposes of valuation of the suit for the
purpose of jurisdiction of the court as also for payment of the
Court fee.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

FIRST APPEAL NO. 729 OF 2013

Kishorbhai Premchand Shah  V  HIRJI BHOJRAJ & SONS

CORAM:-A. P. BHANGALE, J.
DATED : 2/9/2013
Citation;2014(2) MHLJ187 Bom

The appeal is directed against the
order dated
22-10-2011 passed in Civil Suit No. 1711 of 2010 below Ex. 6
passed by the Learned City Civil judge , City Civil Court
Mumbai rejecting the plaint under order 7 Rule 11 (d) of the
Code of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff claimed as transferee, occupant and ownership of the premises being Room No. 3, Mahavir
Building. According to the Plaintiff there was a clause 10 of re conveyance in earlier written agreement for Sale dated
31-03-1957 between Occupant Kishorbhai Premchand Shah
and charitable Trust (Defendant no. 1). The Trust issued notice
to the Plaintiff on 04-07-1988 to enforce clause 10 of the

agreement offering sum of Rs 1575/- by cheque and sought re-
acquisition of the suit premises on the basis of clause 10 and
offered monthly tenancy of the suit premises at the rate of Rs
50/- to the Plaintiff . The Plaintiff rejected the offer of tenancy,
disputing the right of the Trust under clause 10 of the
Agreement dated 31-03-1957 to re-conveyance of suit
premises.

It is case of the Plaintiff that plaintiff took objection after the Trust decided to dispose off it’s property by
a Public notice dated 28-01-2009 published in ‘Mumbai
Samachar’Gujrathi News Paper and objected by letter dated
21-02-2009 . Trust replied and denied the statements made by

the Plaintiff by reply dated 02-03-2009. Thus Plaintiff had

filed S.C suit 1711 of 2010 for declaration that he holds and
occupy the suit premises; with full and complete ownership
challenging clause 10 and 14 of the Agreement for Sale dated
31-03-1957 as void and have no legal effect, with an prayer for

permanent injunction restraining Defendants from interfering
with the Plaintiff’s Possession, on the basis of clause 10 and 14
of the Agreement dated 31-03-1957.

The Suit was valued for Rs 1000/-only mentioning
clause Section 6 (iv) (j) of the Bombay Court Fees Act though
the Plaintiff was seeking declaration as to ownership of the Suit
property and also seeking relief to declare that clauses 10 and
14 of the Agreement dated 31-03-1957 are void.

The Trial Court had noticed after hearing the
Parties and upon perusal of the Plaint that the Plaintiff claimed
declaration that She is occupying the suit property as Owner
and also that the clauses 10 and 14 of the Agreement dated

31-03-1957 as Void. The Plaintiff had knowledge about the

notice dated 04-07-1988 (vide Para 6 of the Plaint) from the
Trust but She claimed that suit premises was allegedly
purchased by her in 1994. Learned Trial Judge applied Art 58
of the Limitation Act, 1963 whereby the period of Limitation is

three years reckoned from when the Trust gave notice dated 04-
07-1988 to the Plaintiff’s predecessor of enforcing the clause
10 of agreement dated 31-03-1957 while offering Tenancy to
the Plaintiff’s predecessor, who had rejected the offer of
Tenancy. No Suit was filed within three years from 04-07-1988
when the right to Sue first accrued in favour of the Plaintiff or
her predecessor. Thus it was observed by a reasoned order that
the Suit was barred under Art 58 of limitation Act as filed
beyond period of Limitation.

The Court also found that the Suit was not valued properly for the purposes of the Court fees and jurisdiction.
Learned Trial Judge refereed to Section 6 (iv)(d) of the

Bombay court fees Act and observed that 1⁄4 th ad valorem fee

was leviable on the market value of the Suit property. Valuation for the purposes of the Court fees and jurisdiction was made at Rs 1000/- only as stated in Para 23 of the Plaint
despite the fact that the residential property is situated at Matunga, prime area in City of Mumbai where market price cannot be less than Ten Lakhs.
It is true that the plaintiff is free to make his or her own estimation of the reliefs sought in the Plaint. But if
meager, arbitrary, and unreasonable the valuation appears Court can consider the prayers made and valuation made for reliefs of declaration and injunction in respect ownership title claimed over suit property, and may reject the plaint if
valuation for the purposes of the Court fees and jurisdiction is
found deliberately wrong.
In the Plaint valuation was stated in Para 23 thus;
“23.The Plaintiff values the relief claimed in the Suit at Rs 1000/- and has paid the court fees accordingly”

This was deliberate, bald and vague statement in mischievous
disregard to the relevant provisions of the Suit valuation Act as
well as the the Bombay court Fees Act or willful ignorance of
relevant provisions of law to avoid revenue. By improper and unjust valuation with scant disregard for the provisions of the
Suit valuation Act and the provisions of the Bombay Court
Fees Act the plaintiff can not allowed to get away from the
fiscal liability before approaching the Court of law.
No care was taken by the Plaintiff to cure the defect of wrong valuation and vagueness in description of
the suit property despite the fact that specific written objections
were taken by the defendant. The Plaintiff could have valued
the Suit separately for the purposes of the Court fees and
jurisdiction of the Court as contemplated under the
Suit Valuation Act and mentioning the relevant provision of the
Bombay Court fees Act. Valuation for the purposes of the Court fees and for the purposes of the jurisdiction may also be the same. But when the plaintiff in substance wanted to claim the declaration as to the right , title as Owner of the immovable
residential property situated at Matunga, prime area in City of
Mumbai capable being valued in terms of money preferably by the Government ready reckoner price and was duty bound to state the market price of the property by reasonably estimating the suit for the purposes of valuation of the Suit and for
jurisdiction of the Court and ought to have made payment of
ad valorem court fees stating the relevant provisions briefly for
benefit of the ministerial officer of the Court for to file the
plaint. . This was not done even till plaint was rejected by the
Court and not even till this appellate stage. The plaintiff must
be vigilant to give description of the immovable suit property
with its full description including boundaries thereof as required in Order 7 rule 3 of the civil procedure code, as amended in state of Maharashtra and cannot suppress the market value of the Suit property from the court, as required to be stated for the purposes of valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction of the court as also for payment of the Court fees. The relevant facts which need to be looked into for whether to return or reject the plaint are the deciding averments made in the plaint. The trial Court can exercise the power to reject the plaint at any stage of the suit even before
registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant
or at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of O.7, R. 11, the averments in the plaint are the relevant and not
the defence pleas taken by the defendant in the written
statement. Defence would be wholly irrelevant at the stage of
rejection of the plaint under order 7 Rule 11 (Saleembhai &
Ors. v. AIR 2003 SC 759). Hence no fault is found with the
impugned order rejecting the Plaint as barred by Article 58 of
the Limitation Act as also the plaintiff continued to run the risk
of rejecting of plaint due to wrong valuation for the purposes of
the Court fees and jurisdiction in view of the provisions under
Order 7 rule 11 (d) of the Code of Civil procedure
For all the reasons stated no interference is
required by this Court with the impugned reasoned order. The
(A.P. BHANGALE, J.)

appeal lacks merits and is dismissed with cost

बलात्कार की पीड़िता को डीएनए टेस्ट कराने के लिए मजबूर नहीं किया जा सकता': POCSO मामले में इलाहाबाद हाईकोर्ट ने कहा

इलाहाबाद हाईकोर्ट ने हाल ही में कहा कि बलात्कार की पीड़िता को उसके बच्चे के पितृत्व का निर्धारण करने के लिए डीएनए टेस्ट करवाने के लिए मजबूर नहीं किया जा सकता।अदालत अतिरिक्त सत्र न्यायाधीश, सुल्तानपुर के 25 जून, 2021 के आदेश को चुनौती देने वाली एक पुनरीक्षण याचिका पर सुनवाई कर रही थी, जिसमें इस तरह के डीएनए टेस्ट की अनुमति दी गई थी। न्यायमूर्ति संगीता चंद्रा ने निराशा व्यक्त करते हुए कहा कि संबंधित अतिरिक्त सत्र न्यायाधीश ने 'अपनी एनर्जी या ऊर्जा को गलत दिशा में निर्देशित' किया है क्योंकि उनके समक्ष विचाराधीन प्रश्न यह नहीं था कि क्या पीड़िता को पैदा हुआ बच्चा आरोपी (विपरीत पक्ष नंबर 2 ) का बच्चा है या नहीं बल्कि सवाल यह है कि क्या बलात्कार का अपराध आरोपी ने किया था?

अदालत ने कहा कि, ''यह स्पष्ट है कि अतिरिक्त सत्र न्यायाधीश ने अपनी एनर्जी को गलत दिशा में निर्देशित किया है। न्यायालय के समक्ष प्रश्न यह नहीं था कि क्या पीड़िता को पैदा हुआ बच्चा विपरीत पक्ष नंबर 2 का बच्चा है या नहीं? बच्चे के पितृत्व को निर्धारित करने के संबंध में कोई प्रश्न नहीं था। इस मामले में शामिल सवाल यह है कि क्या विपरीत पक्ष नंबर 2 ने पीड़िता से बलात्कार किया था? पीड़िता के पास अपने बच्चे का डीएनए परीक्षण करवाने का कोई कारण नहीं था।''
आगे यह भी कहा गया कि कथित घटना के इतने लंबे समय के बाद बलात्कार की पीड़िता को डीएनए परीक्षण के लिए मजबूर नहीं किया जा सकता है। पृष्ठभूमि इस मामले में अतिरिक्त सत्र न्यायाधीश सुल्तानपुर के 25 जून 2021 के आदेश के खिलाफ पीड़िता की मां ने पुनरीक्षण(रिवीजन) याचिका दायर की थी। 14 वर्षीय पीड़ित लड़की के साथ सात महीने पहले कथित तौर पर बलात्कार किया गया था, जिसके परिणामस्वरूप वह गर्भवती हो गई। जिसके बाद थाना कोतवाली देहात, जिला सुल्तानपुर में भारतीय दंड संहिता की धारा 376, 504, 506 और यौन अपराधों से बच्चों का संरक्षण अधिनियम, 2012, (पॉक्सो) अधिनियम की धारा 3/4 के तहत मामला दर्ज किया गया था।
बेटी के गर्भवती होने की खबर मिलने पर पीड़िता की मां ने आरोपी से उसकी शादी कराने की कोशिश की थी लेकिन आरोपी के पिता ने इस तरह के प्रस्ताव से इनकार कर दिया। इसके अलावा, मुकदमे की सुनवाई के दौरान, आरोपी को किशोर घोषित कर दिया गया था, जिसके परिणामस्वरूप मामला ट्रायल कोर्ट से किशोर न्याय बोर्ड, सुल्तानपुर में स्थानांतरित कर दिया गया। नतीजतन, आरोपी ने किशोर न्याय बोर्ड के समक्ष पीड़िता का डीएनए परीक्षण कराने के लिए एक आवेदन दिया। 25 मार्च, 2021 को किशोर न्याय बोर्ड ने पूरे तथ्यों और परिस्थितियों और रिकॉर्ड पर उपलब्ध सबूतों पर विचार करने के बाद डीएनए टेस्ट करवाने की मांग वाले आवेदन को खारिज कर दिया।
किशोर न्याय बोर्ड ने अपने आदेश में कहा था कि पीड़िता की जांच के लिए इस तरह का आवेदन केवल उसी चरण में दायर किया जा सकता है जब सीआरपीसी की धारा 313 के तहत बचाव पक्ष के गवाहों के बयान दर्ज किए जा रहे हों। बोर्ड ने आगे यह भी कहा था कि पीड़ित बच्चे को डीएनए टेस्ट के लिए भेजने से मुकदमे में और देरी होगी, जबकि क़ानून के प्रावधानों के तहत मुकदमे की सुनवाई को जल्दी से समाप्त किया जाना चाहिए। इसके बाद, किशोर न्याय बोर्ड के आदेश के खिलाफ, आरोपी ने अतिरिक्त सत्र न्यायाधीश, सुल्तानपुर के समक्ष एक आपराधिक अपील दायर की, जिसने 25 जून, 2021 के आदेश के तहत डीएनए परीक्षण करवाने की मांग वाले आवेदन को अनुमति दे दी। कोर्ट का निष्कर्ष न्यायालय ने पाया कि अतिरिक्त सत्र न्यायाधीश, सुल्तानपुर ने आक्षेपित आदेश पारित करते हुए भारत के संविधान के अनुच्छेद 14--21 के प्रावधानों की अनदेखी की है। आगे यह भी कहा कि पीड़िता का डीएनए टेस्ट करवाने की अनुमति देने का कोई कारण नहीं था क्योंकि विचाराधीन मुद्दा यह है कि क्या बलात्कार का अपराध किया गया था और न कि क्या आरोपी बच्चे का पिता है? पुनरीक्षण याचिका की अनुमति देते हुए कोर्ट ने कहा, ''25.06.2021 के आदेश को खारिज किया जाता है और किशोर बोर्ड के दिनांक 25.03.2021 के आदेश की पुष्टि इस संशोधन के अधीन की जाती है कि सीआरपीसी की धारा 313 के तहत इस तरह के आवेदन के संबंध में बोर्ड के अवलोकन ( कि उसके गुणदोष के आधार पर विचार किया जाएगा) को भी संशोधनवादी (रिविजनिस्ट)के खिलाफ इस तरह नहीं पढ़ा जाएगा कि कथित घटना के इतने लंबे समय के बाद बलात्कार की पीड़िता को डीएनए परीक्षण के लिए मजबूर किया जा सकता है।'' 

 शीर्षक- गुलाफ्सा बेगम बनाम यू.पी. राज्य

Collector has to assess market value of land taking into account sale consideration reflected in exemplar deeds and not on the basis of minimum rates.

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Court No. - 38
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 53843 of 2010
Petitioner :- Pratap Singh
Respondent :- State of U.P. and Others
Counsel for Petitioner :- Rajesh Kumar Mishra
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.

Hon'ble Jayant Banerji,J.
Heard Shri Rajesh Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Awadhesh Chandra Srivastava, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents.
By means of this petition, the petitioner seeks to challenge the order dated 31.12.2009 passed by the Additional District Magistrate (Finance & Revenue), Moradabad in Case No.407/09 under Section 33/40/47 of the Indian Stamp Act, 18991 whereby, by means of an ex-parte order, deficiency of stamp has been imposed upon the petitioner while relying upon the report dated 16.10.2009 of the Assistant Inspector General of Registration. Further under challenge is the order dated 26.05.2010 passed by the Additional Commissioner (Administration), Moradabad Mandal, Moradabad, whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 56 of the Act, being Appeal No.74/2009-10, has been partly allowed by reducing the amount of penalty imposed upon the petitioner.
The facts as mentioned in the petition are that the petitioner purchased an area of 0.002 hectares from Khasra No.869-Ka, an area of 0.130 hectares from Khasra No.948 and an area of 0.255 hectares from Khasra No.950, totalling 0.387 hectares in Village-Bhogpur, Mithauni, Tehsil & District-Moradabad by means of a sale-deed executed on 27.09.2007, which was registered thereafter. It is stated that the aforesaid land was purchased for agricultural purposes and the stamp duty was paid in accordance with the minimum rates specified by the Collector. The name of the petitioner was also mutated in the revenue records. It is alleged that the respondent no.2 passed the impugned order dated 31.12.2009 without issuance of summons or notice to the petitioner, in which it was held that the plots in question are for residential usage and, therefore, deficiency of stamp duty of Rs.1,38,400/- and penalty of Rs.1,38,400/- alongwith interest at the rate of 1.5% per mensem were imposed. It is stated that on coming to know of the ex-parte order passed by the respondent no.2, an appeal was filed by the petitioner before the Additional Commissioner (Administration) which was partly allowed by reducing the amount of penalty imposed, though no error was found in the order of the respondent no.2 in assessing the land in question as residential.
The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that an ex-parte report of the Assistant Inspector General of Registration has been relied upon by the respondent no.2 to record a finding regarding evasion of duty which could not have been relied upon by the authority in view of the judgment of this Court in the matter of Ram Khelawan alias Bachcha v. State of U.P. and another2. It is further contended that the vendors of the sale-deed in question had sold their entire share of the land on the khasra numbers to the petitioner, and the admitted terms of the habendum clause appearing in the sale-deed reflect that the land in question was bhumidhari over which agricultural activities were being carried on. The learned counsel states that the order of the respondent no.2 was passed ex-parte without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It is further contended that the Additional Commissioner (Administration), in the appellate order, has committed an error of law in affirming the order of the respondent no.2 and that neither the penalty nor the deficiency in stamp duty could have been imposed upon the petitioner under the facts and circumstances of the present case.
Learned Standing Counsel has opposed the writ petition stating that the report of the Assistant Inspector General of Registration dated 16.10.2009 has referred to three exemplar sale-deeds pertaining to parts of land of those very Khasra numbers that were sold to other persons in which the purpose for purchase was stated to be residential. The contention is that, accordingly, no fault exists in the order of the respondent no.2 on this ground and, also on the ground that the service of notice on the petitioner was deemed sufficient.
It is noticed, as is admitted, that the impugned order dated 31.12.2009 was ex-parte. It is not the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that any restoration application was filed on behalf of the petitioner in respect of the aforesaid order dated 31.12.2009. The petitioner straightaway proceeded to file the appeal under Section 56 of the Act. The grounds of appeal, that has been enclosed as Annexure-6 to the writ petition, do not contain any ground with regard to the non-receipt of notice. Among the grounds raised is of lack of opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. In view of the aforesaid, the affirmation on behalf of the petitioner that no notice was received by him, is belied. The order of the respondent no.2, Additional District Magistrate, has been passed relying upon the report of the Assistant Inspector General of Registration dated 16.10.2009 in which it was mentioned that portions of lands of those very Khasra numbers, were subject of instrument Nos.4894/05, 601/06 and 2463/07 on which stamp duty on the basis of the residential rates was paid. The respondent no.2 has observed that since neither the petitioner nor his counsel had appeared nor any objection was filed, it would be deemed that he accepts the report and notice. Accordingly, the deficiency in stamp duty and penalty were imposed.
Annexure-5 is the report made by the Assistant Inspector General of Registration dated 16.10.2009. The relevant part of the report dated 16.10.2009 is extracted below:-
"...........
अधोहस्ताक्षरित द्वारा अर्द्धनगरीय एवं उपान्त क्षेत्र के कृषि आधारित मूल्यांकन वाले विक्रय विलेखों के मूल्यांकन जांच के क्रम में उक्त विक्रय विलेख मेरे संज्ञान में आया। अभिलेखों के अवलोकन से खसरा न० 869, 948 व 950 स्थित ग्राम भोगपुर मिठौनी से सम्पत्ति क्रय की गयी तथा आवासीय दर के मूल्यांकन पर स्टाम्प शुल्क अदा किया गया है। उक्त प्रकार के कतिपय विलेखों का विवरण निम्न सारिणी में दिया जा रहा हैः-
क्रमांक
विक्रय विलेख संख्या
निष्पादन तिथि
खसरा न०
अन्तरित क्षेत्रफल (वर्ग मी० में)
दर प्रति वर्ग मी०
मूल्यांकन जिस पर स्टाम्प शुल्क अदा किया गया
अदा किया गया स्टाम्प शुल्क
1.
4894/05
9.11.05
869, 948, 950
140.00
1500
210000
21000
2.
601/06
8.2.06
948
132.47
1500
199000
20000
3.
2463/07
5.4.07
869, 948, 950
245.91
1600
394000
31600

उपरोक्त सारिणी के अवलोकन से स्पष्ट है कि खसरा न० 869, 948, 950 स्थित ग्राम भोगपुर मिठौनी से सम्बन्धित विक्रय विलेख संख्या 4894/05, 601/06 तथा 2463/07 का निबन्धन किया गया तथा निर्धारित आवासीय दर के मूल्यांकन पर स्टाम्प शुल्क अदा किया गया है। एक ही ग्राम एक ही एक ही खसरे की भूमि के दो दर्रो के आधार पर सम्पत्ति के बाजार मूल्य का निर्धारण किया जाना तर्क संगत एवं विधि सम्मत् नही है कि सारिणी में उल्लिखित विलेख विवादित विलेख संख्या 5733/07 के द्वारा अन्तरित सम्पत्ति के मूल्यांकन हेतु उपयुक्त एवं तर्क संगत पूर्व दृष्टांत / दृष्टांत स्टजित करते है। ....."
As is evident from the report, as extracted above, that three specific exemplar deeds have been relied upon by the Assistant Inspector General of Registration to reflect the residential usage over the land in question.
In the decision of Ram Khelawan (supra), a coordinate Bench of this Court had made an observation that no reliance can be placed on an ex-parte report for deciding the case. It was observed that the ex-parte inspection report may be relevant for initiating the proceedings under Section 47-A of the Act and after initiation of the case, inspection is to be made by the Collector or the authority hearing the case after due notice to the parties to the instrument as provided under Rule 7(3)(c) of the U.P. Stamp (Valuation of Property) Rules, 1997.
Though this Court is in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations made by this Court in the case of Ram Khelawan (supra), however, in the present case at hand, the ex-parte report specifically refers to three exemplar instruments that were considered by the Assistant Inspector General of Registration while making his report. It was, therefore, open for the District Magistrate, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, where despite notice, neither any objection was filed on behalf of the petitioner nor had any advocate appeared on his behalf, to rely upon the ex-parte report which was based upon the exemplar deeds. It is always open to the Collector or the authority undertaking an examination of an instrument under Section 47-A(3) of the Act, to refer to exemplar deeds for the purpose of ascertaining the market value even though they may form part of an ex-parte report that has led to the initiation of the proceedings under Section 47-A(3) of the Act. Therefore, no fault can be attributable to the respondent no.2 in relying upon the three exemplar deeds that find mention in the ex-parte report dated 16.10.2009. In view of the above, the order of the Additional Commissioner, upholding the order of the respondent no.2, cannot faulted as far as this aspect is concerned.
However, the matter of concern in the present petition is that despite relying upon the aforesaid exemplar deeds, the respondent no.2 has proceeded to assess the value of the land in question on the basis of the minimum rates prescribed by the Collector. This could not have been done in view of the express provisions of Section 47-A(3) of the Act that is also relied in the judgment of this Court in Ram Khelawan (supra) and several other decisions. In the decision of a three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Pushpa Sareen vs. State of U.P.3, it has been held as follows:-
"26. The true test for determination by the Collector is the market value of the property on the date of the instrument because, under the provisions of the Act, every instrument is required to be stamped before or at the time of execution. In making that determination, the Collector has to be mindful of the fact that the market value of the property may vary from location to location and is dependent upon a large number of circumstances having a bearing on the comparative advantages or disadvantages of the land as well as the use to which the land can be put on the date of the execution of the instrument.
27. Undoubtedly, the Collector is not permitted to launch upon a speculative inquiry about the prospective use to which a land may be put to use at an uncertain future date. The market value of the property has to be determined with reference to the use to which the land is capable reasonably of being put to immediately or in the proximate future. The possibility of the land becoming available in the immediate or near future for better use and enjoyment reflects upon the potentiality of the land. This potential has to be assessed with reference to the date of the execution of the instrument. In other words, the power of the Collector cannot be unduly circumscribed by ruling out the potential to which the land can be advantageously deployed at the time of the execution of the instrument or a period reasonably proximate thereto. Again the use to which land in the area had been put is a material consideration. If the land surrounding the property in question has been put to commercial use, it would be improper to hold that this is a circumstance which should not weigh with the Collector as a factor which influences the market value of the land.
28. The fact that the land was put to a particular use, say for instance a commercial purpose at a later point in time, may not be a relevant criterion for deciding the value for the purpose of stamp duty, as held by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. and others v. Ambrish Tandon and another, (2012) 5 SCC 566. This is because the nature of the user is relateable to the date of purchase which is relevant for the purpose of computing the stamp duty. Where, however, the potential of the land can be assessed on the date of the execution of the instrument itself, that is clearly a circumstance which is relevant and germane to the determination of the true market value. At the same time, the exercise before the Collector has to be based on adequate material and cannot be a matter of hypothesis or surmise. The Collector must have material on the record to the effect that there has been a change of use or other contemporaneous sale-deeds in respect of the adjacent areas that would have a bearing on the market value of the property which is under consideration. The Collector, therefore, would be within jurisdiction in referring to exemplars or comparable sale instances which have a bearing on the true market value of the property which is required to be assessed. If the sale instances are comparable, they would also reflect the potentiality of the land which would be taken into consideration in a price agreed upon between a vendor and a purchaser."
Accordingly, the impugned order of the respondent no.2 dated 31.12.2009, insofar as it assesses the valuation of the land in question on the basis of the minimum rates, is set aside. The order of the Additional Commissioner (Administration) dated 26.05.2010 is also set aside insofar as it affirms the order of the respondent no.2 assessing the market value on the basis of the minimum rates. The matter is remitted to the respondent no.2 or the competent authority who may be seized of the matter, to assess the market value taking into account the monetary consideration reflected in the exemplar deeds aforesaid or any other exemplar deeds, and not on the basis of the minimum rates. This exercise shall be done by the authority concerned within a period of three months from today. Since the petitioner is represented, no separate notice is required to be sent to him. It is, however, provided that the petitioner shall appear before the respondent no.2 on 22.12.2021 alongwith a certified copy of the order passed today, whereafter dates may be fixed. In case of failure of the petitioner in appearing on that day, it will be open to the authority concerned to proceed in accordance with law.
In view of the aforesaid observations and to the extent mentioned above, this writ petition is allowed.
Order Date :-07.12.2021